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My thesis consists of three chapters on information economics and financial economics.
Chapter 1:
Many decentralized over-the-counter (OTC) markets have recently become subject to
new regulations requiring transparency. I build up an information model that features
bilateral trade in a double auction, endogenous public signal, and inter-dealer network
formation to study the effect of TRACE on the inter-dealer markets. In the trading stage,
I study the private information diffusion process and endogenize the public information
contained in the disseminated trading price. I show that in markets with a relatively
low degree of information asymmetry, post-trade transparency makes the adverse selec-
tion more severe and reduces the surplus from asset reallocation between dealers, and
thus hurts the inter-dealer network formation. Investors are more likely to be symmetri-
cally uninformed about thinly traded bonds. The empirical results provide evidence that
TRACE has a significant negative effect on the inter-dealer trading frequency for thinly
traded bonds.
Chapter 2 (with Kim-Sau Chung):
During currency crises, large traders once simultaneously short the asset markets and
currency market. We study the large trader’s information manipulation in crises by intro-
ducing a large trader in an asset market and a currency-attack coordination game with
imperfect information. The asset price realized in the asset market aggregates dispersed
private information acting as a public signal in the currency attack game. We show
that the incentive of the large trader to manipulate the asset price in favor of its cur-
rency attack leads to financial contagion. In equilibrium, the large trader’s manipulating
ii
the asset price to be lower and attacking the currency regime are concurrent; the large
trader’s manipulation in the asset market is most significant when the public signal is in
the intermediate range. To draw policy implication regarding the market transparency,
we show that when the asset market is transparent, a natural equilibrium refinement that
incorporates forward induction reasoning would select the equilibrium where every trader
behaves most aggressively in the currency-attack game and the currency regime is most
fragile.
Chapter 3 (with Yinqiu Lu):
The way central banks manage their foreign reserve assets has evolved over the past
decades. One major trend is managing reserves in two or more tranches – liquidity tranche
and investment tranche – especially for those with adequate reserves. Incorporating re-
serve tranching, we have developed in this paper a central bank’s reserve portfolio choice
model to analyze the determinants of the currency composition of reserves. In particu-
lar, we adopt the classical mean-variance framework for the investment tranche and the
asset-liability framework for the liquidity tranche. Building on these frameworks, the
roles of currency compositions in imports invoicing and short-term external debt, and
risk and returns of reserve currencies can be quantified by our structural model – a key
contribution of our paper given the absence of structural models in the literature. Finally,
we estimate the potential paths of the share of RMB in reserves under different scenarios
to shed light on its status as an international currency.
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CHAPTER 1
Information Sharing Policy and Inter-dealer OTC
Markets
1.1 Introduction
Many regulations aim at enhancing information sharing in financial markets. In 2002,
FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) began requiring the timely public
dissemination of post-trade price and volume information for the U.S. corporate bond
market through TRACE (FINRA’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine). TRACE
has become the template for increased transparency in other over-the-counter financial
markets. FINRA expanded TRACE to several other asset classes, including Agency-
Backed Securities, since 2010, and Asset-Backed Securities, since 2011. Title VII of
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform has required that swaps (including CDS, interest rate
swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and other derivatives) adopt TRACE-like post-
trade transparency since 2011. European MiFID II/R regulations mimic TRACE for
European corporate bonds and were implemented in 2018.
[ACP13] also examine the effect of TRACE on thinly traded, high-yield bonds. They
find after transparency, while trading costs declined significantly for the entire bond
market, there was a significant decline in the number of trades for thinly traded bonds.
Many of the securities markets that are newly subject to transparency are thinly traded.
Their empirical results support the view that not every segment of a security market
should be subject to the same degree of mandated transparency.
This suggests that theoretical models are needed to study the non-uniform effects of
transparency policy on the different segments of OTC markets. In this paper, I build up
a model that features bilateral trade in a double auction between dealers, endogenous
public signal, and inter-dealer network formation. My model shows that in markets with
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a relatively low degree of information asymmetry, post-trade transparency makes the
adverse selection more severe and reduces the surplus from asset reallocation between
dealers. In those markets, TRACE hurts the network formation and lowers inter-dealer
trading frequency.
In the trading stage, I study a line trading network of risk-neutral dealers. For the
sake of tractability, I assume the first dealer in the line network has private information
about the asset payoff. The dealers have their own private values that are their private
information. The trade sequentially takes place between the first dealer and the second
dealer, then between the second dealer and the third dealer, etc. Each dealer chooses its
demand functions for the transactions, to maximize its expected profits, given its private
value and its information about the asset payoff, and they take their price impacts into
consideration. I characterize the linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium and show that in
equilibrium, the information asymmetry between two consecutive dealers before their
trade decides how aggressively they trade on their private values, and thus decides the
private information diffusion process and the surplus of asset reallocation between them.
To study the effect of TRACE on the inter-dealer markets, I introduce the public
signal to the model. For simplicity, I consider the release of just one public signal. I
study two different information structures of the public signal. I first show the effect of
transparency on dealers’ trading surplus when the public signal is exogenous. Then I
show the effect of transparency on dealers’ trading surplus after endogenizing the public
signal as the disseminated price of TRACE. Contrast to traditional wisdom, my model
shows that the disseminated trading price as the public signal is not desirable for some
markets. The key difference between the endogenous and the exogenous public signal is
that the endogenous public signal is both about asset payoff and about previous dealers’
private values. The information about private values can allow the more informed dealer
to filter the signal more effectively.
In the network formation stage, I study a network formation model to endogenize
the inter-dealer network structure. The network formation stage is before the trading
stage; thus, dealers trading surplus in the trading stage affects their network formation
decision. In the network formation model, the dealer with private information about the
asset payoff bargains with the second dealer over how to split the link formation cost;
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the second dealer who forms the link bargains with the third dealer over how to split the
link formation cost, etc. In equilibrium, the surplus of each formed link would spread
over all the dealers before this link and affect their network formation decision. Thus
the effect of TRACE on downstream dealers’ trading profit would affect the upstream
dealers’ link formation decision. The lower trading profits of downstream dealers could
hurt the the formation of the whole network. This model implies that in markets with
low information asymmetry, TRACE hurts the network formation and thus lowers inter-
dealer trading frequency. The network formation game also implies that TRACE could
reduce the trading frequency of the upstream dealers as well, because they benefit less
from the downstream dealers’ trading profits if they form the link to initiate the trade.
On the empirical side, I study the effect of TRACE on corporate bond inter-dealer
markets, by utilizing the Academic Corporate Bond TRACE data and the Mergent FISD
database. The argument is that if a bond is very actively traded, then although investors
are more likely to know more about them, they are also more likely to be asymmetri-
cally informed; vice versa, if a bond is thinly traded, then investors are more likely to
be symmetrically uninformed. So the model predicts that TRACE would have negative
effects on inter-dealer trading activity for thinly traded bonds. The empirical findings
in this paper show that TRACE has significant negative effect on the inter-dealer trad-
ing frequency only for thinly traded bonds. To be more specific, DID estimates show
that TRACE has a non-negative or positive effect on the inter-dealer trading frequency
of actively traded bonds, Phase 2 bonds, and Phase 3B bonds. In contrast, TRACE
significantly lowers the inter-dealer trading frequency of Phase 3B bonds, which are the
most thinly traded corporate bonds. It is a warning for the widespread implementation
of TRACE, as many of the assets that are newly subject to transparency are similar to
Phase 3B bonds as they are also thinly traded.
Related Literature
This paper follows the double auction literature when modeling the trading game, e.g.
[Kyl89] and [MR17]. My work adds to the growing literature on network studies in finan-
cial markets. The application of network theory to financial markets has only just begun.
[BEK09] and [GK07] study how a network intermediates trades in a decentralized market.
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[Gof11] assesses the efficiency of resource allocation through the trading network in an
OTC market. [MR17] develop a general framework for studying dealers’ strategic inter-
actions in decentralized markets. Many past studies also focus on information acquisition
from a network and its impact on financial markets. [HY13] extend the rational expecta-
tion equilibrium model to study the information network in a financial market. [BK18]
and [BKW19] study information transmission through inter-dealer networks in the OTC
markets by extending the model in [Viv11] to games in networks. In addition to using
network models to study OTC markets, others apply network models to the interbank
market to analyze contagion risk in the banking system, e.g. [Bab16] and [EGJ14].
Most models of OTC markets are based on search and bargaining. [DGP05] and
[DGP07] study how search and bargaining determine prices in the OTC markets. [AEW15]
study how market entry costs help determine the structure of OTC trading, and thereby
prices charged in OTC trading.
There is a branch of theoretical work on the impact of transparency on trading behav-
ior in financial markets. [PR96] argue that well-informed dealers may be able to extract
rents from less well-informed customers in an opaque market. [BO99] show that trans-
parency can reduce market-makers incentives to supply liquidity, if market makers have
more difficulty unwinding inventory following large traders. [NNV99] show that trans-
parency can improve dealers’ ability to share risks, which decreases their inventory costs
and therefore customers’ costs of trading. [Mad95] demonstrates hat dealers may prefer
not to disclose trades because they benefit from the reduction in information. Some of
this work highlights the downside of more transparency, but none of it studies the impact
of transparency on network formation in the OTC market. My paper fills this gap in the
literature.
The effect of TRACE on the US corporate bond market has been studied in some
empirical work. [BMV06], focusing on Phase 1 only, which covered investment grade
and large issue bonds, document a reduction in trade execution costs, estimated using a
structural model. [EHP07] and [GHS07a], both using investment grade bonds in Phase
2 TRACE data, report no effect on the trading activity and a decline in transaction
costs. [ACP13] find that even though trading costs decrease significantly across all types
of bonds, transparency effects are not uniform across different segments of the bond
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market; after transparency, there is a significant decline in the number of trades for
Phase 3B bonds, which are far more likely to be lower rated high yield bonds, while
transparency has a limited impact on the trading activity of investment grade bonds and
the most frequently-traded bonds. [BM08] survey dealers and report that bond dealers
almost universally perceive that trading became more difficult after TRACE.
There is a set of studies on municipal bonds. On January 31, 2005, the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) started requiring that information about trades
in municipal bonds be reported within 15 minutes, similar to TRACE. Prior to that
dissemination, [GHS07b] find significant price dispersion in new issues of municipal bonds,
which they attribute to the decentralized and opaque market design. [Sch12] compares
price dispersion at the offering date for municipal bonds before and after this change
and finds that it falls sharply. [BLS17] show that the MSRB transparency rule reduced
trading volume in uninsured bonds, but not in insured bonds.
Some papers study another kind of information sharing, that is, dealers’ sharing of
clients’ bid information. [DFK19] document that equity dealers share clients’ bid infor-
mation with other clients. [BLV16] use a quantitative model to study the effect of dealers’
information sharing of clients’ order order flow information in a centralized market.
Some empirical papers study the effect of public information on information asymme-
try. [KV94] and [KV97] suggest that public information releases may actually increase
information asymmetry if market participants differ in their ability to interpret the news.
Findings in [Gre04] indicate that the release of public information raises the level of infor-
mation asymmetry in the government bond market. The results indicate that information
asymmetry in the government bond market arises not from the absence of relevant public
information, but rather the ability of market participants to interpret the information.
My work also contributes to the literature that studies endogenous network structure.
There are other models that study the network formation in financial markets for different
markets or from different perspectives, see [Bab16], [Zho14], and [CZ18].
The paper is organized as follows. The following section introduces the model setup
of trading in the inter-dealer markets and the equilibrium concept of the trading game.
In Section 1.3, I derive the Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the trading game in
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opaque markets and show the information asymmetry decides dealers’ surplus from asset
reallocation. In Section 1.4, I introduce the public signal to the model; I study two differ-
ent information structures of the public signal and show that the TRACE transparency
would increase the degree of information asymmetry and lower dealers’ trading surplus in
markets with a relatively low degree of information asymmetry. In Section 1.5, I propose
a network formation model to study the effect of TRACE on the inter-dealer network
structure. In Section 1.6, I do empirical analysis to study the effect of TRACE post-trade
transparency on inter-dealer trading activity in different markets. In Section 1.7, I study
variants of the baseline model and show that the results of the baseline model are robust.
Finally, I conclude. Proofs and data cleaning procedures are in the Appendix 4.1.
1.2 A Model of Trading in the Inter-dealer Markets
In this section I first describe the agents and the trading game they play, then I define
the equilibrium of the trading game.
1.2.1 The Model Setup
1.2.1.1 Information Structure
We consider an economy with n risk-neutral dealers that trade bilaterally a divisible risky
asset. The asset is in zero net supply.
Dealer i’s value of the asset is
θi = θ + ηi,
where θ ∼ N (0, σ2θ), ηi i.i.d∼ N (0, σ2η), θ ⊥ ηi. This implies that θ is normally distributed
with a mean normalized to zero and a variance σ2θ , and ηi are drawn independently across
dealers and from θ.
Each dealer i knows its own ηi, but does not know θ. Dealer 1 receives the private
signal about θ,
s1 = θ + ε,
where ε ∼ N (0, σ2ε), θ ⊥ ε, ηi ⊥ ε.
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In this model without public signal, other dealers do not receive any exogenous infor-
mation. I define opaque markets to be the markets without public signal. I will introduce
the public signal to the model in Section 1.4.
1.2.1.2 Dealer’s Action and Payoff
Let pi−1,i or pi,i−1 denote the price at which trade takes place over link (i− 1, i).
Suppose the network has one dealer, then there is no trade between dealers. Suppose
the network has n dealers, then the trade takes place sequentially between dealer 1 and
dealer 2, then between dealer 2 and dealer 3,...,between dealer n− 1 and dealer n.
Dealer 1 Dealer 2 Dealer 3 Dealer 4
Figure 1.1: The Inter-dealer Network with n = 4
I assume there is demand from clients. The aggregate demand of clients on each link
(i, i+1) is βpi,i+1, where β < 0. Clients’ linear demand is micro-founded in the Appendix
4.1.2.1
The demand function of dealer 1 is
Q11,2(η1, s1, p1,2),
where Q11,2 maps η1, s1, and p1,2 into the quantity it wishes to trade on the link (1,2).
The demand functions of dealer i ∈ {2, .., n− 1} are
(
Qii−1,i(ηi, pi−1,i), Q
i
i,i+1(ηi, pi−1,i, pi,i+1)
)
,
where Qii−1,i maps ηi, pi−1,i into the quantity it wishes to trade on the link (i− 1, i); and
Qii,i+1 maps ηi, pi−1,i and pi,i+1 into the quantity it wishes to trade on the link (i, i+ 1).
1I assume the clients are non-atomic and risk-neutral. They incur quadratic flow cost when trading.
The quadratic flow cost is used in the models of [RW12] and [DZ17]. The fixed β for all the links is based
on the assumption that clients only trade for liquidity needs. In Section 1.7.3, I relax this assumption
and clients also trade for the asset payoff, and I show that the qualitative results in the baseline model
still hold and the effect of transparency on dealers’ trading surplus is amplified due to the effect of
information asymmetry on clients’ trading intensity.
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The demand function of dealer n is
Qnn−1,n(ηn, pn−1,n),
where Qnn−1,n maps ηn, pn−1,n into the quantity it wishes to trade on the link (n− 1, n).
OTC trading protocols do not typically involve the submission of full demand sched-
ules. But as mentioned in [BK18], generalized demand functions capture the repeated
exchange of limit and market orders (i.e., the offer and acceptance of quotes) within
a short time interval across fixed counterparties as a reduced-form price determination
mechanism. 2
The expected payoff of dealer 1 is
E(pi11,2) = E
[
Q11,2(η1, s1, p1,2)(θ1 − p1,2)
]
.
The expected payoff of dealer i ∈ {2, .., n− 1}is
E(pii) = E(piii−1,i) + E(piii,i+1),
where
E(piii−1,i) = E[Qii−1,i(ηi, pi−1,i)(θi − pi−1,i)],
E(piii,i+1) = E[Qii,i+1(ηi, pi−1,i, pi,i+1)(θi − pi,i+1)].
The expected payoff of dealer n is
E(pinn−1,n) = E
[
Qnn−1,n(ηn, pn−1,n)(θn − pn−1,n)
]
.
1.2.2 Equilibrium Concept
I consider linear equilibria of the game, defined as follows.
Definition 1. A Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the trading game is a vector of
dealers’ linear demand functions{
Q11,2(.),
(
Q21,2(.), Q
2
2,3(.)
)
, ...,
(
Qn−1n−2,n−1(.), Q
n−1
n−1,n(.)
)
, Qnn−1,n(.)
}
,
2In Section 1.7.2, I explicitly model the price-discovery process. The price discovery game shows that
the equilibrium prices and quantities of my baseline model can be found via an iterative, decentralized
process.
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such that
(1) Q11,2(η1, s1, p1,2) solves the problem
max
Q11,2
E
[
Q11,2(θ1 − p1,2)|η1, s1
]
,
(2)
(
Qii−1,i(ηi, pi−1,i), Q
i
i,i+1(ηi, pi−1,i, pi,i+1)
)
for i ∈ {2, .., n− 1} solves the problem
max
(Qii−1,i,Q
i
i,i+1)
E[Qii−1,i(θi − pi−1,i)|ηi] + E[Qii,i+1(θi − pi,i+1)|ηi, pi−1,i],
(3) Qnn−1,n(ηn, pn−1,n) solves the problem
max
Qnn−1,n
E
[
Qnn−1,n(θn − pn−1,n)|ηn
]
,
(4) p1,2, pi,i+1 for i ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} clear the market,
Q11,2(η1, s1, p1,2) +Q
2
1,2(η2, p1,2) + βp1,2 = 0,
Qii,i+1(ηi, pi−1,i, pi,i+1)) +Q
i+1
i,i+1(ηi+1, pi,i+1) + βpi,i+1 = 0.
Each dealer chooses its demand functions for the transactions, to maximize its ex-
pected profits, given its private value (for dealer 1, also given its private information) and
given the demand functions chosen by its counter-parties. For each transaction, given
both dealers’ demand functions, the equilibrium price clears the market. Implicit in the
definition of the equilibrium is that each dealer understands that she has a price impact
when trading with the counterparties.
1.3 Equilibrium of the Trading Game
In this section, I derive the equilibrium of the trading game in opaque markets. I show
the information asymmetry between dealers decide how aggressively they trade on their
private values in equilibrium, and thus decide the surplus from asset reallocation between
them.
The following proposition characterizes the trading behavior of dealer 1 and dealer 2,
and the price function on the link (1, 2).
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Proposition 1. In the Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the trading game between
dealer 1 and 2, dealer 1’s demand function is
Q11,2 = a
1
1,2s1 + b
1
1,2p1,2 + c
1
1,2η1.
Dealer 2’s demand function on link (1,2) is
Q21,2 = b
2
1,2p1,2 + c
2
1,2η2.
Define
κ1 ≡
σ2η
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|s1) = (1 +
σ2ε
σ2θ
)
σ2η
σ2θ
:= (1 + γ)ϕ,
which is the inverse of information asymmetry between dealer 1 and 2 scaled by σ2η. The
degree of the interdependence between dealers’ values is captured by ϕ ≡ σ2η
σ2θ
. The inverse
of dealer 1’s information precision is captured by γ ≡ σ2ε
σ2θ
.
a11,2, b
1
1,2, b
2
1,2, c
1
1,2, c
2
1,2 have closed-form solution
b11,2 = b
2
1,2 + β = βκ1,
c11,2 = c
2
1,2 = −βκ1,
c11,2
a11,2
=
κ1
ϕ
.
The price function is
p1,2 =
ϕ
2κ1
s1 +
η1 + η2
2
.
In order to solve for the equilibrium of the trading game between dealer 2 and 3, we
first analyze the information dealer 2 gets from trading with dealer 1. For dealer 2, the
market clearing condition for link (1,2) implies
Q21,2 + a
1
1,2s1 + b
1
1,2p1,2 + c
1
1,2η1 + βp1,2 = 0,
thus
p1,2 = −
a11,2s1 + c
1
1,2η1
b11,2 + β
− Q
2
1,2
b11,2 + β
:= I2 + λ
2
1,2Q
2
1,2
Dealer 2 knows his or her own demand, so dealer 2 can infer the intercept I2. Thus,
dealer 2 can learn the private signal s2,
s2 ≡ s1 +
c11,2
a11,2
η1 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1.
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Similarly, I define si (i ∈ {2, ..., n− 1}) to be the signal dealer i learns from price pi−1,i.
Following the same equilibrium characterization procedure of Proposition 1, the trading
game between dealer 2 and 3, ..., dealer n − 1 and n can be solved, as shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. In the Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the trading game between dealer
i and i+ 1 (i ∈ {2, 3, ..., n− 1}), dealer i’s demand function can be expressed as
Qii,i+1 = a
i
i,i+1si + b
i
i,i+1pi,i+1 + c
i
i,i+1ηi,i+1,
where
si =
2κi−1pi−1,i − κi−1ηi
ϕ
.
Dealer i+ 1’s demand function on link (i, i+ 1) is
Qi+1i,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1pi,i+1 + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1.
Define
κi ≡
σ2η
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|si) ,
which is the inverse of information asymmetry between dealer i and i + 1 scaled by σ2η.
aii,i+1, b
i
i,i+1, b
i+1
i,i+1, c
i
i,i+1, c
i+1
i,i+1 have closed-form solution
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + β = βκi,
cii,i+1 = c
i+1
i,i+1 = −βκi,
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
=
κi
ϕ
.
The price function is
pi,i+1 =
ϕ
2κi
si +
ηi + ηi+1
2
.
In Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, from cii,i+1 = c
i+1
i,i+1 = −βκi, we can see in equilibrium
how aggressively dealers trade on their private values is decided by the inverse of infor-
mation asymmetry between two consecutive dealers on each link scaled by the variance
of private values,
σ2η
V ar(θ)−V ar(θ|si) ; it is also decided by clients’ trading intensity. This will
create important implications for dealers’ trading surplus, which will be shown later.
The following lemma generalizes the private information diffusion process over links.
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Lemma 2. In equilibrium, dealer i+ 1 learns si from trading with dealer i,
si+1 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ2
ϕ
η2 + ...+
κi
ϕ
ηi.
Define
κi+1 ≡
σ2η
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|si+1) = κi + κ
2
i .
From Lemma 2, we can see the information diffusion process is governed by the initial
information asymmetry between dealer 1 and 2. If the degree of informational asymmetry
between dealer 1 and 2 is lower, then the degree of information asymmetry between all
the subsequent consecutive dealers will become lower before their trade. This is because
a lower degree of information asymmetry between dealer 1 and 2 will make a dealer trade
relatively more aggressively on private value than private signal, reflected by the ratio
c1
a1
= κ1
ϕ
. Thus dealer 2 learns less from the price between dealer 1 and 2 and the degree
of information asymmetry between dealer 2 and 3 is lower as well, which makes dealer 2
trade relatively more aggressively on private value than the signal learned from trading
with dealer 1, and so on.
Now I characterize dealers’ trading profit using the result from Proposition 1 and
Lemma 1. Dealers’ profit from each link can be decomposed into two components: the
surplus from asset reallocation between dealers and the profits from serving clients. Con-
sidering dealer i+ 1 demands Qi+1i,i+1 units of the asset, clients demand βpi,i+1 units of the
asset, dealer i supplies Qi+1i,i+1 + βpi,i+1 units of the asset. The trading profit of dealer i
and i+ 1 is
E[(Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] + E[βpi,i+1(pi,i+1 − θ − ηi)],
where the first component is the surplus from the asset reallocation between dealers, and
the second component is the rent dealer i extracts from serving the clients.
The following lemma shows dealers’ profit on each link.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, the ex-ante trading profit of dealer i and i+1 from link (i, i+1)
is
E(piii,i+1) + E(pii+1i,i+1) = −βσ2ηκi +
−β
4
σ2η
κi
,
where −βσ2ηκi is the surplus from asset reallocation between dealer i and i + 1, −β4
σ2η
κi
is
dealer i’s profit from serving clients.
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Lemma 3 shows less severe adverse selection increases the surplus from asset real-
location between dealers. This is because the lower degree of information asymmetry
will make dealers trade more aggressively on their private values, and thus increase the
trading surplus from asset reallocation between them.
To link my theory to more observable characteristics of the inter-dealer markets
documented in the empirical literature, I define the inter-dealer trading cost of dealer
i ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} to be |pi,i+1− pi−1,i|. This definition of trading cost is similar to that in
[LS19], which measures trading costs for investors by inter-dealer markups.
Lemma 4. For i ∈ {2, ..., n− 1},
V ar(pi,i+1 − pi−1,i) =
σ2η
4
κi−1
κi−1 + 1
+
1
4
σ2η,
thus
(1) Inter-dealer trading cost E(|pi,i+1 − pi−1,i|) =
√
2
pi
√
V ar(pi,i+1 − pi−1,i) is increas-
ing in i.
(2) The average inter-dealer trading cost
∑
i∈{2,...,n−1} E(|pi,i+1−pi−1,i|)
n−2 is increasing in n.
Lemma 4 shows that the inter-dealer trading cost is increasing over links; thus, the
average inter-dealer trading cost of the whole chain is increasing in number of dealers
in the chain. This result is consistent with the empirical finding in [LS19] that average
markups increase monotonically with the number of dealers intermediating the chain, and
the evidence in [Sch12] on newly issued bonds, from 1.9% on average when one dealer is
involved to 3.7% with seven dealers involved.
1.4 Exogenous and Endogenous Public Signal
In this Section, I first introduce the public signal to the trading game, and derive the
equilibrium of the trading game. Using the equilibrium solution, I study in both cases how
the information diffuses and how it affects dealers’ trading surplus from asset reallocation
between them. Then I study two different information structures of the public signal and
highlight the different implications in these two scenarios.
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1.4.1 Introduction of a Public Signal
For simplicity, I consider the release of just one public signal S. To allow delays in the
information release, as is done in practice, I consider that the signal is made available to
all traders after the trade between dealer np − 1 and np is done.
S = θ + εS,
where εS ∼ N (0, σ2p), θ ⊥ εS, εS ⊥ ηnp , ηnp+1, ..., ηn. This implies that εS is normally
distributed with a variance σS and is independent from θ. I assume the noisy term in the
public signal is orthogonal to the private values of dealer np, np+1, ..., n. We consider the
natural case that these dealers’ private values do not affect the generation of the public
signal.
With the existence of the public signal S, for dealer i ∈ {np, ..., n}, their demand
depends on this public signal. The demand functions of i ∈ {np, .., n− 1} are(
Qii−1,i(ηi, pi−1,i, S), Q
i
i,i+1(ηi, pi−1,i, pi,i+1, S)
)
.
The demand function of dealer n is
Qnn−1,n(ηn, pn−1,n, S).
Let sˆi denote the private signal dealer i learns from trading with dealer i − 1. From
Lemma 2, we have the result that for i ∈ {2, ..., np},
sˆi = si = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ2
ϕ
η2 + ...+
κi−1
ϕ
ηi−1,
as their trade takes place before the dissemination of the public signal, and the information
diffusion until dealer np is not affected. By contrast, for dealer i ∈ {np + 1, ..., n − 1},
sˆi 6= si as the public signal changes the information diffusion process since the trade
between dealer np and np + 1.
The following proposition characterizes the trading behavior of dealer i and i+ 1 for
i ∈ {np, np + 1, ..., n− 1}, and the price function on the link (i, i+ 1).
Proposition 2. In the Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the trading game between
dealer i and i+ 1 (i ∈ {np, np + 1, ..., n− 1}), dealer i’s demand is
Qii,i+1 = a
i
i,i+1sˆi + b
i
i,i+1pi,i+1 + c
i
i,i+1ηi + d
i
i,i+1S,
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dealer i+ 1’s demand is
Qi+1i,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1pi,i+1 + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1S.
Define
κˆi ≡
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) ,
which is the inverse of information asymmetry between dealer i and i + 1 scaled by σ2η.
The coefficients have closed-form solution
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + β = βκˆi, c
i
i,i+1 = c
i+1
i,i+1 = −βκˆi,
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
=
κˆi
ϕ
(1− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(S)
).
The price function is
pi,i+1 = −
aii,i+1
2κˆiβ
sˆi −
dii,i+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1
2κˆiβ
S +
ηi + ηi+1
2
.
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium of the trading game with a public signal is
very similar to the equilibrium without, but with the following two differences. First,
dealers’ demands and the price function in equilibrium depend on the public signal.
Second, the public signal affects the information asymmetry between dealers. Third, the
private information diffusion process is not only decided by the information asymmetry
κˆi, but also by a new term
Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
.
For dealer np and np + 1, their information asymmetry in the game with public
signal, V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|snp , S), is different from that in the game without public signal,
V ar(θ) − V ar(θ|snp), as both of them learn from the public signal. Dealer np could
learn a greater or smaller extent from S, V ar(θ|snp)− V ar(θ|snp , S), than dealer np + 1,
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|S).
For dealer i and i+1 (i ∈ {np+1, ..., n−1}), their information asymmetry in the game
with public signal, V ar(θ|S) − V ar(θ|sˆi, S), is different from that in the game without
public signal, V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|sˆi), as both of them learn from the public signal, and also
the private signals learned by dealer i, sˆi and si, are different in these two cases. Dealer
i could learn a greater or smaller extent, V ar(θ|si) − V ar(θ|sˆi, S), than dealer i + 1,
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|S).
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The following lemma shows the information diffusion process after the release of the
public information.
Lemma 5. In equilibrium, dealer i+ 1 learns sˆi from trading with dealer i (i ∈ {np, np +
1, ..., n− 1}),
si+1 = snp +
κˆnp
ϕ
(1− Cov(sˆnp , S)
V ar(S)
)ηnp + ...+
κˆi
ϕ
(1− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(S)
)ηi,
κˆi+1 = κˆi + κˆ
2
i .
Using Lemma 2 and Lemma 5, we immediately have the following corollary that
characterizes the necessary and sufficient condition for the effect of the public signal on
the information asymmetry between dealer i and i+ 1 (i ∈ {np, np + 1, ..., n− 1}).
Corollary 1. Comparing the effect of the public signal on the information asymmetry
between dealer i and i+ 1 for i ∈ {np + 1, ..., n− 1},
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) > V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|si)
iff V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|snp , S) > V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|snp).
If and only if the degree of information asymmetry between dealer np and np + 1 becomes
higher due to the existence of the public signal, then for any dealer i ∈ {np + 1, ..., n− 1},
the degree of information asymmetry between dealer i and i+ 1 becomes higher.
Corollary 1 shows that, to determine whether the introduction of a public signal
mitigates or worsens adverse selection, it is sufficient to focus on the link immediately
following the information release.
Now using the results in Proposition 2, I characterize dealers’ surplus from the asset
reallocation, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. In equilibrium, the surplus from asset reallocation between dealer i and i+ 1
(i ∈ {np, np + 1, ..., n− 1}) is
E[(Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] = −βσ2ηκˆi =
−βσ4η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) .
16
Compared with its counterpart in the game without public signal
E[(Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] =
−βσ4η
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|si) ,
we can see whether the existence of a public signal would increase or reduce the surplus
from asset reallocation between dealers depends on whether the degree of information
asymmetry between dealers becomes higher or lower. Equivalently, it depends on whether
or not dealer np can learn more from the public signal than dealer np + 1.
Now I study two different information structures of the public signal. I first show the
effect of transparency on dealers’ trading surplus when the public signal is exogenous.
Then I show the effect of transparency on dealers’ trading surplus after endogenizing the
public signal as the disseminated price of TRACE. I highlight the different implications
in these two scenarios.
1.4.2 Exogenous Public Signal
I assume the public signal is exogenous, in the sense that the noisy term in S is indepen-
dent from the noisy term in snp ,
εS ⊥ (ε+ κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ2
ϕ
η2 + ...+
κnp−1
ϕ
ηnp−1).
It can be shown that dealer np + 1 will learn more from the exogenous public signal
than dealer np. Using Corollary 1, we have the result that the degree of information
asymmetry between dealer i and i + 1 becomes lower for i ∈ {np, np + 1, ..., n − 1}, as
shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. If the public signal is exogenous, then in equilibrium, the degree of information
asymmetry between dealer i and i + 1 (i ∈ {np, np + 1, ..., n − 1}) is lower than the case
without a public signal,
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) < V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|si).
We can also interpret this result from the perspective of information substitution and
complementarity, e.g.[BHK13]. If the public signal is exogenous,
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|snp , S) < V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|snp),
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thus in terms of reducing the posterior variance of θ, the marginal value of having snp is
smaller with the existence of S than without the existence of S. Thus the public signal
S is always a substitute for the private signal snp .
The existence of the exogenous public signal would affect dealers’ profits from clients,
while it can be shown that the extent to which that is affected is modest. In contrast,
the extent to which dealers’ surplus from asset reallocation is affected is dramatic if the
degree of information asymmetry becomes relatively low.
Lemma 8.
lim
σp→0
E[(Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] = lim
σp→0
−βσ4η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) =∞,
lim
σp→0
E[βpi,i+1(pi,i+1 − θ − ηi)] is bounded.
If the public signal is extremely precise, the information asymmetry goes away, and the
surplus from asset reallocation between dealer i, i + 1 will explode, while dealers’ profit
from serving clients is bounded. Thus the profit of dealer i and i + 1 from link (i, i + 1)
is larger with a precise public signal than without a public signal.
This result is consistent with the conventional wisdom. The existence of the public
signal reduces the information asymmetry, makes the adverse selection less severe, and
thus increases the trading surplus in equilibrium by facilitating dealers’ trade.
1.4.3 Endogenous Public Signal
In practice, TRACE collects the price of trades that have taken place and then dissemi-
nates the historical prices to the public. Thus the disseminated prices from the upstream
trades are not exogenous public signals, because firstly, the prices of the upstream trades
and the prices of the downstream trades could share the same information source (in
my model, dealer 1’s private signal s1); secondly, they share the noisy terms that arise
from upstream dealers’ idiosyncratic trading needs (in my model, for example, dealer 1’s
private value η1 enters the noisy terms of the prices in all the links.)
I assume the price of the first trade, the trading price between dealer 1 and 2, is the
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public signal,
S =
2κ1
ϕ
p1,2 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
(η1 + η2).
I make a technical assumption that np ≥ 3. Namely, p1,2 is observable after the trade
between dealer 2 and 3 has finished. This assumption ensures that dealer 2 does not have
an incentive to manipulate the public signal p1,2 to profit from the trade with dealer 3.
3
The following result shows that in markets with a relatively low degree of information
asymmetry, the public signal would increase the degree of information asymmetry.
Proposition 3. Compare the information asymmetry between dealer i and i + 1 (i ∈
{np, ..., n− 1}) with and without public signal, there is a threshold κ∗ such that,
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) > V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|si) if κ1 > κ∗.
If np = 3, κ
∗ = 1 is necessary and sufficient.
From the perspective of information substitution and complementarity, e.g.[BHK13],
we can see when κ1 > κ
∗,
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|snp , S) > V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|snp),
thus in terms of reducing the posterior variance of θ, the marginal value of having snp is
larger with the existence of S than without the existence of S. Thus the public signal S
is a complement for the private signal snp .
As shown in Corollary 1, for dealer i and i + 1 (i ∈ {np, np + 1, ..., n − 1}), whether
their information asymmetry in the game with a public signal, V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S),
is larger or smaller that in the game without a public signal, V ar(θ) − V ar(θ|si), de-
pends on whether the information asymmetry between dealer np and np + 1, V ar(θ|S)−
V ar(θ|sˆnp , S), is larger or smaller that in the game without a public signal, V ar(θ) −
V ar(θ|snp). That is equivalent to whether dealer np learns a greater or smaller extent
from S, V ar(θ|snp)− V ar(θ|snp , S), than dealer np + 1, V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|S).
3It can be proved that if we compare the cases that p1,2 is observable or not for dealer 3 before
dealer 3 trades with dealer 2, dealer 2 will behave differently in equilibrium. It is an interesting question
how the price transparency affects price formation and information diffusion by incentivizing dealers to
manipulate prices, though it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 1.2 plots the inverse of variance reduction for dealer 3 and 4 due to the existence
of the public signal when np = 3.
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Figure 1.2: The Inverse of Variance Reduction
1
V ar(θ|s3)−V ar(θ|s3,S) and
1
V ar(θ)−V ar(θ|S)
Parameters: np = 3, σθ = 1, ση = 0.1.
To see the intuition for this result, let us look at the case np = 3. In equilibrium, dealer
3’s private signal is s3 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ2
ϕ
η2, and the public signal is S = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
(η1 +η2). The
key difference between the endogenous and the exogenous signal is that the endogenous
signal is both about the asset payoff and previous dealers’ private values, which allows the
more informed dealer to filter its private signal more effectively. Intuitively, dealer np = 3
already has a signal about the private values of dealer 1 and 2. The endogenous public
signal provides an additional signal that can make dealer 3 fully informed about η2 and,
by implication, fully informed about s2 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1. But dealer 4 only learns S. When k1
is relatively large, κ1
ϕ
η2, the difference between s2 and S that stems from the private value
of dealer 2, becomes more noisy, and would increase the degree of information asymmetry
between dealer 3 and 4.
To further see this, let us do a thought experiment by assuming the public signal is
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s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ∗
ϕ
η2. Dealer 3’s private signal is the same as before. Then from this public
signal and s3 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ2
ϕ
η2, dealer 3 still learns the signal s2 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1, while
dealer 4 learns the signal s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ∗
ϕ
η2. We can see the value of κ
∗ that governs how
pronounced the private value of dealer 2 is in the public signal, would decide whether
the public signal would increase or reduce the degree of information asymmetry between
dealer 3 and 4. Considering κ∗ approaches 0, then the information asymmetry between
dealer 3 and 4 is almost removed; thus, the degree of information asymmetry becomes
smaller. Suppose κ∗ goes to infinity, then dealer 4 basically can not learn anything from
the public signal (the information asymmetry between 3 and 4 approaches the information
asymmetry between dealer 2 and 3); thus, the degree of information asymmetry becomes
larger. 4
From this thought experiment, we can see the effect of the public signal on the degree
of information asymmetry is decided by the magnitude of κ∗ or how significantly dealer
2’s private value affects the public signal. From the price function shown in Proposition
1, we have in equilibrium κ∗ = κ1. The degree of information asymmetry between dealer
1 and 2 decides how aggressively dealer 2 trades on its private value, and thus decides
how significantly its private value affects the public signal, which decides whether the
public signal would increase or reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the
subsequent dealers.
The existence of the endogenous public signal would affect dealers’ profits from serving
the clients, while it can be shown that qualitatively, that effect is dominated by the effect
on dealers’ surplus from asset reallocation if the degree of information asymmetry is
relatively low, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Trading profit of dealer i and i+ 1 (i ∈ {np, ..., n− 1})
E(piii,i+1) + E(pii+1i,i+1) = E[(Q
i+1
i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] + E[βpi,i+1(pi,i+1 − θ − ηi)],
4Formally, the change of information asymmetry is
V ar(θ|s1 + κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ∗
ϕ
η2)− V ar(θ|s3, s1 + κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ∗
ϕ
η2)− (V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|s3))
= − σ
2
θ
κ1 + κ21 + κ
∗
1
2ϕ+
σ2θ
κ2
ϕ− σ
2
θ
κ3
ϕ = σ2θϕ(
1
κ2
− 1
κ3
− 1
κ1 + κ21 + κ
∗
1
2 ) = σ
2
θϕ
κ2(κ
∗2 − 1)
(κ2 + κ22)(κ1 + κ
2
1 + κ
∗2)
.
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is smaller with a public signal than without a public signal if κ1 is relatively large.
Figure 1.3 plots when np = 3, dealer 3 and dealer 4’s trading profits from link (3,4),
and dealer 4 and dealer 5’s trading profits from link (4,5). The blue line plots the profits
when the market is opaque, and the orange line plots the profits when the trading price
between dealer 1 and 2, p1,2, is public.
From the simulation results, we can see when κ1 is above a threshold that is very close
to 1 — which is a threshold for the information asymmetry to be larger or smaller —
dealers’ trading profits from link (3,4) or link (4,5) are higher in the case that the market
is opaque. The observation from Figure 1.3 that these two thresholds are almost the same
holds for all the parameters that I have used for the simulation and for any np ≥ 3. That
indicates that for the wide range of κ1, the effect on dealers’ information asymmetry, and
thus on dealers’ trading surplus from asset reallocation, plays a dominant role in affecting
dealers’ trading profit.5
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Figure 1.3: Profits on Links
E(pi33,4) + E(pi43,4), E(pi44,5) + E(pi54,5)
Parameters: np = 3, β = −1, σθ = 1, ση = 0.1.
5When κ1 is very close to 0, sometimes dealers’ trading profit is higher in the case that the market is
opaque.
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1.5 The Network Formation Game
In this section, I propose a network formation model to study the effect of TRACE on
the inter-dealer network structure. The network formation stage is before the trading
stage.
In this model, the dealer with private information about the asset payoff bargains
with the second dealer over how to split the link formation cost; the second dealer who
forms the link bargains with the third dealer over how to split the link formation cost,
etc. In equilibrium, the surplus of each formed link would spread over all the dealers
before this link and affect their network formation decision. Thus the effect of TRACE
on downstream dealers’ trading profit would affect the upstream dealers’ link formation
decision. The lower trading profits of downstream dealers could hurt the the formation
of the whole network.
I show that, in a market with less information asymmetry, the inter-dealer trading
frequency becomes lower after TRACE. The network formation game also implies that
TRACE could reduce the trading frequency of the upstream dealers as well, because
they benefit less from the downstream dealers’ trading profits if forming the links. The
empirical implications are tested in Section 1.6 and leave to be done more empirical work
in the future.
1.5.1 The Model Setup
There is a set of risk-neutral dealers {1, 2, .., n¯}. The link formation cost C is drawn from
distribution F (C). Given the realization of C, the link formation problem between dealer
1 and 2 is modeled as Nash’s two-person bargaining problem with fixed disagreement
payoffs, which are 0; if dealer 1 and 2 agree to form the link, we proceed to the link
formation problem between dealer 2 and 3, etc; between two consecutive dealers, whether
the agreement is reached and how the cost C is split are determined according to the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution. For i ∈ {2, .., n¯}, li−1,i = 1 denotes the link is
formed between dealer i − 1 and dealer i; li−1,i = 0 otherwise. (i − 1, i) denotes the
formed link between dealer i− 1 and dealer i.
Ci−1i−1,i and C
i
i−1,i denote the costs paid by dealer i− 1 and dealer i respectively when
23
the link is formed between them. Ci−1i−1,i +C
i
i−1,i = C. E(piii−1,i) and E(piii,i+1) denotes the
expected payoff of dealer i from trading on the link (i−1, i) and link (i, i+1) respectively.
Dealer 1’s payoff
U1(l1,2, C
1
1,2) = l1,2(E(pi11,2)− C11,2).
Dealer 2’s payoff
U2(l1,2, C
2
1,2, l2,3, C
2
2,3) = l1,2
(
E(pi21,2)− C21,2 + l2,3(E(pi22,3)− C22,3)
)
.
For i ∈ {2, ..., n¯− 1}, dealer i’s payoff is
Ui(li−1,i, Cii−1,i, li,i+1, C
i
i,i+1) = li−1,i
(
E(piii−1,i)− Cii−1,i + li,i+1(E(piii,i+1)− Cii,i+1)
)
.
For dealer n¯, its payoff is
Un¯(ln¯−1,n¯, C n¯n¯−1,n¯) = ln¯−1,n¯
(
E(pin¯n¯−1,n¯)− C n¯n¯−1,n¯
)
.
Whether the link is formed and how the cost is split are determined according to the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution.
In the main text of the paper, I restrict the network to a line or chain. This framework
can be extended to study the formation of any tree network, but all the qualitative results
will be the same as what I show in the main text.6 After the network is formed, dealers’
private values and dealer 1’s private signal s1 are realized, and then the sequential trading
takes place.7
1.5.2 Equilibrium Concept
Definition 2. n denotes the number of dealers in network.
(
n, (lˆi−1,i)i∈{2,..,n}, (Cˆi−1i−1,i)i∈{2,..,n}
)
is an equilibrium if and only if
6For example, I am able to extend the network formation game, such that the dealer that has formed
the link can contact and negotiate with each of a random number of other dealers, and decide whether
to form links with them. The details are available upon request.
7This setup of timing is in the spirit of security design literature, for example, [DD99], such that I do
not need to deal with the thorny signaling problem during the network formation process. The network
structure in equilibrium only depends on the primitives of the model, rather than the realization of the
random variables.
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(1) Cˆi−1i−1,i is the symmetric Nash bargaining solution
Cˆi−1i−1,i = arg max
Ci−1i−1,i
(
E(pii−1i−1,i)− Ci−1i−1,i
) 1
2
,
(
E(piii−1,i)− (C − Ci−1i−1,i) + 1(i < n)
(
(E(piii,i+1)− Cˆii,i+1
)) 12
,
where
(
(E(piii,i+1)− Cˆii,i+1
)
is the continuation value for i < n. Thus lˆi−1,i = 1 if and only
if E(pii−1i−1,i) ≥ Ci−1i−1,i and lˆj−1,j = 1 for all j ∈ {2, ..., i− 1}.
(2) Let lˆ0,1 = 1. n is the maximal integer in {1, ..., n¯} such that lˆi−1,i = 1 for any
i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
1.5.3 Equilibrium of the Network Formation Game
Conditional on all the previous links being formed, whether the last link can be formed
or not just depends on whether the surplus of trading on this link, E(pin−1n−1,n) +E(pinn−1,n),
is larger than the link formation cost.
Conditional on all the links before the penultimate link being formed, E(pii−1i−1,i) +
E(piii−1,i)−C ≥ 0 does not ensure the penultimate link can be formed. For the penultimate
link in the chain, whether it can be formed or not depends on the surplus of trading on
this link and the net benefit of dealer n− 1 from the last link, E(piii,i+1)− Cˆii,i+1, which is
affected by the surplus of the last link. Solving the symmetric Nash Bargaining problem
for the penultimate link and substituting in the symmetric Nash bargaining solution of
the last link, we have the penultimate link able to be formed if and only if
E(pin−2n−2,n−1) + E(pin−1n−2,n−1) + 12
(
E(pin−1n−1,n + E(pinn−1,n)
)
1 + 1
2
≥ C.
Repeating this procedure for all the previous links until the first link, I can get the
cost threshold for each length of the network. If the realized cost is below that threshold,
the network with that length can be formed in equilibrium. The following algorithm
formalizes this procedure.
Algorithm that solves the network formation game
Considering n = n¯.
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Link (n¯− 1, n¯) is formed if and only if C ≤ C˜n¯−1,n¯(n¯), where
C˜n¯−1,n¯(n¯) ≡ E(pin¯−1n¯−1,n¯) + E(pin¯n¯−1,n¯).
Link (i− 1, i) for i ∈ {2, n¯} is formed if and only if C ≤ C˜i−1,i(n¯), where
C˜i−1,i(n¯) ≡
E(pii−1i−1,i) + E(piii−1,i) + 12
(
E(piii,i+1) + E(pii+1i,i+1)
)
+ ... 1
2n¯−i
(
E(pin¯−1n¯−1,n¯) + E(pin¯n¯−1,n¯)
)
1 + 1
2
+ ... 1
2n¯−i
.
Define C∗(n¯) ≡ min{C˜1,2(n¯), ..., C˜n¯−1,n¯(n¯)}.
In equilibrium the trading network has n¯ dealers if and only if C ≤ C∗(n¯).
If C > C∗(n¯), we let n = n¯ − 1, and characterize C∗(n¯ − 1) ≡ min{C˜1,2(n¯ −
1), ..., C˜n¯−2,n¯−1(n¯− 1)}.
In equilibrium the network has n¯− 1 dealers if and only if C∗(n¯) < C ≤ C∗(n¯− 1).
If C > max{C∗(n¯), C∗(n¯ − 1)}, we let n = n¯ − 2, and characterize C∗(n¯ − 2) ≡
min{C˜1,2(n¯− 2), ..., C˜n¯−3,n¯−2(n¯− 2)}.
In equilibrium the network has n¯− 2 dealers if and only if max{C∗(n¯), C∗(n¯− 1)} <
C ≤ C∗(n¯− 2).
...
The link between dealer i − 1 and i is formed in equilibrium, if and only if the
network formed in equilibrium has at least i dealers. Thus in equilibrium lˆi−1,i = 1 for
i ∈ {2, 3, ..., n¯}, if and only if C ≤ C∗i−1,i(κ1), where
C∗i−1,i(κ1) ≡ max{C∗(i), ..., C∗(n¯)}.
I denote C∗i−1,i,np(κ1) to be the threshold in the game without a public signal, and
C∗i−1,i,p(κ1) to be the threshold in the game with p1,2 as the public signal.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium of the network formation game, when κ1 is relatively
large,
(1) for i ∈ {np + 1, ..., n¯}, C∗i−1,i,np(κ1) > C∗i−1,i,p(κ1);
(2) for i ∈ {2, ..., np}, C∗i−1,i,np(κ1) ≥ C∗i−1,i,p(κ1).
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Proposition 5 is directly implied by Proposition 4. When κ1 is relatively large, for
any two consecutive dealers that are affected by the public signal, due to the larger
information asymmetry between them, they have lower trading profit. That lowers the
threshold of cost for forming the link between them.
It also implies that TRACE could reduce the trading frequency of the upstream
dealers for whom trading profits are not affected by the public signal. That is because
they benefit less from the downstream dealers’ trading profits if they form the link to
initiate the trade. Figure 1.4 plots C∗1,2,np(κ1) in the game without a public signal and
C∗1,2,p(κ1) in the game with p1,2 as the endogenous public signal. In markets with relatively
large κ1, the public signal reduces the cost threshold of the first link’s formation, and
thus reduces the ex-ante probability of any inter-dealer trade.
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Figure 1.4: Cost Threshold for Network Formation
C∗1,2,np(κ1) and C
∗
1,2,p(κ1)
Parameters: β = −1, σθ = 1, ση = 0.1, n = 5, np = 3.
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1.6 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I study the effect of TRACE on corporate bond markets, by utilizing the
Academic Corporate Bond TRACE data and the Mergent FISD database. The argument
is that if a bond is very actively traded, then although investors are more likely to know
more about them, they are also more likely to be asymmetrically informed; vice versa, if
a bond is thinly traded, then investors are more likely to be symmetrically uninformed.
So the model predicts that TRACE would have negative effects on inter-dealer trading
activity for thinly traded bonds.
The regression results indicate that TRACE has a significant negative effect on the
inter-dealer trading frequency for thinly traded bonds. It is also a warning for the
widespread implementation of TRACE, as many of the assets that are newly subject
to transparency are also thinly traded.
The main difference between my empirical work and [ACP13] is that, the trading
activity in their paper is the aggregate trading activity (including the trade between dealer
and customer and inter-dealer trade), while mine is the inter-dealer trading activity (and
further separate inter-dealer trade into principle inter-dealer trade and agency inter-dealer
trade).
1.6.1 Data Description
The data source for corporate bond trading is the Academic Corporate Bond TRACE
data, purchased from FINRA. During the time period, July 1, 2002 until December
31, 2005, there are 29,064,905 unique trade reports on 37,026 different CUSIPs in the
Academic TRACE dataset.
The Mergent FISD database is my source for bond characteristics such as issue size,
credit ratings, maturity, etc., which I add to the Academic TRACE dataset. The Mergent
FISD database I use include all the bonds with an offering date between January of 1950
and January of 2010.
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1.6.2 Steps from the Academic TRACE File to the Cleaned Academic TRACE
Sample
There are a number of reporting errors in this self-reported data. The Appendix 4.1.3
describes the steps I take to convert the Academic TRACE File to the Cleaned Academic
TRACE Sample. The references for the cleaning procedure are [ACP13] and [Dic14].
Table 1.1 reports the number of bonds and trade reports after each step.
1.6.3 Steps from FINRA’s Phase Listings to the Cleaned Phase Sample
Dissemination took place in Phases over two-and-a-half years. FINRA’s main criteria for
a bond’s dissemination Phase are the bond issue size and credit rating. Actively traded,
investment grade bonds became transparent before thinly traded, high-yield bonds. Phase
1 of TRACE was implemented on July 1, 2002. Phase 2 of TRACE was implemented on
March 3, 2003. Phase 3A of TRACE was implemented on October 1, 2004. Phase 3B of
TRACE was implemented on February 7, 2005.
I begin with a list of all Phase 1, 2, 3A, and 3B bonds. There are 16,854 bonds in this
list, of which 15,769 exist in the Cleaned Academic TRACE sample. They have 3,526,543
trades during our sample period.
In addition to the four Phases that correspond to the FINRA dissemination dates,
FINRA also maintained two other lists of bonds, which we call the FINRA50 and the
FINRA1208. The FINRA50 represent 50 Non-Investment Grade (High-Yield) securities
disseminated under the Fixed Income Pricing System (FIPS)9. This list of 50 bonds
changes over time with bonds both entering and exiting. I eliminate any bonds that also
exist in the FINRA50. There are 3,517,618 unique trade reports (phase 1: 1,031,396,
phase 2: 668,300, phase 3A: 1,613,748, phase 3B: 204,174) and 15,781 different CUSIPs
(phase 1: 370, phase 2: 2,348, phase 3A: 10,492, phase 3B: 2,551) left.
8Dissemination began on April 14, 2003 for a group of 120 Investment-Grade securities rated BBB.
These BBB bonds are denoted as the FINRA120.
9FIPS started in April 1994. It reported transactions information on approximately 50 high-yield
bonds.
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Table 1.1: Steps from Academic TRACE File to Cleaned Academic TRACE Sample
Remaining Remaining
CUSIPs trade reports
Source: Academic TRACE 37,026 29,064,905
Eliminate trade btw dealer and customer 32,795 11,900,080
Eliminate bonds based on characteristics
Bonds unmatched to FISD by CUSIP 31,682 11,800,641
Convertible bonds and exchangeable bonds 29,872 11,005,869
SEC Rule 144a bonds 26,965 10,704,976
Bonds with 0 or very small issue size 26,729 10,687,352
Eliminate trade because of self-reported errors
Same day corrections and cancellations 26,647 10,423,151
Reversals: ten-way match 26,581 10,121,712
Reversals: nine-way match 26,578 10,113,094
Reversals: nine-way match (price rounding to 0.01) 26,578 10,112,431
Eliminate double report 25,239 5,155,102
Address trade splitting 25,239 4,889,149
Eliminate trade reports with price or volume issues
Prices that are vastly out of line 25,239 4,885,676
Prices/volumes below 0.01% or above 99.99% 25,181 4,883,688
Eliminate trade that is under special circumstances, etc. 25,101 4,865,045
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Table 1.2: Steps from FINRA’s Phase Listings to the Cleaned Phase Sample
CUSIPs Trade reports
Sample 1: Cleaned Academic TRACE Sample 25,101 4,865,045
Sample 2: FINRA list of Phase 1-3B bonds 16,854 -
Sample 3: Bonds in both Sample 1 and 2 15,769 3,526,557
Bonds in Sample 3 but not in FINRA50 15,761 3,517,632
(Cleaned Phase Sample)
Phase 1 370 1,031,409
Phase 2 2,348 668,300
Phase 3A 10,492 1,613,741
Phase 3B 2,551 204,182
1.6.4 Key Statistics
Different from other bond characteristics, a bond usually has multiple credit ratings that
are specific to rating date. I assign credit ratings that are rated since July 2002. Data on
credit ratings are from FISD. FISD includes ratings from S&P, Moody’s, Fitch and Duff
and Phelps. I first transform Moody’s rating to be consistent with others. For the phase
2 (3A, 3B) exercise, for each bond in the credit rating data, I keep the observation with
the rating date that is after and closest to July 2002.10
From Table 1.3, we can see Phase 3B bonds have significant lower credit ratings than
bonds in other Phases; Phase 3A bonds have much smaller issue size.
For the regression in the next section, I construct three subsamples. The Phase 2
10As an alternative, I could use the bond’s credit rating that was established after its phase began. I
do not use that, because many bonds, especially Phase 3B bonds, were not rated anymore after the start
of Phase 3B. For example, for the 2551 Phase 3B bonds in my sample, there are only 1126 bonds that
are rated after February 7, 2005, when TRACE was implemented for Phase 3B.
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Table 1.3: Bond Issue Size and Credit Rating
Phase 2 Phase 3A Phase 3B
Number of bonds 2,348 10,492 2,551
Number of bonds Issue size ($M)
mean 274 88 185
p5 100 1 1
p10 100 1 5
p25 150 3 100
median 237 12 150
p75 325 92 235
p90 500 300 350
p95 600 450 450
Credit rating
mean A+ A- B+
p5 AAA AAA BBB
p10 AA AA BBB-
p25 AA- A+ BB
median A+ A- BB-
p75 A BBB+ B-
p90 A- BBB- CCC
p95 A- BB+ CC
# of bonds with rating information 2,200 10,334 2,142
subsample keeps the transactions from December 3, 2002 to June 3, 2003; the Phase
3A subsample keeps the transactions from July 1, 2004 to the end of 2004; the Phase
3B subsample keeps the transactions from November 7, 2004 to May 7, 2005. For each
subsample, I fill in the bonds that are not observable within that subsample but are
observable in other subsamples, and count their number of trades as 0; then I drop the
bond if its offering day is after the policy implementation date or its maturity day is
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before the policy implementation date or its credit rating information is missing.
For each subsample, I calculate each bond’s number of inter-dealer trade per day
within 3 months before the policy implementation and 3 months after the policy imple-
mentation.11 Table 1.4 shows the average number of trades per day for Phase 2 bonds
in the Phase 2 subsample, Phase 3A bonds in the Phase 3A subsample, and Phase 3B
bonds in the Phase 3B subsample. We can see Phase 3B bonds are much less frequently
traded than Phase 2 and Phase 3A bonds.
Table 1.4: Number of Overall Inter-dealer Trades per Day by Phase
num of trades per day num of trades per day
within 3 months before within 3 months after
Phase 2 bonds 0.2479 0.2857
Phase 3A bonds 0.1289 0.1286
Phase 3B bonds 0.0486 0.0509
In some trades, dealers may act as agent. In agency transactions, a dealer does
intermediation by transferring the bond while not assuming any price risk, thus the
agency transaction does not reflect the transfer of bond ownership or price risk. The
principal inter-dealer trade is defined to be the trade between two dealers whose trading
capacities are both principal. The agency inter-dealer trade is defined to be the trade
between two dealers and at least one side’s trading capacity is principal. I separate
the over-all inter-dealer trades into agency inter-dealer trades and principal inter-dealer
trades, to study the separate effects of TRACE on them.
11If the bond’s offering day is within 3 months before the policy implementation, its number of trades
per day is the total number of trades before the policy implementation divided by the number of days
between its offering day and the policy implementation. If the bond’s maturity day is within 3 months
after the policy implementation, its number of trades per day is the total number of trades after the policy
implementation divided by the number of days between the policy implementation and its maturity day.
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Table 1.5 reports each bond’s number of trades per day for principal inter-dealer trade
by phase. We can see for all the bonds, most of their inter-dealer trades are principal
inter-dealer trades. In terms of principal inter-dealer trade, Phase 3B bonds are still
much less frequently traded than Phase 2 and Phase 3A bonds. Table 1.6 reports each
bond’s number of trades per day for agency inter-dealer trade by phase. In terms of
agency inter-dealer trade, Phase 3B bonds’ trading frequency is similar to Phase 3A
bonds, while Phase 3A and Phase 3B bonds are much less frequently traded than Phase
3 bonds.
Table 1.5: Number of Principal Inter-dealer Trades per Day by Phase
num of trades per day num of trades per day
within 3 months before within 3 months after
Phase 2 bonds 0.2139 0.2473
Phase 3A bonds 0.1158 0.1171
Phase 3B bonds 0.0397 0.0398
Table 1.6: Number of Agency Inter-dealer Trades per Day by Phase
num of trades per day num of trades per day
within 3 months before within 3 months after
Phase 2 bonds 0.0394 0.0445
Phase 3A bonds 0.0167 0.0147
Phase 3B bonds 0.0124 0.0152
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1.6.5 Difference-in-Differences Regression
The before-and-after comparisons in Table 1.4 do not establish that dissemination affected
trading activity because there could be contemporaneous market-wide trends. I adjust for
potential market trends by comparing the changes in the sample of newly disseminated
bonds (the treated sample) to those that do not change dissemination status (the control
sample) by estimating difference-in-differences models of the form:
yit = λ1Disseminatei + λ2Postt + λ3Disseminatei × Postt + λ4Xit + εit
where i denotes the bond, t denotes the time period (3 months before/after the dissemi-
nation), yit is bond i’s outcome (number of trades per day), Disseminatei is an indicator
for whether the bond changes dissemination status (i.e., is in the treated group), Postt is
an indicator for the trade outcomes after the dissemination, and Xit is a vector of bond
i’s characteristics (issue size and credit rating).
Any pre-existing difference between bonds that change dissemination status and those
that do not are captured by λ1. Any effects of dissemination that accrue to all bonds
— that is, effects that are not limited to only bonds that change their dissemination
status in the Phase — are absorbed by time effects λ2. The coefficient of interest is λ3,
which estimates the direct effect of transparency on the outcome variable. The coefficient
λ3 reflects the change in trading outcomes for bonds that change dissemination status
compared to the change in trading outcomes for bonds that do not change dissemination
status. Estimates of λ3 therefore, net out aggregate changes in bond trading outcomes.
The control bonds for Phase 2 are the disseminated bonds in Phase 1, and the non-
disseminated bonds in Phase 3A and Phase 3B. For Phase 3A and Phase 3B, the control
bonds are the disseminated bonds in Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 3A bonds are not a
control for Phase 3B and vice versa because Phase 3A and Phase 3B occur just over four
months apart, on October 1, 2004 and February 7, 2005, respectively. For λ3 to provide
unbiased estimates of the causal effect of transparency, I assume that the change over
time in control bonds’ behavior reveals what would have occurred to treated bonds if
there had been no change in their dissemination status.12
12The other necessary assumptions are, first, that transparency and its consequences are not well
anticipated by market participants and thus the impacts on the trading activity would not appear before
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Table 1.7 reports the estimates of equation for overall inter-dealer trades of Phase 2
bonds, Phase 3A bonds and Phase 3B bonds. For Phase 2 bonds and Phase 3A bonds,
TRACE post-trade transparency does not have significant effect, for Phase 3B bonds,
it significantly reduces the number of trades. TRACE reduces the average number of
overall inter-dealer trades for Phase 3B bonds by 0.09. This represents a 190% drop from
the average level before dissemination.
Table 1.7: DID Regression Results for Overall Inter-dealer Trade
Phase 2 Phase 3A Phase 3B
num of trades per day num of trades per day num of trades per day
Disseminate -0.303∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.994∗∗∗
(-10.79) (-5.63) (-5.09)
Post 0.0250∗∗∗ -0.0151∗ 0.0947∗∗∗
(4.72) (-2.00) (3.80)
Disseminate×Post 0.0128 0.0148 -0.0924∗∗∗
(1.57) (1.86) (-3.69)
N 19998 24946 8418
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.8 reports the estimates of equation for principal inter-dealer trades. For Phase
2 bonds and Phase 3A bonds, TRACE post-trade transparency does not have a negative
effect, whereas for Phase 3B bonds it significantly reduces the number of principal inter-
dealer trades.
Table 1.9 reports the estimates of equation for agency inter-dealer trades. For Phase
2 bonds, TRACE post-trade transparency does not have a significant effect, whereas for
Phase 3A and Phase 3B bonds it significantly reduces the number of agency inter-dealer
the actual change in dissemination status; and secondly, that there are no other changes simultaneous
with the phase start date that affects the trading activity for those bonds changing dissemination status,
as argued in [ACP13].
36
Table 1.8: DID Regression Results for Principal Inter-dealer Trade
Phase 2 Phase 3A Phase 3B
num of trades per day num of trades per day num of trades per day
Disseminate -0.260∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗∗
(-10.75) (-4.29) (-5.18)
Post 0.0213∗∗∗ -0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗
(4.21) (-4.13) (3.54)
Disseminate×Post 0.0121 0.0273∗∗∗ -0.0809∗∗∗
(1.56) (4.06) (-3.53)
N 19882 24896 8314
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
trades. TRACE reduces the average number of agency inter-dealer trades for Phase 3A
bonds by 0.0138. This represents a 83% drop from the average level before dissemination.
TRACE reduces the average number of agency inter-dealer trades for Phase 3B bonds by
0.012. This represents a 97% drop from the average level before dissemination.
In summary, Phase 2 bonds are the most actively traded bonds in the overall inter-
dealer trade, the principal inter-dealer trade, and the agency inter-dealer trade. DID
estimates show that TRACE does not have a significant effect on the trading frequency
of Phase 2 bonds. Phase 3A bonds are similarly thinly traded as Phase 3B bonds in
the agency inter-dealer trade. DID estimates show that TRACE significantly lowers the
trading frequency of Phase 2 bonds in agency inter-dealer trade and the magnitude of the
negative effect is quantitatively similar to that on Phase 3B bonds. Phase 3B bonds are
the most thinly traded bonds in the overall inter-dealer trade, the principal inter-dealer
trade, and the agency inter-dealer trade. DID estimates show that TRACE significantly
lowers the trading frequency of Phase 3B bonds and the overall negative effect mainly
comes from the negative effect on the principle inter-dealer trade.
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Table 1.9: DID Regression Results for Agency Inter-dealer Trade
Phase 2 Phase 3A Phase 3B
num of trades per day num of trades per day num of trades per day
Disseminate -0.0502∗∗∗ -0.0763∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗
(-7.23) (-8.79) (-3.11)
Post 0.00458∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗
(4.76) (4.28) (3.43)
Disseminate×Post 0.000510 -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗
(0.37) (-4.93) (-2.68)
N 16794 20424 7234
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
1.7 Extension
In Section 1.7.1, I study the relationship between the sequential trading game and the
simultaneous trading game. The equivalence between them indicates that the modeling
choice of the sequential trading game does not play any role in deciding the outcome in
equilibrium, even though the sequential trading game is more natural than the simulta-
neous trading game.
In Section 1.7.2, I explicitly model the price-discovery process. The price discovery
game shows that the equilibrium prices and quantities of my baseline model can be found
via an iterative, decentralized process. It shows that my equilibrium outcome is not
specific to the double auction modeling technique, which captures the repeated exchange
of limit and market orders (i.e., the offer and acceptance of quotes) within a short time
interval across fixed counterparties.
In Section 1.7.3, I relax the assumption for clients’ trading intensity to be fixed. It
shows when clients trade for the asset payoff, the information diffusion process is the same
as the baseline model, but clients’ trading intensity would be lower when the information
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asymmetry becomes larger. Thus the results in the baseline model still hold and the
effect on dealers’ trading surplus are amplified via changing clients’ trading intensity.
1.7.1 Payoff Equivalent to the Simultaneous Trading Game
[BK18] and [BKW19] use a simultaneous trading model to study the information diffusion
in the inter-dealer network. In this paper, I use the sequential trading model mainly for
the sake of exposition, and it is more suitable for discussing post-trade transparency
policy. Under the assumption that one dealer is informed of private information about
the asset payoff and dealers are risk-neutral, the following proposition shows that the
sequential trading game is payoff equivalent to the simultaneous trading game.
Proposition 6. Considering the simultaneous trading game, where dealers’ linear de-
mand functions are{
Q11,2(η1, s1, p1,2),
(
Q21,2(η2, p1,2, p2,3), Q
2
2,3(η2, p1,2, p2,3)
)
, ...,
(
Qn−1n−2,n−1(ηn−1, pn−2,n−1, pn−1,n), Q
n−1
n−1,n(ηn−1, pn−2,n−1, pn−1,n)
)
, Qnn−1,n(ηn, pn−1,n)
}
,
the simultaneous trading game shown in the main text is payoff equivalent to the simul-
taneous trading game.
For any dealer i ∈ {2, ..., n− 1}, the trading price on link (i, i+ 1) is not informative
about the asset payoff, as the subsequent dealers do not have private information about
the asset payoff. Thus, as dealers are risk neutral, the optimization problem of trading
on the link (i− 1, i) is separate from that on the link (i, i+ 1), and is not affected by the
price on the link (i, i+1). Thus the solution to the sequential trading game I characterize
above is also the solution to the simultaneous trading game.
1.7.2 The Price Discovery Game
In real-world OTC markets, dealers engage in bilateral negotiations with their counter-
parties by quoting prices which are valid for a certain quantity. To capture this feature,
I introduce the price discovery game, as a variant of the OTC game where dealers find
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the equilibrium prices and quantities through a sequence of bilateral exchange of quotes.
It is in the spirit of the price discovery game in [BK18].
Formally, I define the price-discovery game as follows. In round 0, dealer i chooses
a bidding strategy piii,i+1,0 = {pii,i+1,0, qii,i+1,0}, and dealer i + 1 chooses a bidding strat-
egy pii+1i,i+1,0 = {pi+1i,i+1,0, qi+1i,i+1,0}. They also choose Bii,i+1(si, pii+1i,i+1,τ ) = piii,i+1,τ+1, which
describes the counter-offers that dealer i makes in round τ + 1, conditional on the bids it
received in round τ . Bi+1i,i+1(si, pi
i
i,i+1,τ ) = pi
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1 describes the counter-offers that dealer
i+ 1 makes in round τ + 1, conditional on the bids it received in round τ . If there exists
a price and quantity vector {p¯ii,i+1, q¯i+1i,i+1} with
p¯ii,i+1 = p¯
i+1
i,i+1,
q¯ii,i+1 + q¯
i+1
i,i+1 + βp¯
i
i,i+1 = 0,
and
lim
τ→∞
piii,i+1,τ = (p¯
i
i,i+1, q¯
i
i,i+1),
for some random starting vector {piii,i+1,0, pii+1i,i+1,0}, then trade takes place.
The payoff for dealer i is E[q¯ii,i+1(θ+ ηi− p¯ii,i+1)|si], provided {p¯ii,i+1, q¯i+1i,i+1} exists, and
minus infinity otherwise. Thus, taking dealer i + 1’s bidding strategy as given, dealer i
solves
max
Bii,i+1(si,pi
i+1
i,i+1,τ )
E[q¯ii,i+1(θ + ηi − p¯ii,i+1)|si, ηi];
and taking dealer i’s bidding strategy as given, dealer i+ 1 solves
max
Bi+1i,i+1(pi
i
i,i+1,τ )
E[q¯i+1i,i+1(θ + ηi − p¯ii,i+1)|ηi+1].
The following proposition proves that dealers can find the equilibrium prices and quan-
tities in the OTC game by playing the price-discovery game.
Proposition 7. There exists an equilibrium in the price-discovery game, where prices
and quantities are the same as the equilibrium prices and quantities in the equilibrium of
the OTC game.
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1.7.3 Clients Trade for the Asset Payoff
I extend the baseline model of clients such that clients trade not only because of liquidity
needs, but also for the asset payoff.
In the trade between dealer i and i + 1, a continuum of clients participate. Clients
do not have private information about the asset payoff or the dealers’ private values of
the asset. Clients are risk-neutral, Client j’s value of the asset is θ + ηj with E(ηj) = 0
and ηj is independently distributed across the clients on the same link. Clients incur a
quadratic flow cost of trading the asset.
The demand function of client j is qji,i+1(pi,i+1, ηj, S). The payoff of client j is
E
(
(θ + ηj)q
j
i,i+1 − pi,i+1qji,i+1 −
µ
2
(qji,i+1)
2|pi,i+1, S
)
.
Thus we have that the demand of client j is
qji,i+1(pi,i+1, ηj, S) =
1
µ
(ηj + E(θ|pi,i+1, S)− pi,i+1).
Thus the aggregate demand of clients on each link (i, i+1) is 1
µ
(E(θ|pi,i+1, S)−pi,i+1) =
βi,i+1pi,i+1 + δi,i+1S.
Proposition 8. In the Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this model,
1. the information diffusion process is the same as the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the baseline model;
2. in the trade between dealer i and i + 1, clients’ trading intensity βi,i+1 and the
trading surplus from the asset allocation between dealer i and i+ 1 become smaller if and
only if the information asymmetry between dealer i and i + 1, V ar(θ|S) − V ar(θ|sˆi, S)
becomes larger.
Thus the qualitative results in the baseline model still hold and are amplified due to
the effect of information asymmetry on clients’ trading intensity.
1.8 Conclusion
The harm of TRACE has been argued by many market participants. A recent study
by [ACP13] finds that after transparency, there is a significant decline in the number of
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trades for thinly traded bonds. Many of the securities markets that are newly subject
to transparency are thinly traded. Their empirical results support the view that not
every segment of a security market should be subject to the same degree of mandated
transparency.
This paper provides a theory framework to fill the gap in the literature in that regard.
I build up an information model that features bilateral trade in a double auction, en-
dogenous public signal, and inter-dealer network formation to study the effect of TRACE
on the inter-dealer markets. For the sake of tractability, I assume there is one dealer in
the market that has private information about the asset payoff. In the trading stage, I
study the private information diffusion process, and endogenize the public information
contained in the disseminated trading price; I show that in markets with a relatively low
degree of information asymmetry, post-trade transparency would increase the degree of
information asymmetry, and thus make the adverse selection more severe and reduce the
surplus from asset reallocation between dealers. The effect of TRACE on dealers’ trading
profit affects dealers’ network decisions and for markets with a low degree of information
asymmetry TRACE hurts the network formation and lowers inter-dealer trading fre-
quency. This model implies that the effects of TRACE on inter-dealer trading frequency
are not uniform across different markets with different information asymmetry, supported
by the empirical evidence in Section 1.6. In recent years, TRACE-like transparency policy
has been expanding in many other securities markets, e.g., the Agency-Backed Securities
market and Asset-Backed Securities required by FINRA, the swaps market required by
Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform, etc. This paper sheds light on the discussion
whether besides the corporate bond market, other securities markets should be subject
to TRACE-like post-trade transparency.
In future research, this framework can be applied to the study of other types of
information sharing policies in the OTC markets (for example, pre-trade transparency for
bonds brought by MiFID II/R’s regulatory regime in Europe, more information sharing
of agents’ private trading needs in CDS markets13, etc.) and cast light on their effects
13Congress passed Section 13 (f) of the Securities Exchange Act in 1975 in order to increase the public
availability of information regarding the security holdings of institutional investors. [BST19] interpret
the information of institutional investors’ security holdings provided to the market in the 13-F form as
information related to the trading needs of investors on CDS, as CDS indexes are a way for institutions
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on agents’ trading behavior and trading surplus, the information diffusion process, and
network structure.
to hedge against risk in their portfolios.
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CHAPTER 2
Large Traders, Information Manipulation, and Crises
2.1 Introduction
In many episodes during the currency crises, large traders were implementing “double
play” strategies, that is, they short the asset markets, e.g., equity or bond market, and
the currency market at the same time. For example, in South Africa in 1998, large
international financial firms were taking short positions in the bond market and in the
currency market; in Hong Kong in 1998 during the Asian crisis, large macro hedge funds
were shorting the Hong Kong equity markets and Hong Kong dollars. 1
We propose a stylized model to study the large trader’s information manipulation and
its implication for asset prices during currency crises. To isolate the forces and effects of
the information manipulation, the large trader is assumed to be without private infor-
mation. The forces at play are that, the dividend of the asset depends on the underlying
fundamental, the equilibrium asset price will convey information about the fundamental
in the coordination game; as the lower asset price indicates the worse fundamental, small
traders become strictly more aggressive after observing the lower asset price, thus the
lower asset price strictly increases the mass of small traders who attack the currency
regime. That incentivizes the large trader to manipulate the asset price in favor of its
currency attack. We show that in all the equilibrium the large trader will manipulate the
asset price to be lower than the price in the case that its demand schedule in the asset
1As noted in Financial Stability Forum (2000), “Among those taking short positions in the equity
market were four large HFs (Hedge Funds), whose futures and options positions were equivalent to around
40 percent of all outstanding equity futures contracts as of early August prior to the HKMA(Hong Kong
Monetary Authority) intervention. Position data suggest a correlation, albeit far from perfect, in the
timing of the establishment of the short position. Two HFs substantially increased their position during
the period of the HKMA intervention. At the end of August, four hedge funds accounted for 50,500
contracts or 49% of the total open interest/net delta position; one fund accounted for one third. The
group’s meeting suggested that some large HLIs (Highly Leveraged Institutions) had large short positions
in both the equity and currency markets.”
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market is observable. The intuition is that, when the large trader’s position in the asset
market is not observable, in a fictitious “equilibrium” with no manipulation, the large
trader can manipulate the asset price to be infinitesimal lower with infinitesimal cost,
while its marginal benefit in the currency-attack game is strictly bounded above zero, so
no manipulation will not be the large trader’s strategy in equilibrium. This result doesn’t
reply on whether the price manipulator is large or small in the currency-attack game.
Also, in equilibrium, the large trader’s manipulating the asset price to be lower and
attacking the currency regime are concurrent; the large trader’s manipulation in the
asset market is most significant when the public signal is in the intermediate range. The
intuition is straightforward. If the large trader doesn’t attack the currency regime, then
its incentive to manipulate the asset price goes away; when the public signal is in the
intermediate range, the marginal benefit from a lower public signal in the currency-attack
game is most significant.
It’s worth mentioning the mechanism above goes beyond the currency crises scenario.
In bank runs, sovereign debt crisis, financial crashes and other applications captured by
Morris-Shin and others using coordination game, we observe that in many scenarios, the
larger trader’s behavior is suspected to be information manipulation. For example, SEC
once investigated the market manipulation in 2008 financial crisis.2 As pointed out by
Gary Gensler (Ex-CFTC Chair),
“in the fall of 2008, stock prices were in a free fall...CDS figured into that
decline...buyers of credit default swaps had an incentive to see a company fail,
they may have engaged in market activity to help undermine an underlying
company’s prospects.”
The second stage in the above setting is a bank-run or debt roll-over scenario. The
lower equity price would lead more creditors to ask the company for debt repayment,
and also make the company harder to roll over its debt, thus increase the probability
of the company’s failure. That incentivizes the large investors in the equity market,
who hold the CDS, to manipulate the equity price to be lower. Another scenario is the
manipulation of the deficit and debt statistics by the Greek government in 2000s. The
2See “Anatomy of the Morgan Stanley Panic” (https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122748970896452051)
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lower deficit and debt statistics makes more debtors willing to lend money or roll over
the sovereign debt.
Our results imply that the manipulator is worse off when it has the manipulation
power than it does not have. So the manipulator is trapped by its manipulation power.
This is a surprising result in the first sight, but makes great sense considering that in
the rational expectation equilibrium nobody is fooled, the manipulation is costly and the
manipulation is the case in all the equilibrium.
Finally we draw policy implication regarding the market transparency. After the crisis,
it’s commonly believed and advocated that the complete transparency helps stabilize the
currency regime.3
We show that if the asset market is transparent, a natural equilibrium refinement that
incorporates forward induction reasoning selects the equilibrium where all the traders
behave most aggressively in the currency-attack game. The public understand that the
large trader could have easily coordinated an aggressive attack by taking a non-trivial
position in the asset market, and hence the most aggressive attack is coordinated even
when the large trader does not do so. It highlights how the transparent asset market
as large traders’ coordination device for aggressive currency attack, could jeopardize the
currency regime. That is in contrast with the traditional wisdom that transparency helps
stabilize the currency regime.
The remainder of the introduction contains the market features and literature review.
The article is then structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the baseline model with
the first-stage asset market and second-stage currency-attack game. The asset market is
not transparent, in the sense that the large trader’s demand schedule is not observable
for small traders. Section 2.3 presents the equilibrium definition and characterizes the
multiple equilibrium when the first-stage large trader and the second-stage large trader
are two different large traders. The multiplicity of equilibrium arises from the strategic
3The Hong Kong Financial Secretary, Mr Donald Tsang, said new international rules and regulations
on transparency and disclosure should cover not only government accounts but all foreign exchange
movements by investment banks and hedge funds. Quote from his speech in 1998, “There must be
total and complete transparency from everyone. What is the point if governments are totally open
and accountable but private funds are not?...We need greater transparency from government and fund
managers so investors can make educated and sensible decisions based on sound economic fundamentals
and data.”
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complementarity between the second-stage large trader and small traders, and the large
trader is large in the currency market. Section 2.4 shows if the one large trader partic-
ipates in the asset market and currency-attack game, under some assumption to ensure
the single-crossing property, the equilibrium exists and there are multiple equilibrium. In
all the equilibrium, the incentive of the large trader to manipulate the asset price leads
to financial contagion in the asset markets and the large trader is worse off than in the
case that its demand schedule in the asset market is observable. Section 2.5 shows if the
asset market is transparent, a natural equilibrium refinement that incorporates forward
induction reasoning would select the equilibrium where every trader behaves most ag-
gressively in the currency-attack game and the currency regime is most fragile. Policy
implications regarding the market transparency is discussed. Section 2.6 concludes. The
proofs are shown in the appendix.
2.1.1 Market Features
Firstly, the markets where large traders operated were opaque, as emphasized by the
Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Joseph CK Yam in 1999, “Only
these hedge funds have the knowledge of the size of their very large positions.” This is
especially the case for the currency market as most foreign exchange took place in OTC
market, “The OTC markets in which hedge funds normally operate are equally opaque.”
Secondly, it’s widely accepted that the foreign investors have information disadvantage
relative to the locals. There is a branch of literatures showing the foreign investors’
information disadvantage relative to the locals. That information asymmetry between
domestic and foreign investors is the most convincing explanation for the home bias
phenomenon.45
In our model presented later, we assume the large trader, as foreign investor, does not
4Home bias refers to the phenomenon that, despite the well documented gains from international
diversification, investors continue to show a strong preference for investing in domestic assets.
5Please see [Low93], [Geh93], and [Kan97]. The alternative explanations such as barriers to capital
flows created by higher costs of transacting in foreign securities, withholding taxes, and political risk,
the failure of purchasing power parity (PPP) and regulation, are negated by the findings in [TW95],
[CK94], [FP91], [Fra03]. [BC97] examines U.S. portfolio investment in emerging markets and finds
strong evidence that is consistent with U.S. investors being at an informational disadvantage relative
to locals in emerging markets, and trading on new information with a lag. [VV09] shows why global
information access does not eliminate this asymmetry.
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have private information. This assumption will not hold perfectly in reality, but was made
to deliver the theoretical insights in the most transparent way. This assumption makes
the model tractable, and isolates the large trader’s information manipulation incentive
in a clear way, which will be shown later.
2.1.2 Related Literature
Following [MS98], the backbone of our model is the coordination game that Stephen
Morris, Hyun Song Shin and others have applied to explain currency crisis, bank runs
and financial crashes. Such game is usually called global game.6
Our build-up of asset market is similar with [AW06]. They employ a two-stage model,
incorporating a first-stage asset market and a second-stage coordination game of currency
attack, with continuum of small traders participating in both of them, to figure out
the role of information in currency crisis. In terms of asset market, their model setup,
equilibrium definition and characterization are built upon [GS76]. [AW06] emphasizes
the role of asset market in producing public signal. Their main finding is that with
endogenous public signal, multiplicity is ensured if private signal is relatively precise
enough. Our model incorporates the large trader, thus the model setup and equilibrium
in [AW06] turns out to be a degenerate case in our model when we set the measure of the
large trader to be 0. In contrast with [AW06], the dimension of multiplicity this paper
focuses on arises from the strategic complementarity between the large trader and small
traders, and the large trader is large in the currency market.
Our construction of asymmetric coordination game is similar with [CDM04] but with
different information structure. [CDM04] aims at pinpointing the effect of a large trader,
Soros, on other small traders’ equilibrium strategy, in a one-stage coordination game of
currency attack. The effect is contingent on the size of Soros, precision of Soros’ private
signal, etc. In [CDM04], public signal is not considered, and any trader, including Soros,
only observes his private signal.
Our paper is also linked to the literature about price manipulation in the financial mar-
kets, see [AG92], [AG91], [CY04]. The manipulation incentive in our paper is different
6Also, global game and quasi-global game frame are also used for the analysis of political issue, e.g.
[Edm13], [De 10]
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from the previous literature.
In game theory, forward induction has already been talked about in many literatures.
A typical example about forward induction is “burn money”, which is referred to in
[BD92], [Van89]. It highlights the key point that, in the equilibrium surviving the re-
finement featured by forward induction reasoning, the option of “burning money” won’t
be executed but the potential of “burning money” guarantees the best outcome for the
player with this potential. In our model, if the asset market is transparent, the equilib-
rium surviving our equilibrium refinement indicates a unique equilibrium outcome that
is most in favor of the large trader, where its potential to “burn money” in asset market
is not executed, but drives all the traders to be most aggressive in the currency-attack
game, and hence jeopardizes the stability of the currency regime.
2.2 Model Setup
In this paper, we build up a two-stage model. In the first-stage, there is an asset market,
where a large trader and a group of small traders trade a risky asset. In the second-stage,
there is a coordination game of currency attack, where a large trader and another group
of small traders participate.
2.2.1 The First-stage Asset Market
In the asset market, there is a measure ω continuum of small traders, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1],
and there is a measure-one larger trader. Nature draws θ from an improper uniform
distribution over the real line.7 Each small trader receives private signal xi = θ + σxξi,
where σx > 0 and ξi ∼ N(0, 1) is independent of θ, i.i.d across small traders. αx := σ−2x
denotes the precision of small traders’ private signal. The large trader doesn’t receive
private signal.
The risky asset is with dividend f = θ.8 The price of the asset is determined in an
7The setup for improper uniform prior of θ follows [CDM04], [AW06] and [OY08].
8Besides f = θ, [AW06] also discusses the case where the asset’s dividend is endogenously determined
by the coordination game. Extending our model to that case complicates the analysis, while does not
bring new insight.
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auction. Small traders and the large trader submit their menu of prices and quantities of
assets they are willing to purchase or sell at each price, ki(p), z(p). z(p) is not observable
for small traders.
The supply of the asset is uncertain,
Ks(ε) = σεε,
where σε > 0, ε ∼ N(0, 1), independent of θ and ξi.
The auctioneer specifies a market-clearing price p that equates aggregate demand and
supply, i.e.,
∫
i
ki(p) + z(p) = K
s(ε).
The large trader is risk neutral.9 The utility of small trader i is,
V (wi) = −e−γwi ,
where risk aversion parameter γ > 0, final wealth wi = w0 − pki + fki.
2.2.2 The Second-stage Currency-attack Game
In this stage, there is a continuum of small traders, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], and a large
trader. The distinguishing feature of the large trader is that he has access to a sufficiently
large line of credit in the domestic currency to take a short position up to the limit of
λ < 1. All small traders taken together have a combined trading limit 1− λ.
Small trader j receives private signal xj = θ + σxξj, where σx > 0, ξj ∼ N(0, 1)
is independent of θ, i.i.d across small traders. The large trader doesn’t receive private
signal. All traders in this stage can observe the market clear price of the asset in the
asset market.
Each small trader j can choose between two actions, either attack the status quo
aj = 1, or not aj = 0. The large trader can choose to attack as = 1, or not as = 0.
The cost of attack is denoted by t ∈ (0, 1). t is normalized relative to the payoff to a
9In dealing with heterogeneous traders in the asset market, like [LM90] and [OY08], we assume one
group of traders are risk averse, and other traders (the large trader in this paper) are risk neutral.
From empirical side, Blume, M.E.,J. [BCF74] shows that the average degree of portfolio diversification
is roughly equivalent to having an equally weighted portfolio with two stocks; quote from [AG92], “Most
of the stockholders are small...The fraction of their wealth held in this stock is large enough to make
them risk averse.”“their wealth (large traders’ wealth) is sufficiently large enough that they hold many
stocks and are well diversified. As a result, they can be treated as approximately risk neutral.”
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successful attack, so that the payoff to a successful attack is given by 1, and the payoff
from refraining from attack is given by 0.
In the end of this stage, the status quo is abandoned if the mass of attackers is larger
than θ, i.e., A :=
∫
j
aj + as > θ, and the status quo is maintained otherwise
10 It follows
that the payoff of agent j is
U(aj, A, θ) = aj(1A>θ − t).
2.3 “Two Large Traders” Model
In this part, we assume the first-stage large trader and second-stage large trader are two
different traders. By doing so, we completely suppress the larger trader’s incentive to
manipulate the asset price. This case is a useful benchmark.
2.3.1 Equilibrium in the First-stage Asset Market
Definition 3. First-stage equilibrium is a set of functions{
p(θ, ε, z), k(x, p), K(θ, p), z(p)
}
,
such that
i. Utility maximization: k and z solve the maximization problem of small traders and
the large trader conditional upon their information
k(x, p) ∈ arg max
k∈R
E(u(w0 + (θ − p)k)|x, p),
and
K(θ, p) = E(k(x, p)|θ, p)ω,
z(p) ∈ arg max
z(p)
E((θ − p)z(p)).
ii. Market clearing: For all pairs (θ, ε), the price p(θ, ε) equates supply and demand
K(θ, p) + z(p) = Ks(ε) = σεε.
10[AHP06] sets the model where policy maker can change the cost of attack for agents, and discusses
the equilibrium in this signalling game. Different from their focus on the strategic interaction between
policy maker and traders, our paper focuses on the strategic interaction between the large trader, and
small traders. Thus following [MS98], [CDM04], [AW06], etc, the attack cost for agents is exogenous in
our model and the authority is mechanical.
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Small trader makes his optimal investment decision k to maximize his expected payoff in
asset market, contingent on his information, including private signal x, price he observes
p. Small traders’ total demand K is the sum of all the small trader’s individual demand.
First-stage large trader decides the optimal demand schedule z(p).
Traders in the first-stage asset market hold self-fulfilled belief about the price they
observe and z(p). In this paper, we focus on linear price function, that is, price is linear
in θ and ε.
Proposition 9. In linear equilibrium in the first-stage asset market,
z(p) = 0,∀p,
p = θ − γσε
ωαx
ε.
The equilibrium characterization procedure is shown in the Appendix 4.2.1.
2.3.2 Equilibrium in the Second-stage Currency-attack Game
Definition 4. Second-stage equilibrium is a set of functions {aj(x, p), as(p), A(θ, p)},
such that given p = θ − γσε
ωαx
ε,
aj(x, p) solves the maximization problem of small trader j,
aj(x, p) ∈ arg max
aj∈{0,1}
E(u(aj, A(θ, p), θ)|x, p),
as(p) solves the optimization problem of the large trader,
as(p) ∈ arg max
as∈{0,1}
E(u(as, A(θ, p), θ)|p),
and
A(θ, p) = (1− λ)E(aj(xj, p)|p, θ, z) + λas(p),
where
u(aj, A, θ) = aj(1A>θ − t),
u(as, A, θ) = as(1A>θ − t).
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We focus on monotone equilibrium, that is, for the given price realized in the first-
stage asset market, small trader attacks if and only if his private signal xj ≤ x¯∗(p) when
p ≤ p∗, or xj ≤ x∗(p) when p > p∗; the large trader attacks if and only if asset price
p ≤ p∗.
Suppose p ≤ p∗, in equilibrium second-stage large trader attacks, small traders attack
if and only if x ≤ x¯∗(p).
Define θ¯(p) by
λ+ (1− λ)Pr(xj < x¯∗(p)|θ¯(p)) = θ¯(p),
⇒ λ+ (1− λ)Φ( x¯
∗(p)− θ¯(p)
σx
) = θ¯(p), (2.1)
that is, when the large trader attacks and small traders take the strategy x¯∗(p), status
quo is abandoned if and only if θ ≤ θ¯(p).
For traders in the second-stage currency-attack game, they observe asset price and
take this public signal into consideration when forming their posterior of θ.
Indifferent conditions for small traders is
Pr(θ ≤ θ¯(p)|x¯∗(p), p) = t.
All traders adopt Bayesian rule to update their posterior of θ, thus
Φ(
√
αx + αp(θ¯(p)− αx
α
x¯∗(p)− αp
α
p)) = t. (2.2)
Combining equations (2.1)(2.2), we can pin down x¯∗(p) and θ¯(p).
Assumption 1. σx and σp satisfy
σx
σ2p
<
√
2pi
1− λ.
Under Assumption 1, x¯∗(p) and θ¯(p) are functions of p.
Suppose p > p∗, in equilibrium second-stage large trader doesn’t attack, small traders
attack if and only if x ≤ x∗(p).
Define θ(p) by
(1− λ)Pr(xj < x∗(p)|θ(p)) = θ(p),
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⇒ (1− λ)Φ(x
∗(p)− θ(p)
σx
) = θ(p), (2.3)
that is, when the second-stage large trader doesn’t attack and small traders take the
strategy x∗(p), status quo is abandoned if and only if θ ≤ θ(p).
Indifferent conditions for the marginal small trader is
Pr(θ ≤ θ(p)|x∗(p), p) = t
⇒ Φ(√αx + αp(θ(p)− αx
α
x∗(p)− αp
α
p)) = t. (2.4)
Combining equations (2.3)(2.4), we can pin down x∗(p) and θ(p). Under Assumption 1,
x∗(p) and θ(p) are functions of p.
Define θˆ(p) by
λ+ (1− λ)Pr(xj < x∗(p)|θˆ(p)) = θˆ(p),
⇒ λ+ (1− λ)Φ(x
∗(p)− θˆ(p)
σx
) = θˆ(p),
that is, when the large trader attacks, and small traders take strategy x∗(p), status quo
is abandoned if and only if θ ≤ θˆ(p).
Define p1, p2 by
Pr(θ ≤ θ¯(p1)|p1) = Φ( θ¯(p1)− p1
σp
) = t, (2.5)
Pr(θ ≤ θˆ(p2)|p2) = Φ( θˆ(p2)− p2
σp
) = t. (2.6)
Proposition 10. Equations (2.5) (2.6) uniquely characterize p1 and p2. We have
p2 < p1.
In Figure 2.1, the red line denotes the expected payoff of the second-stage large trader
when small traders’ strategy is x¯∗(p), that is, Pr(θ ≤ θ¯(p)|p) − t; the blue line denotes
the expected payoff of the second-stage large trader when small traders’ strategy is x∗(p),
that is, Pr(θ ≤ θˆ(p)|p)− t.
Figure 2.2 depicts the large trader’s expected payoff in the second-stage currency-
attack game.
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Figure 2.1: The Large Trader’s Expected payoff in the Second-stage Currency-attack
Game given Small Traders’ Different Strategies
Figure 2.2: The Large Trader’s Expected Payoff in the Second-stage Currency-attack
Game
Proposition 11. Any p∗ ∈ [p2, p1] identifies a monotone equilibrium, where
i. the second-stage large trader attacks if and only if p ≤ p∗;
ii. small trader attacks if and only his private signal xj ≤ x¯∗(p) when p ≤ p∗, or
xj ≤ x∗(p) when p > p∗.
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2.4 “One Large Trader” Model
2.4.1 The First-stage Asset Market
The large traders in the two stages are the same trader. As shown in the Appendix 4.2.1,
in equilibrium,
p = θ − γσε
ωαx
ε+
z(p)γ
ωα
,
where σp :=
γσε
ωαx
, αp := σ
−2
p , α := αx + αp.
Small traders hold belief ze(p) of the large trader’s demand schedule.
p˜ := p− γz
e(p)
ωα
.
Small trader i’s asset demand is,
k(xi, p) =
E[θ|xi, p, ze(p)]− p
γV ar[θ|xi, p, ze(p)] =
αxxi + αpp˜− αp
γ
.
The aggregate demand of small traders in the asset market is,
K(θ, p) = E(k(xi, p)|θ, p)ω = αxθ + αpp˜− αp
γ
ω.
Market clear condition,
K(θ, p) + z(p) = σεε.
It implies
z(p) = M +Dp−Bp˜,
where M := σεε− ωαxγ θ, D := ωαγ , B := ωαpγ .
Conditional on M , the larger trader’s expected payoff in the asset market,
U1 = η(E[θ|M ]− p)z(p) = η( M
B −D − p)(M +Dp−Bp˜),
where η normalizes the large trader’s first-stage payoff, such that the payoff of a successful
currency attack is 1.
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2.4.2 The Second-stage Currency-attack Game
As before, we still adopt the monotone equilibrium. In this stage, small traders attack if
and only if xi < x¯
∗(p˜) when p˜ ≤ p˜∗, or xi < x∗(p˜) when p˜ > p˜∗. When, p˜ ≤ p˜∗, the large
trader attacks, the regime collapses if and only if θ < θ¯(p˜); when p˜ > p˜∗, the large trader
doesn’t attack, the regime collapses if and only if θ < θ(p˜).
{x¯∗(p˜), θ¯(p˜)} are characterized by equations,
λ+ (1− λ)Φ( x¯
∗(p˜)− θ¯(p˜)
σx
) = θ¯(p˜),
Φ(
√
α(θ¯(p˜)− αx
α
x¯∗(p˜)− αp
α
p˜)) = t,
together,
αpθ¯(p˜)−
√
αxΦ
−1(
θ¯(p˜)− λ
1− λ )− αpp˜ = Φ
−1(t)
√
α. (2.7)
Under Assumption 1, θ¯(p˜) is a function of p˜.
dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
=
αp
αp −
√
αx
1−λ
1
φ(Φ−1( θ¯(p˜)−λ
1−λ ))
. (2.8)
{x∗(p˜), θ(p˜)} are characterized by equations,
(1− λ)Φ(x
∗(p˜)− θ(p˜)
σx
) = θ(p˜),
Φ(
√
α(θ(p˜)− αx
α
x∗(p˜)− αp
α
p˜)) = t.
Define {p˜1, p˜2} by equations,
Φ(
θ¯(p˜1)− p˜1
σp
) = t,
Φ(
θˆ(p˜2)− p˜2
σp
) = t,
where
λ+ (1− λ)Φ(x
∗(p˜)− θˆ(p˜)
σx
) = θˆ(p˜).
Obviously p˜1 = p1, p˜2 = p2. We have p˜2 < p˜1.
When small traders’ strategy is x¯∗(p˜), the large trader’s expected payoff from attack
in the currency-attack game is,
U2 = Φ(
θ¯(p˜)− M
B−D
σp
)− t.
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2.4.3 Characterizing the Price Locus in Equilibrium
We first look at the case when M
B−D ≤ p˜∗, for some p˜∗.
Choosing z(p) is equivalent to choosing (p˜, p) on p˜ = p − γze(p)
ωα
. Suppose the large
trader is constrained to choose p˜ ≤ p˜∗, then the large trader’s constrained optimization
problem is,
max
{p˜,p}
η(
M
B −D − p)(M +Dp−Bp˜) + Φ(
θ¯(p˜)− M
B−D
σp
)− t,
subject to p˜ = p− γze(p)
ωα
, p˜ ≤ p˜∗.
Assuming p is a function of p˜,
U(M, p˜) := η(
M
B −D − p(p˜))(M +Dp(p˜)−Bp˜) + Φ(
θ¯(p˜)− M
B−D
σp
)− t,
p˜∗(M) := arg max
p˜
U(M, p˜).
In equilibrium,
p˜∗(M) =
M
B −D, ∀M ≥ (B −D)p˜
∗. (2.9)
A necessary condition for (2.9) to hold is,
∂U(M, p˜)
∂p˜
|p˜= M
B−D
= 0,
⇒ dp
dp˜
=
(p− p˜)Bη + φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
1
σp
(p− p˜)2ηD , (2.10)
where θ¯(p˜) is given by (2.7), dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
is given by (2.8).
From necessary condition ∂
2U(M,p˜)
∂p˜2
|p˜= M
B−D
≤ 0, we have p(p˜) < p˜ for p˜ < p˜∗;
U(M, p˜)| M
B−D=p˜
∗,p˜=p˜∗ = 0, we solve p0.
Given initial condition (p˜∗, p0), p˜∗ ≥ p0, (2.10) pins down a locus p(p˜), p˜ ≤ p˜∗.
Proposition 12. Under Assumption 2 in the Appendix 4.2.1 (i.e., σε is relatively large)
11,
for p˜∗ ∈ [p˜2, p˜1] such that
−
√√√√Φ( θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗σp )− t
ηD
≥ φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
|p˜=p˜∗
(1
2
− B
4D
)2ηDσp
, (2.11)
11This ensures the single-crossing property (Spence-Mirrlees Property) holds for U(M, p˜).
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p(p˜) characterized below is the equilibrium locus.
p(p˜) =

p(p˜) pinned down by (2.10) given (p˜∗, p˜∗ −
√
Φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗
σp
)−t
ηD
) for p˜ ≤ p˜∗;
p˜ for p˜ > p˜∗.
Proposition 13. Under Assumption 2, there are multiple equilibria.
In Figure 2.3, the red line denotes the equilibrium locus p(p˜) in equilibrium p˜∗, the
blue line denotes the 45 degree line.
It’s clear that z(p˜) < 0, ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗, which is consistent with our observation that during
crisis the large trader shorts the asset market. In Figure 2.4, the red line denotes the
large trader’s bidding function z(p) in equilibrium p˜∗. The incentive of the large trader
to manipulate the asset price leads to financial contagion in the asset markets.
The take-away message from Figure 2.4 is, in equilibrium the large trader’s shorting
the asset market and attacking the currency regime are concurrent; the large trader’s
short position in the asset market is most significant when the public signal is in the
intermediate range. Intuitively, when the public signal is very strong, manipulating the
asset price in order to drive the small traders to be aggressive in currency attack is too
costly for the large trader; when the public signal is very weak, the marginal benefit of
depressing the asset price is small.12
In Figure 2.5, the red line denotes the large trader’s expected payoff in the second
stage game, the blue line denotes the large trader’s total expected payoff. The large
trader is loosing money in the first-stage asset market due to the costly manipulation.
Proposition 14. Given any p˜∗ ∈ [p2, p1), there exists η(p˜∗), such that if η ≤ η(p˜∗), p˜∗ is
an equilibrium; there exists η¯(p˜∗), such that if η > η¯(p˜∗), p˜∗ is not an equilibrium. Thus
larger η (weakly) shrinks the equilibrium set.
12The manipulation behavior of the large trader is attributed to the currency peg. To see this, suppose
in the second stage, the domestic currency agents trade is modeled as an asset with payoff θ. The second-
stage currency market is symmetric with the first-stage asset market, but the traders in the second stage
can observe the first-stage asset price. In this case, it can be proved the large trader doesn’t participate
in the first-stage asset market in equilibrium. The proof is available upon request.
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Figure 2.3: The Equilibrium Price Locus
Parameters: σx = 0.5, σε = 1, ω = 1, γ = 2, t = 0.5, η = 1, λ = 0.7, p˜1 = 0.85, p˜2 = 0.7011.
On the upper graph, p˜∗ = p˜1+p˜2
2
; on the lower graph, p˜∗ = p˜1.
The proof of Proposition 14 is shown in the Appendix 4.2.1. Figure 2.6 depicts η(p˜∗)
and η¯(p˜∗) for some parameter values.
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Figure 2.4: The Large Trader’s Bidding Function
Parameters: σx = 0.5, σε = 1, ω = 1, γ = 2, t = 0.5, η = 1, λ = 0.7, p1 = 0.85,
p2 = 0.7011.
On the left graph, p˜∗ = p1 = 0.85; on the right graph, p˜∗ = 0.83 < p1.
2.5 “One Large Trader” Model and the Asset Market is Trans-
parent
To draw policy implication regarding the transparency of the asset market, in this section
we assume the asset market is transparent in the sense that, the large trader’s demand
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Figure 2.5: The Large Trader’s Expected Payoff in the Second-stage Currency-attack
Game and Total Expected Payoff
Parameters: σx = 0.5, σε = 1, ω = 1, γ = 2, t = 0.5, η = 1, λ = 0.7, p1 = 0.85,
p2 = 0.7011.
On the left graph, p˜∗ = p1 = 0.85; on the right graph, p˜∗ = 0.83 < p1.
schedule in the asset market is observable for small traders.
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Figure 2.6: η(p˜∗) and η¯(p˜∗)
Parameters: σx = 0.5, σε = 1, ω = 1, γ = 2, t = 0.5, λ = 0.7, p˜1 = 0.85, p˜2 = 0.7011.
2.5.1 A Continuum of Equilibrium
Definition 5. Equilibrium is a set of functions{
p(θ, ε, z), k(x, p, z), K(θ, p, z), z(p), a(x, p, z), as(z, p), A(θ, p, z)
}
,
such that
i. Utility Maximization:
k solves the maximization problem of small trader,
k(x, p, z) ∈ arg max
k∈R
E(u(w0 + (θ − p)k)|x, p, z),
and
K(θ, p, z) = E(k(x, p, z)|θ, p, z)ω;
a solves the maximization problem of small trader,
a(x, p, z) ∈ arg max
a∈{0,1}
E(u(a,A(θ, p, z), θ)|x, p, z);
(z(p), as(z, p)) solves the maximization problem of the large trader,
(z(p), as(z, p)) ∈ arg max
z∈R,a∈{0,1}
Es((θ − p)zη + u(as, A(θ, p, z), θ)|p),
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where η normalizes the large trader’s payoff in the asset market relative to the payoff to
a successful attack in the currency-attack game.
A(θ, p, z) = (1− λ)E(a(x, p, z)|p, θ, z) + λas(p, z),
where
u(a,A, θ) = a(1A>θ − t),
u(as, A, θ) = as(1A>θ − t).
ii. Market clearing in the first-stage asset market:
K(θ, p, z) + z = Ks(ε) = σεε.
iii. Sequential Rationality:
For any z 6= z(p), there exists some belief of trader to support his a(x, p, z) or as(p, z)
as its optimal strategy,
∀z 6= z(p),∃A ∈ [0, 1 + λ], such that
a(x, p, z) ∈ arg max
a∈{0,1}
E(u(a,A, θ)|x, p, z);
∀z 6= z(p),∃A ∈ [λas, (1− λ) + λas], such that
as(p, z) ∈ arg max
as∈{0,1}
E(u(as, A, θ)|p, z).
The characterization of equilibrium of small traders in the first-stage asset market is
the same with “Two Large Traders” model above. The price function is
p = θ − γσε
ωαx
ε+
zγ
ωα
.
Define p˜ := p − γz(p)
ωα
, which is the de facto public signal about θ used by small traders
and the large trader in the second-stage currency-attack game. Replacing p with p˜ in
equations (2.1)(2.2), we can solve small trader’s strategy x¯∗(p˜) and x∗(p˜) in the currency-
attack game.
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Proposition 15. We have a continuum of equilibrium. For any p∗ ∈ [p2, p1], we can
specify an equilibrium where,
i. the large trader doesn’t participate in the asset market, i.e., z = 0; p = θ − γσε
ωαx
ε;
small trader’s demand function in the asset market is
k(x, p, z) = (αxx− αxp− γαp
ωα
z)
1
γ
;
ii. the large trader attacks the currency regime if and only if p˜ ≤ p∗;
iii. if z = 0 (on the equilibrium path), small trader attacks the currency regime if and
only if x ≤ x¯∗(p˜) when p˜ ≤ p∗, or x ≤ x∗(p˜) when p˜ > p∗;
iv. if z 6= 0 (off the equilibrium path), the large trader and small trader’s strategies
satisfy sequential rationality.
2.5.2 Equilibrium Refinement Using Forward Induction
Our refinement of equilibrium adopts the infinite rounds of elimination of dominated
strategies, which incorporates the idea of forward induction. The detailed procedure is
shown in the Appendix 4.2.1.
Proposition 16. Given k(x, p, z) = (αxx−αxp− γαpωα z) 1γ , the equilibria that survives the
infinite rounds of elimination of dominated strategies are,
(z(p), as(z, p)) =

(0, 1) if p˜ < p1;
(0, 0) if p˜ > p1;
(0, 1) and (0, 0) if p˜ = p1.
The equilibrium strategy of small traders in the second-stage currency-attack game
(x∗(z = 0, p˜), x∗(z 6= 0, p˜)) =

(x¯∗(p˜), x¯∗(p˜)) if p˜ < p1;
(x∗(p˜),x(p˜)) if p˜ > p1;
(x(p˜), x¯∗(p˜)) if p˜ = p1.
where x(p˜) denotes non-singleton strategy set.
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Except for p˜ = p1, this refinement leads to the same outcome with that of the most
aggressive equilibrium p∗ = p1 among the continuum of equilibrium in Proposition 15.
The large trader can easily coordinate an aggressive attack by taking a non-trivial position
in the asset market. The public understand that the large trader could have easily
coordinated an aggressive attack by taking a non-trivial position in the asset market, and
hence an aggressive attack is coordinated even when the large trader does not do so.It
highlights how a transparent asset market, as the large trader’s coordination device for
aggressive currency attack, could jeopardize the currency regime.
2.5.3 Policy Implication
Transparency in the Asset Market
The mechanism found in our paper is in contrast with the traditional wisdom that
the complete transparency helps stabilize the currency regime.
Proposition 13 shows it has multiple equilibrium when the asset market is not trans-
parent. Proposition 16 shows if the asset market is transparent, a natural equilibrium
refinement that incorporates forward induction reasoning selects the equilibrium where
all the traders behave most aggressively in the currency-attack game. Regarding the
case with non-transparent asset market as the benchmark, a transparent asset market,
as large traders’ coordination device for aggressive currency attack, could jeopardize the
currency regime.
Transparency in the Currency-attack game
If the large trader’s position in the currency-attack game is transparent, then it is
equivalent to that the large trader moves first in the currency-attack game and second-
stage small traders move afterwards. In our model, the large trader will attack the
currency regime if and only if p˜ ≤ p˜1. Small traders will attack if and only if xj ≤ x¯∗(p˜)
if p˜ ≤ p˜1, or xj ≤ x∗(p˜) if p˜ > p˜1. The transparency of the currency-attack game removes
the large trader’s strategic uncertainty for small traders. The equilibrium outcome is
identical to that in the most aggressive equilibrium.
From this perspective, the opacity of large traders’ position in currency market could
vitalize timid equilibrium, and hence do good to the stability of currency regime.
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2.6 Conclusion
We use a stylized model to study the large trader’s information manipulation and its
implication for asset prices during currency crises. To isolate the forces and effects of the
information manipulation, the large trader is assumed to be without private information.
Our model shows the large trader has the incentive to manipulate the asset price in favor
of its currency attack. It delivers the result that in all the equilibrium the large trader
will manipulate the asset price to be lower than the price in the case that its demand
schedule in the asset market is observable; the large trader’s shorting the asset market
and attacking the currency regime are concurrent; the large trader’s short position in the
asset market is most significant when the public signal is in the intermediate range.
The force conveyed in this paper is likely to be at play in other scenarios, such as the
market manipulation in 2008 and the manipulation of the deficit and debt statistics by
the Greek government in 2000s. Our results also imply that the uninformed manipulator
is trapped by its manipulation power.
Finally, we show that if the asset market is transparent, a natural equilibrium re-
finement that incorporates forward induction reasoning selects the equilibrium where
all the traders behave most aggressively in the currency-attack game. It highlights the
mechanism how the transparent asset market as large traders’ coordination device for
aggressive currency attack, could jeopardize the currency regime. That is in contrast
with the traditional wisdom that transparency helps stabilize the currency regime.
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CHAPTER 3
Determinants of Currency Composition of Reserves:
a Portfolio Theory Approach with an Application to
RMB
3.1 Introduction
This paper applies a portfolio theory approach to analyze the determinants of the currency
composition of foreign exchange (FX) reserves. Even though the need for reserves varies
by country, the majority of central banks manage their reserves in a similar approach
with common features including:
• Central banks are in general highly risk-averse, with the bulk of their reserves
invested in safe assets.1)
• Central banks often follow a portfolio optimization strategy ([PC03] and [PC05];
[BCC04]) with the mean-variance portfolio diversification approach being a popular
one ([Red03]; [De 03]; and [Naa03]).2
• “Safety, liquidity, and profitability” are generally accepted as the objectives of re-
serve management ([Nug00]; and [Fun01]) with safety and liquidity being the pri-
mary goals ([BGH08]).
• Central banks often create a “liquidity tranche” portfolio and a “investment port-
folio”. The liquidity tranche is designed to finance the day-to-day FX needs, fa-
1For example, in the case of Canada, the list of eligible reserves currencies is limited to US dollars,
euros, Japanese yen, and UK pounds; and the list of eligible asset classes is similarly narrow and limited
to fixed-income securities ([MW15]
2Central banks have followed the broad trend of the asset management sector of the financial industry,
borrowing and putting in place very much the same kind of processes and tools ([BGH08]).
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cilitating trade and financial flows.3 Its asset portfolio often includes exclusively
T-bills and time deposits. The “investment portfolio” pursues the highest return
subject to risk constraints.4 It is especially relevant for countries with large reserve
holdings that can afford to invest with longer-term growth objectives.5 Two-thirds
of the central banks responding to a BIS survey had established two (or more)
separate tranches ([BGH08]). The size of each tranche differs by central bank. In
some cases, less than 10 percent of reserves are allocated to liquidity tranche, while
in others, over half of reserves are held in this tranche.
• The currency compositions of imports invoicing and short-term external debt could
have a significant effect on the currency composition of FX reserves. If reserves
are considered mainly as providing an insurance (a “hedge”) against the loss of
accesss to foreign goods and services, the currency composition of import basket is
relevant for the currency composition of reserves. If reserves are seen as primarily
hedging against the loss of the access to international financial markets, the currency
composition of external liabilities would be more relevant ([BGH08]).6 Some well-
known rules of thumb, such as the ratio of reserves to imports or the ratio of
reserves to short-term external liabilities, have been used to assess the adequate
level of reserves.
• A shift towards using domestic currency as numeraire (i.e., to serve as a unit of
account) may well have taken place ([BGH08], [McC08]; [Rik06]; and [Chi06]).
Incorporating these features into consideration, we introduce a central bank’s reserve
3For example, in the case of Israel, “About three quarters of the reserve portfolio is invested in very
liquid assets. The other quarter is invested in assets with slightly lower liquidity. The ratio is set in
relation to the level of reserves and an assessment of the possible need for liquidity.”([BI01]).
4For example, in the case of Chile, “The diversification portfolio is managed on the basis of a risk
budget. This risk budget controls exchange rate risk, interest risk and, partly, credit risk.”
5For example, the investment portfolio of Hong Kong SAR is invested to preserve the Fund’s value
for future generations ([BI01]).
6As noted in [BI01], in the case of Columbia, “The authorities are now also considering bringing the
currency composition of reserves closer in line with that of the stock of short-term external debt”; in
the case of Israel, “The benchmark comprises pre-set weights of several currencies, determined more or
less in accordance with the currency composition of imports and debt service expenditure in the coming
year”; and in the case of Korea, “currency composition is based on the currency of external debt, current
payments and market depth and size of reserve assets.”
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portfolio choice model.
Our approach adopts the classical mean-variance framework for the investment tranche;
while the asset-liability framework is adopted for the liquidity tranche. As pointed out by
[ST90], the asset-liability framework is appropriate in cases where the types of liabilities
are very different (such as FX obligations arising from imports and debt payments).7
As shown later, the asset-liability framework can deliver a closed-form solution, which
makes parameter estimations convenient. Our structural model enables us to quantify
the importance of various factors in influencing a central bank’s decision.
Using the IMF Currency Composition of Official Foreign (COFER) data, we can quan-
tify the roles of the currency compositions of imports invoicing and short-term external
debt, and risk and returns of reserve currencies in determining the currency composition
of FX reserves. We can also estimate the likely paths of RMB’s share in FX reserves
under different scenarios.
Given the absence of structural models in the literature, a key contribution of our
paper is to quantify the importance of various factors in determining the currency com-
position of FX reserves by using a structural model that explicitly models central banks’
multi-tranche optimization problem, in particular, at the aggregate level of central banks.
Prior to our work, the importance of these factors in determining the currency compo-
sition at the aggregate level of central banks was recognized largely qualitatively, and
was estimated by some using reduced-form approaches. Our structural approach com-
plements them and has the advantage of identifying the mechanisms that determine the
outcomes of currency composition and relating them to central banks’ preferences and
other factors. In addition, the structural model can conduct counter-factual analyses and
scenario-based forecasts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature.
Section 3.3 introduces the stylized patterns of reserves and reserve management, and
presents an analysis based on a reduced-form regression. Section 3.4 describes the data.
Section 3.5 proposes our portfolio choice model for central banks. Section 3.6 illustrates
our estimation strategy and presents results. Section 3.7 analyzes the paths of the share
7The original Markowitz model ([Mar52] is a special case of the asset-liability model.
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of RMB in FX reserves under different scenarios.8 Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Theory
There is a set of literature that focuses on the modeling of the internationalization of
one currency. [Kru84] shows how there can be multiple equilibrium in the use of an
international currency. [MKM93] develops a theory of random matching games. [Rey01]
shows that the possibility of multiple equilibrium in the internationalization of currencies
is determined by network externalities and the pattern of international trade. [GRG10]
presents a model of the special “exorbitant privilege” role of the US dollar in the inter-
national financial system.
As reserve currency fulfills three roles–an international store of value, a unit of account,
and a medium of exchange ([Kru84] and [Fra92]–the literature on safe asset shortages and
rollover risk is relevant. [HKM19] reviews this set of literature and links the determination
of reserve asset status to the relative fundamentals and relative debt sizes by modeling
two countries that issue sovereign bonds to satisfy reserve asset demands from investors.
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence
[Eic98] applies a reduced-form analysis based on the annual aggregate-level FX reserve
currency composition data (1971-1995). Its results indicate that a reserve-currency coun-
try’s shares of global GDP and global trade have significant positive effect on that cur-
rency’s share in global FX reserves.
[CF07] also uses the aggregate-level data (1973-1998) on the shares of seven main
currencies in official reserve holdings to investigate the determinants of the currency
composition of international reserves. Their main finding is that the lagged depreciation
rate and inflation (or exchange rate volatility) have negative and significant influence
8There are many types of reserve buyers, including central banks, private banks, and investment
managers. However due to the importance of central banks as reserve buyers, “shares in central banks’
foreign exchange reserve holdings are the most important measure of international currency status as
well as the most easily measured.” ([Fra12])
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on the share, while income having a significantly positive influence.9 They also point
out that to attain international currency status, the currency issuing country’s financial
markets must be not only open and free of control but also deep and well developed.
[DLM89], and [EM00] use confidential IMF data on the country-level currency com-
position of reserve holdings. Both find that currency pegs, the direction of trade, and
the currency of foreign debt are significant and robust determinants of the currency com-
position of reserve holdings; and their importance is stable across time. [DFG03] and
[DFG05] also point out that trade links and currency pegs are the key reasons behind the
East Asian and Latin American central banks’ unwillingness to follow a pure textbook
diversification strategy.10
[PPS06] proposes a theoretically grounded and simple mean-variance framework and
modifies it to incorporate the specific needs of monetary authorities to hold a sizable
portion of their holdings in the currencies of their external debt and the currencies of
their main trading partners. Their results indicate that the optimum portfolios show a
much lower weight for the euro than is observed. [ZCX12] assumes central banks have
two sub-portfolios or tranches; one is with higher risk aversion and fulfills the safety
and liquidity objectives and the other is oriented with lower risk aversion and fulfills
the profitability objective. [FL04] presents a strategic asset allocation framework and
shows that with their assumption of the model’s parameters, a typical central bank can
significantly increase the efficiency of its portfolio by relaxing the constraints.
With respect to the estimates of RMB’s share as reserve currency, [CP10] uses a
post-euro data set (1999-2006), and infers from the estimates that RMB could quickly
attain the same international currency status as the yen and pound, assuming that China
achieved full financial market development. [SK13] forecasts the internalization of RMB
9They also find the shares of major currencies in global reserve holdings are very persistent (the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is between 0.85 and 0.96). [FO05] builds an open economy
model with monopolistic competition among firms that generates high inertia in the currency invoicing of
exports. This provides an explanation for the dollar’s dominant and stable role in invoicing international
trade transactions. Since trade patterns affect the composition of FX reserves, this theory provides one
explanation for the high persistence of the dollar in reserve holdings. As our model has taken the trade
invoicing into consideration, we do not endogenize the inertia effect through other channel.
10The results in [PPS06] suggest that even if the East Asian countries increase their trade with the
euro zone and issue euro-denominated securities, as long as they peg their currencies to the dollar, it is
very unlikely that they will massively diversify away from the dollar.
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from the perspective of reference currency. They show that RMB has increasingly become
a reference currency due to trade integration. They forecast that a more global RMB
bloc would emerge by the mid-2030s if trade were the sole driver.
3.2.3 Survey and Case Studies
Based on information from central bank asset managers as well as survey data on their
reserve policies, Royal Bank of Scotland and the European Central Bank ([PC03] and
[PC05]; and [BCC04]) note that central banks do follow a portfolio optimization strategy.
The reviews by [Red03] and [De 03] of the asset management practices of the Indian
and the Canadian central banks suggest that these institutions pursue mean-variance
portfolio diversification policies in their main international reserve holdings. This is
further emphasized in [Naa03]’s overview of developing countries’ reserves management,
which also presents evidence that constraints associated with trade, debt composition,
and the currency peg are particularly important in deciding currency composition.
[BGH08] documents the reserve management practices of central banks. Their dis-
cussion relies on a survey of central banks and monetary authorities representing in total
about 80 percent of global FX reserves at end-2006. They find safety and liquidity are
still universally agreed to be the primary goals; at the same time, the weight on the
return objectives has generally increased over time; while these trends are common to all
central banks, practices still differ considerably, reflecting country-specific circumstances.
3.3 Stylized Patterns and Evidence from a Reduced-form Re-
gression
3.3.1 Currency Compositions of FX Reserves, External Debt, and Imports
Invoicing
Figure 3.1 shows the main emerging and developing countries’ aggregate FX reserves in
main reserve currencies (EUR, JPY, GBP, and USD), imports and short-term external
debt denominated in these reserve currencies between 2006 Q1 and 2014 Q4.11 It shows
11The data source and calculation are shown in Section 3.3.
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a rapid accumulation of reserves.
Figure 3.1: FX Reserves, Imports Invoicing, and Short-term External Debt Denominated
in EUR, JPY, GBP, and USD ( 2006 Q1 - 2014 Q4, in mln USD)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; [Gop15]; Haver; IMF COFER and DOTS; UNCTAD; World
Bank International Debt Statistics; and authors’ calculations.
The shares of euro and dollar in import invoicing and external debt are moving in line
with their shares in FX reserves (Figure 3.2). The shares of dollar in FX reserves and
external debt have increased. Cross-sectional data also shows that the shares of of euro
and dollar in external debt are in line with their shares in FX reserves (Figure 3.3).
3.3.2 Domestic Currency as Numeraire
When central banks measure the risk and returns in reserve management, different nu-
meraire choices would generally imply different optimal allocations. For example, if a
domestic currency varies less against the dollar than other major currencies, a reserve
portfolio with a substantial dollar share poses less risk when returns are measured in
that domestic currency. The central banks in Australia ([Val12]) and Chile ([Chi12]) are
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Figure 3.2: The Shares of EUR and USD in FX Reserves, Imports Invoicing, and Short-
term External Debt (2006 Q1 - 2014 Q4)
Sources: [Gop15]; Haver; IMF COFER and DOTS; UNCTAD; World Bank International Debt Statistics;
and authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.3: The Shares of EUR (left) and USD (right) in FX Reserves versus in External
Debt (2016 Q4)
Sources: Haver; IMF COFER; World Bank International Debt Statistics; and authors’ calculations.
examples of using domestic currency as numeraire.
[MC14], and [MIC15] provide evidence consistent with the use of domestic currency
as numeraire. They estimate the currency movement for 25 economies, and find cross-
sectional evidence that the share of the dollar in reserves is higher where the domestic
currency varies less against the dollar than other major currencies. The relationship still
holds after they exclude currencies with currency peg and currencies that the IMF charac-
terizes as “crawl-like” or “other managed arrangement”, which indicates the relationship
does not depend on economies where the currency is heavily managed.
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In order to quantify each country’s currency co-movement with main reserve curren-
cies, we adopt the method developed by [FW94] and [FW07].
∆ ln
Xt
CHFt
= ρ1∆ ln
EURt
CHFt
+ ρ2∆ ln
JPYt
CHFt
+ ρ3∆ ln
GBPt
CHFt
+ ρ4∆ ln
USDt
CHFt
+ α + εt,
where Xt
CHFt
is each country’s exchange rate versus Swiss Franc. We name ρ1-ρ4 the
weights of euro zone, yen zone, pound zone, and dollar zone.
Following [MC14], we use a 10-year sample (2007 to September 2017) to estimate ρ1
to ρ4 for each country which releases its currency composition to COFER.
12 The results
are consistent with the use of domestic currency as numeraire (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: The Share of EUR in FX vs Euro Zone Weight (left); and the Share of USD
in FX vs Dollar Zone Weight (right) (2017 Q4)
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; IMF COFER; and authors’ calculations.
3.3.3 Exchange Rate Risk and Interest Rate Risk
Our focus is on the exchange rate risk, as the exchange rate movement is much more
volatile than the interest rate movement. It is consistent with the well-recognized sta-
bility of the government bond yield (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). For example, in the case of
Australia,“The most significant of these risks is an exposure to fluctuations in the value
of the Australian dollar against the currencies in which reserves are held” ([Val12]). As
12Euro zone countries (Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, and Portugal) are
excluded in our analysis, as their ρ1 = 1 by definition. Moldova and West Bank and Gaza are also
excluded due to data limits.
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shown later, our framework can be extended to incorporate the interest risk and other
types of risks.
Figure 3.5: Within-one-year Means of EUR, and USD Exchange Rate Returns and 2Y
Government Bond Returns Averaged for Brazil, China, India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia
(2006 Q1 - 2014 Q4)
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.6: Within-one-year Variance of Exchange Rate Returns (left) and 2Y Govern-
ment Bond Returns (right) Averaged for Brazil, China, India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia
(2006 Q1 - 2014 Q4)
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and authors’ calculations.
3.3.4 Evidence from a Reduced-form Regression
A reduced-form analysis is used to analyze the effect of the currency compositions of
imports invoicing and short-term external debt, and risk and returns of exchange rates
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on the currency composition of FX reserves. The regression model can be presented as
xit = ci + β1imports invoicingit + β2average returnit + β3return volatilityit + εit.
The fixed-effect estimators are the OLS estimators for
xit−x¯i = β1(imports invoicingit−imports invoicingit)+β2(average returnit−average returni)
+β3(return volatilityit − return volatilityi) + (εit − ε¯i),
where xit is the share of reserve currency i (either EUR, JPY, GBP, or USD) in period t
among our sample of emerging and developing countries’ FX reserves; imports invoicingit
is the share of currency i among these countries’ imports invoicing in period t; average returnit
is currency i’s average return rates using SDR as numeraire in the past 7 years up to
each quarter; and return volatilityit is currency i’s volatility of return rates using SDR
as numeraire in the past 7 years up to each quarter. The results are presented in column
(1) of Table 3.1.
In column (2), we use the share of reserve currency i of these countries’ short-term
external debt. In column (3), we use the weighted average of the currency shares in
imports invoicing and short-term external debt. The aggregate imports invoiced in the
four reserve currencies is the weight for the former and the aggregate short-term external
debt denominated in these currencies is the weight for the latter. In column (4), the
2-year government bond bid-ask spread is introduced as the control variable.
The results show that the currency compositions of imports invoicing and short-term
external debt have significant effect on the currency composition of FX reserves; the
return rates also have significant effect, consistent with the existence of the investment
tranche; and the effect of the return volatility is not statistically significant, consistent
with the results in [CP10].
The effect of the government bond spread is not statistically significant. We believe
that, for these four main reserve currencies, the government bonds of their issuers are
liquid enough so that their liquidity is not a major concern for reserve buyers. However,
as discussed in Section 3.7.1, a liquid government bond market could be one necessary
condition for central banks to hold these bonds.
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Table 3.1: Results of the Reduced-form Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
imports invoicing 0.622∗∗∗
(4.90)
ST external debt denomination 0.413∗∗∗
(11.20)
imports invoicing and ST external debt denomination 0.549∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗
(9.96) (9.98)
average return 47.60∗∗ 97.10∗∗∗ 64.26∗∗∗ 69.51∗∗∗
(2.15) (6.06) (3.76) (3.87)
return volatility -3.602 1.383 -0.318 -1.714
(-1.46) (0.69) (-0.15) (-0.67)
government bond spread -9.588
(-0.94)
const 0.117∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(3.53) (11.48) (6.35) (6.12)
N 144 144 144 144
within R-square 0.2459 0.5374 0.4859 0.4892
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4 Data
Our main sample includes 22 emerging and developing countries.13 The selection criteria
is that they either had FX reserves exceeding USD10bn in 2017, or are included in the
imports invoicing dataset in [Gop15]. As the aggregate FX reserves of these 22 countries
accounted for 88 percent of the total FX reserve holdings of the emerging and developing
13They are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Columbia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand,
Turkey, and Ukraine.
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economies in 2015 Q1, we use the currency composition of the emerging and developing
countries’ aggregate FX reserves reported by COFER14 to approximate the currency
composition of these 22 countries’ aggregate FX reserves. The time period covered in
our estimation is from 2006 Q1 to 2014 Q4, as the currency composition of emerging and
developing countries’ FX reserves became unavailable starting from 2015 Q1.
The data on the average currency composition of imports invoicing between 1999 and
2015 is from [Gop15]. We use that average to calculate the imports invoicing in each
currency for each year due to data limits.15 For countries included in the dataset but
with missing share for some reserve currency, and for those not included in the dataset,
we approximate the currency composition of their imports invoicing as follows:
• If the country is included in the dataset but the share of some reserve currency
is missing, we approximate the share using that currency’s share in the imports
invoicing of the countries with available data.
• If the country is not included in the dataset, we approximate each reserve currency’s
share using that currency’s share in the imports invoicing of the countries with
available data.
After the approximation, the sum of each country’s imports invoiced in that reserve
currency becomes the aggregate imports of all these 22 countries invoiced in that reserve
currency.
Approximation is also applied for the currency composition of short-term external
debt. The data on country-level short-term external debt is sourced from Haver. As
there is almost no data on the currency composition of short-term external debt, we use
the currency composition of total external debt or public and publicly-guaranteed (PPG)
debt from World Bank International Debt Statistics as an approximation. In cases where
PPG debt is unavailable for one country, we use the short-term external debt-weighted
average of other countries’ currency shares as the approximation for that country. Next
we calculate each country’s aggregate short-term external debt denominated in reserve
14COFER data for individual countries are strictly confidential, except for several countries.
15The imports of goods data is from IMF DOTS; and the imports of service data is from UNCTAD.
80
currencies; and the aggregate short-term external debt of all these 22 countries denomi-
nated in each reserve currency.
To investigate the cross-sectional pattern, we use the rather limited quarterly country-
level reserve currency composition data from the IMF COFER data.16 For each country,
we calculate the currency share of EUR, JYP, GBP, and USD.
3.5 A Portfolio Choice Model
We have developed a portfolio choice model to analyze the currency allocation decision
of central banks. In the model, the aggregate reserve portfolio of a central bank is
divided into two tranches, liquidity tranche and investment tranche. The size of the
FX obligations, denoted by L, is related to the value of FX used for the payment for
imports and short-term external debt, using domestic currency as numeraire. There are
other types of liabilities that could potentially call for FX, such as domestic deposits
denominated in FX, M2, and other types of external liabilities ([Fun11]). However,
in this paper we only consider FX payment for imports and short-term external debt
denominated in FX, as they are the most relevant FX-denominated potential drains for
many countries. yi denotes the share of obligations in currency i ∈ I. Ri denotes the
growth rate of the value of currency i obligations, which equals to the growth rate of
the exchange rate of currency i using domestic currency as numeraire. The value of the
obligations one period later is
∑
i
Lyi(1 +Ri) = L(1 +
∑
i
yiRi),
where A denotes the initial value of reserve assets (the aggregate portfolio). If A > L,
the size of the liquidity tranche equals to L, the size of the investment tranche is A− L.
If A ≤ L, the whole portfolio is the liquidity tranche.
For simplicity, in our benchmark model, we assume the returns of the reserve assets
using their denominate currency as numeraire are zero, therefore exchange rates are the
only factor that affects the values of reserves assets. Under this assumption, as the assets
16The data is available for Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia,
Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway,
Peru, Portugal, Seychelles, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay, West Bank and Gaza.
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denominated in the same reserve currency are essentially the same, the central banks’
problem becomes a choice of currency allocation. This assumption is consistent with the
observation of a much larger FX risk compared to interest rate risk (Figures 3.5 and 3.6).
In reality, central banks we have seen do set the shares of reserve currencies as benchmark
when managing their FX reserves.17 This assumption can be relaxed with details shown
in Appendix 4.3.1.
The central bank chooses the currency share xLi, xIi of each currency i for the liquidity
tranche and the investment tranche. The value of the liquidity tranche after one period
is ∑
i
LxLi(1 +Ri) = L(1 +
∑
i
xLiRi).
The value of the investment tranche after one period is∑
i
(A− L)xIi(1 +Ri) = (A− L)(1 +
∑
i
xIiRi).
The goal for the liquidity tranche is to maximize the surplus subject to some risk
constraints18
L
∑
i
xLiRi − L
∑
i
yiRi.
It is equivalent to maximize
L
∑
i xLiRi−L
∑
i yiRi
L
=
∑
i(xLi − yi)Ri. The central bank’s
optimization problem for the liquidity tranche is
min
xL
1
2
(xL − y)ᵀΩ(xL − y)− λLmᵀ(xL − y),
s.t. eᵀxL = 1.
where Ω is the covariance matrix of the currency return rates, m is the expected
return rates of currencies. The solution is
xL = y + λL(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e).
17For example, Chile’ central bank sets the reference structure of the medium-term liquidity portfolio
to be USD 39%, and EUR 36% (Central Bank of Chile, 2012); for Sweden, its benchmark is USD 35%,
EUR 35%, GBP 15% and JPY 15%; for UK, its benchmark is USD 40%, EUR 40%, and JPY 20%;
for Hong Kong, the benchmark is USD 80%, EUR 15%, JPY 5%; for Colombia, the benchmark is USD
80.4%, EUR 15.3%, JPY 4.2%; and for Botswana, the currency composition of the short-term fund is
USD 48.9%, EUR 25.2%, GBP 11.1%, JPY 11.9% ([BI01]).
18For example, for Colombia, its currency composition of the benchmark is determined by the expected
denomination of the balance of payments outflows...in order to maintain the value of the reserves in terms
of expected outflows ([BI01]).
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y is the minimum variance portfolio (λL = 0). If central banks do not have return concern
for the liquidity tranche, the currency composition of the liquidity tranche will be set to
be equal to the currency composition of the obligations.
The goal for the investment tranche is to maximize the returns subject to some
risk constraints. It is equivalent to maximize 1 +
∑
i xIiRi. Thus the central bank’s
optimization problem for the investment tranche is
min
xI
1
2
xᵀIΩxI − λImᵀxI ,
s.t. eᵀxI = 1.
The solution is
xI =
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+ λI(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e).
If A > L, the currency composition of the whole reserve portfolio is
x =
LxL + (A− L)xI
A
= xI +
L
A
(xL − xI)
=
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+λI(Ω
−1m−e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)+
L
A
(y− Ω
−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+(λL−λI)(Ω−1m−e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)).
If A ≤ L, the whole portfolio is the liquidity tranche; we assume the central banks
only take the maximal size of obligation that can be covered by the reserves, that is A,
into consideration, which implies x = xL.
19
In the optimization problems shown above, we assume central banks use their domestic
currencies as the numeraire when valuing the investment tranche and the surplus of the
liquidity tranche. The choice of numeraire matters for the optimal currency allocation,
as the returns and risk of reserve currencies are affected by which currency is chosen as
the unit of account. Based on the empirical evidence and case studies, using domestic
currency as the numeraire is a reasonable assumption to make. However it does not
preclude that some countries might use USD or SDR or a basket of currencies as the
numeraire. If the return is not the concern for the liquidity tranche (λL = 0), the
19Thus this assumption leads to the result that if the return is not the concern for their liquidity
tranche, then for the central banks with inadequate reserves, the currency composition of their reserve
portfolio is in accordance with the that of obligations. This result is consistent with many central banks’
practices.
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currency composition of the liquidity tranche is determined by the currency composition
of the obligations; and therefore only the currency composition of the investment tranche
is affected by the choice of numeraire.
The FX obligations depend on the imports payment and short-term external debt
service,
Ly = aT + bD,
where T are the imports invoicing in foreign currencies, D are the short-term external
debt denominated in foreign currencies. As the foreign currencies in imports invoicing
and external debt denomination are dominated by EUR, JPY, GBP, and USD,20 we only
need to look at the import invoicing and short-term external debt denominated in these
four main reserve currencies. Our model and estimation can be extended to incorporate
more currencies in imports invoicing and short-term external debt denomination.
The aggregate obligation and the size of the liquidity tranche are
L = eᵀLy = eᵀ(aT + bD),
y =
aT + bD
eᵀ(aT + bD)
.
In some period, for the central bank with L < A, there is investment tranche. These
central banks are denoted by l ∈ J1; for the central bank with L ≥ A, there is no
investment tranche. These central banks are denoted by l ∈ J2.
l ∈

J1 if e
ᵀ(aTl + bDl) < Al;
J2 if e
ᵀ(aTl + bDl) ≥ Al.
The optimal currency composition of each of central bank l ∈ J1 are
x =
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+λI(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)+
1
A
(a(T− Ω
−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
eᵀT)+b(D− Ω
−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
eᵀD))
+
1
A
(λL − λI)(Ω−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)eᵀ(aT + bD).
The optimal currency composition of central bank l ∈ J2 are,
x =
aT + bD
eᵀ(aT + bD)
+ λL(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e).
20Based on the dataset from [Gop15], almost all the imports are invoiced in EUR, JPY, GBP, USD.
In our sample, the share of external debt denominated in EUR, JPY, GBP, USD is nearly 90%. The
ratio would be even higher if the external debt denominated in the domestic currency is excluded.
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By using the data of reserve size, we can derive the optimal currency composition of
FX reserves of all central banks l ∈ J1 and l ∈ J2, assuming each central bank has the
same λL, λI , a, b,
21
xaggregate(A,Ω,m,T,D, a, b, λI , λL) :=
∑
l∈J Alxl∑
l∈J Al
=
∑
l∈J1 Al
Ω−1l e
eᵀΩ−1l e∑
l∈J Al
+a
∑
l∈J1(Tl −
Ω−1l e
eᵀΩ−1l e
eᵀTl)∑
l∈J Al
+ b
∑
l∈J1(Dl −
Ω−1l e
eᵀΩ−1l e
eᵀDl)∑
l∈J Al
+
∑
l∈J2 Al
aTl+bDl
eᵀ(aTl+bDl)∑
l∈J Al
+λI(
∑
l∈J1 Al(Ω
−1
l ml − e
ᵀΩ−1l ml
eᵀΩ−1l e
Ω−1l e)∑
l∈J Al
−
∑
l∈J1(Ω
−1
l ml − e
ᵀΩ−1l ml
eᵀΩ−1l e
Ω−1l e)e
ᵀ(aTl + bDl)∑
l∈J Al
)
+λL(
∑
l∈J1(Ω
−1
l ml − e
ᵀΩ−1l ml
eᵀΩ−1l e
Ω−1l e)e
ᵀ(aTl + bDl)∑
l∈J Al
+
∑
l∈J2 Al(Ω
−1
l ml − e
ᵀΩ−1l ml
eᵀΩ−1l e
Ω−1l e)∑
l∈J Al
).
(3.1)
3.6 Estimation
3.6.1 Results
For each quarter t and central bank l, the covariance matrix Ωlt and mean vector mlt of
the reserve currencies can be estimated using the latest seven-year sample up to quarter
t. For each central bank l, the choice of the numeraire affects Ωlt and mlt of the reserve
currencies. In our estimation we assume each central bank uses its domestic currency as
the numeraire. This assumption can be relaxed if more information about central banks’
numeraire choices are available.
Define Λt := (At,Ωt,mt,Tt,Dt) and ui(Λt, a, b) as a 9×1 vector,
ui1 =
∑
l∈J1 Alt
(Ω−1lt e)i
eᵀΩ−1lt e∑
l∈J Alt
,ui2 =
∑
l∈J1(Tlt −
Ω−1lt e
eᵀΩ−1lt e
eᵀTlt)i∑
l∈J Alt
,ui3 =
∑
l∈J1(Dlt −
Ω−1lt e
eᵀΩ−1lt e
eᵀDlt)i∑
l∈J Alt
,
ui4 =
∑
l∈J2 Alt
(Tlt)i
eᵀ(aTlt+bDlt)∑
l∈J Alt
,ui5 =
∑
l∈J2 Alt
(Dlt)i
eᵀ(aTlt+bDlt)∑
l∈J Alt
,
21The assumption of homogeneous λI , λL, a, b among central banks can be relaxed. Due to a relatively
small sample of observations, this assumption is made to reduce the number of parameters we need to
estimate.
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ui6 =
∑
l∈J1 Alt(Ω
−1
lt mlt − e
ᵀΩ−1lt mlt
eᵀΩ−1lt e
Ω−1lt e)i∑
l∈J Alt
,
ui7 =
∑
l∈J1(Ω
−1
lt mlt − e
ᵀΩ−1lt mlt
eᵀΩ−1lt e
Ω−1lt e)ie
ᵀTlt∑
l∈J Alt
,ui8 =
∑
l∈J1(Ω
−1
lt mlt − e
ᵀΩ−1lt mlt
eᵀΩ−1lt e
Ω−1lt e)ie
ᵀDlt∑
l∈J Alt
,
ui9 =
∑
l∈J2 Alt(Ω
−1
lt mlt − e
ᵀΩ−1lt mlt
eᵀΩ−1lt e
Ω−1lt e)i∑
l∈J Alt
.
We have
x(Λt, a, b, λI , λL)aggregate,i = (1, a, b, a, b, λI , (λL − λI)a, (λL − λI)b, λL)ui(Λt, a, b).
Assuming xit, the share of currency i in countries’ FX reserves in quarter t, satisfies
xit = ci + βx(Λt, a, b, λI , λL)aggregate,i + εit, (3.2)
where ci is the currency-specific fixed term, capturing the time-invariant currency-specific
factor in a reduced-form way. We expect ci of euro and dollar to be much higher than
that of yen and pound, reflecting the privilege of euro and dollar.22 εit captures the
unobserved shocks and the measurement errors. The solution to our portfolio choice
model in Section 3.5 delivers how the time-varying component of the currency composi-
tion of FX reserves, βx(Λt, a, b, λI , λL)aggregate,i, depends on the observed variables and
the model’s parameters. β is expected to be smaller than one, as it captures the fact
that central banks are reluctant to rapidly adjust the currency composition of their FX
reserves. There are several plausible reasons for that reluctance. First, there is a strong
inertia bias in favor of using currency that has been the international currency in the past
(Chinn and Frankel, 2005); and second, central banks prefer to see a stable composition
for the reserves that would help to explain a consistent investment policy ([Ram99]).23
Then
xit − x¯i = β(x(Λt, a, b, λI , λL)aggregate,i − x¯(Λt, a, b, λI , λL)aggregate,i) + εit − ε¯i
22The magnitude of this term may be determined by the reserve currency issuer’s relatively stable
and persistent characteristics, for example, the economy’s size, the size of the financial markets, and the
economy’s status in the world.
23In our baseline estimation, we implicitly assume β are the same for central banks’ liquidity tranche
and investment tranche. This assumption can be relaxed.
86
= β(1, a, b, a, b, λI , (λL − λI)a, (λL − λI)b, λL)(ui(Λt, a, b)− u¯i(Λt, a, b)) + εit − ε¯i. (3.3)
A GMM estimator is adopted. We use the orthogonality conditions as the moment
conditions,
E[(uit(a0, b0)− u¯i(a0, b0))(εit − ε¯i)] = 0,
E[εit − ε¯i] = 0,
which are expressed as
E[hi(xt,Λt, a0, b0, β0, λI0, λL0)] = 0,
where
hi(xt,Λt, a, b, β, λI , λL) =
(
ui(Λt, a, b)− u¯i(Λt, a, b), 1
)
(
xit − x¯i − β(1, a, b, a, b, λI , (λL − λI)a, (λL − λI)b, λL)(ui(Λt, a, b)− u¯i(Λt, a, b))
)
.
We define θ = (a, b, β, λI , λL), and assume the identification condition holds, i.e., θ0
is the only solution to E[hi(xt,Λt, θ0)] = 0.
A two-step estimation approach is adopted.
Step 1:
We find θ∗ = (a∗, b∗, β∗, λ∗I , λ
∗
L) that minimizes( 1
n
∑
it
hi(xt,Λt, a, b, β, λI , λL)
ᵀ)In( 1
n
∑
it
hi(xt,Λt, a, b, β, λI , λL)
)
,
where In is the identity matrix.
We can implement this minimization in two steps.
xit − x¯i = β(1, λI , λL)

ui1 + a(ui2 + ui4) + b(ui3 + ui5)
ui6 − aui7 − bui8
aui7 + bui8 + ui9
−

u¯i1 + a(u¯i2 + u¯i4) + b(u¯i3 + u¯i5)
u¯i6 − au¯i7 − bu¯i8
au¯i7 + bu¯i8 + u¯i9


+εit − ε¯i.
The closed-form expression of (a, b), β∗(a, b), λ∗I(a, b), λ
∗
L(a, b) makes the overall min-
imization task much more computationally feasible. The objective function above is
minimized by searching for (a∗, b∗).
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Step 2:
Wn is defined by
Wn :=
(
1
n
∑
it
hi
(
xt,Λt, a
∗, b∗, β∗, λ∗I , λ
∗
L
)
hi
(
xt,Λt, a
∗, b∗, β∗, λ∗I , λ
∗
L
)ᵀ)−1
We find θˆ = (aˆ, bˆ, βˆ, λˆI , λˆL) that minimizes( 1
n
∑
it
hi(xt,Λt, a, b, λI , λL)
ᵀ)Wn( 1
n
∑
it
hi(xt,Λt, a, b, λI , λL)
)
,
via the same two steps as shown in step 1, using Wn as the weight matrix.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.2. More details about the estimation
are shown in the Appendix 4.3.2. We can not reject the null hypothesis that λL = 0,
which is consistent with the fact that returns are not the objective of the liquidity tranche.
Table 3.2: Estimation Results
a b β λI λL
2.6101∗∗∗ 2.3853∗∗∗ 0.5086∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗ -0.0017
(3.1603) (2.7436) (7.0743) (5.9580) (-0.5094)
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.7 shows the actual and fitted euro and dollar shares in the 22 emerging and
developing countries’ FX reserves.24 We can see that the fitted shares can capture well
the trend and fluctuations of the actual shares.
Using the estimates, we can estimate the size of the liquidity tranche and investment
tranche at the country and aggregate levels.
Laggregate liquidity =
∑
l∈J1
eᵀ(aT + bD) +
∑
l∈J2
Al,
24ci is estimated by assuming the moment condition Et(ciεit) = 0 in equation (3.2), so cˆi is calculated
from
1
T
∑
t
xit = cˆi + β
1
T
∑
t
x(Λt, aˆ, bˆ, λˆI , λˆL)aggregate,i
The estimates are cEUR = 0.1814, cJPY = 0.0070, cGBP = 0.0590, cUSD = 0.2439. That indicates dollar
and euro enjoy great privilege compared with yen and pound. Note the difference between cEUR and
cUSD (0.0625) is much smaller than the difference between euro’s and dollar’s share in the FX reserves
we see in the data (between 0.3 and 0.5), indicating our model is able to explain most of the difference
between euro’s and dollar’s share in the FX reserves.
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Figure 3.7: Actual and Fitted Shares of EUR (left) and of USD (right) (2006 Q1-2014Q4)
Sources: IMF COFER; and authors’ calculations.
Laggregate investment =
∑
l∈J1
(
Al − eᵀ(aT + bD)
)
.
Compared to 2006 and 2007, there has been a significant increase in the absolute and
relative sizes of the aggregate investment tranche afterwards (Figure 3.8). After 2008,
despite the growth of the aggregate reserve portfolio, the absolute size of the developing
countries’ aggregate investment tranche has been stable, and the absolute and relative
sizes of the liquidity tranche has been growing, driven by the growing imports invoicing
and short-term external debt denominated in reserve currencies.
With the estimates, we can estimate the optimal currency composition of the aggre-
gate liquidity tranche and investment tranche.
xaggregate liquidity =
∑
l∈J1(aTl + bDl) +
∑
l∈J2 Al
aTl+bDl
eᵀ(aTl+bDl)∑
l∈J1 e
ᵀ(aT + bD) +
∑
l∈J2 Al
,
xaggregate investment =
∑
l∈J1
(
Al − eᵀ(aT + bD)
)(
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e + λI(Ω
−1m− eᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e Ω
−1e)
)∑
l∈J1
(
Al − eᵀ(aT + bD)
) .
Between 2007 Q1 and 2008 Q1, the increase of the optimal euro share and the decline
of the optimal dollar share in the investment tranche (Figure 3.9) are in line with the
increasing returns of euro and the decreasing returns of dollar, as shown in Figure 3.5.
The trend reversed after 2008.
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Figure 3.8: FX Reserves and the Estimated Size of the Liquidity Tranche
(2006 Q1 - 2014 Q4)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Haver; IMF COFER; and authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.9: The Optimal Shares of EUR and USD in the Aggregate Liquidity Tranche
and Investment Tranche (2006 - 2014)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; [Gop15]; Haver; IMF COFER and DOTS; UNCTAD; World
Bank International Debt Statistics; and authors’ calculations.
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3.6.2 The Size of the Liquidity Tranche Included in the Reduced-form Anal-
ysis
Some hypothesis can be tested based on the relative size of the liquidity tranche,∑
l∈J1 e
ᵀ(aT + bD) +
∑
l∈J2 Al∑
l∈J Al
.
First, we expect that the larger the relative liquidity tranche size, the larger effect the
currency compositions of imports invoicing and short-term external debt on the currency
composition of FX reserves. To test the hypothesis, we interact the relative size of
liquidity tranche with the currency compositions of imports invoicing and short-term
external debt, and the weighted average of the currency composition in imports invoicing
and short-term external debt, and include them as control variables in the regressions in
Section 3.3.4. As expected, the sign of the interaction terms are positive and statistically
significant (Columns (1), (3), and (4) in Table 3.3).
Second, we expect that, the larger the relative size of liquidity tranche, the smaller
effect the exchange rate returns on the currency composition of FX reserves. To test it, we
interact the relative size of liquidity tranche with the exchange rate returns. As expected,
the sign of the interaction terms are negative and statistically significant (Columns (1)-(4)
in Table 3.3).
The coefficients of the interaction terms in Table 3.3 also indicate that the estimated
relative size of liquidity tranche and our estimates of the model’s parameters are robust.
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Table 3.3: Results of the Reduced-form Regression with the Relative Size of Liquidity
Tranche Included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
imports invoicing 0.631∗∗∗
(5.06)
ST external debt denomination 0.383∗∗∗
(7.23)
imports invoicing and ST external debt denomination 0.500∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(8.26) (8.24)
average return 658.0∗∗∗ 455.8∗∗ 551.0∗∗∗ 590.2∗∗∗
(3.00) (2.57) (3.05) (2.83)
return volatility -1.547 2.340 1.340 2.066
(-0.62) (1.15) (0.65) (0.73)
government bond spread 4.384
(0.38)
imports invocing×rel liquidity size 0.0913∗
(1.74)
ST external debt denomination×rel liquidity size 0.0307
(0.67)
imports and ST external debt×rel liquidity size 0.0726∗ 0.0709∗
(1.77) (1.71)
average return×rel liquidity size -717.1∗∗∗ -416.4∗∗ -566.4∗∗∗ -614.6∗∗
(-2.82) (-2.03) (-2.71) (-2.50)
const 0.0883∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(2.63) (11.33) (5.92) (4.84)
N 144 144 144 144
within R-square 0.3024 0.5544 0.5254 0.5259
t statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.7 The RMB as Reserve Currency
3.7.1 The Liquidity of the Government Bond Market and the Convertibility
of the Currency
When central banks decide whether to include one new currency in their FX reserves, the
liquidity of that currency issuer’s government bond market and the ease of convertibility
of that currency are important factors. As an example, Christian Vallence’s “Foreign
Exchange Reserves and the Reserve Bank’s Balance Sheet” describes the reserve man-
agement practice of the Reserve Bank of Australia ([Val12]),
“The Bank first identifies eligible reserve currencies based on several cri-
teria, including the ease of convertibility of the currency into US and/or Aus-
tralian dollars, and whether the currency has underlying government bond
markets that are sufficiently liquid for intervention purposes, and the sovereign
issuer is of high credit quality.”
We use the bid-ask spread of the government bonds to measure the liquidity of the
government bond markets. Figure 3.10 shows the mean (over time) of the daily bid-ask
spread of the government bond of the eurozone, Japan, UK, US, China, using the latest
one-year sample up to each quarter. We can observe that China’s government bonds are
less liquid than other reserve currency issuers’ government bonds, although the liquidity
has improved since the first half of 2018 (Figure 3.10).
The bid-ask spread of each reserve currency versus domestic currency can be used to
measure the transaction cost in the forex market (the ease of convertibility). Figure 3.11
shows the mean (over time) of the daily bid-ask spread of EUR, JPY, GBP, USD, and
RMB (onshore market) versus the domestic currency of China, Saudi Arabia, Russia,
India, Brazil, averaged for these five large emerging market economies, using the latest
one-year sample up to each quarter. We can see that the transaction cost of RMB is
above those of other reserve currencies in most times.
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Figure 3.10: Bid-ask Spread of 2Y Government Bonds (2005 Q4 - 2018 Q2)
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.11: Bid-ask Spread of Exchange Rates (2005 Q3 - 2018 Q2)
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and authors’ calculations.
3.7.2 The RMB as Reserve Currency under Different Scenarios
It is expected that China will gradually enhance capital account convertibility, and the
share of RMB in central banks’ FX reserves will further increase from the current level
of around 2 percent. Over 60 central banks or monetary authorities hold RMB reserves
([Yi18]). Based on our estimates in Section 3.6, we can estimate the share of RMB in
central banks’ FX reserves under different hypothetical scenarios.
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The exchange rate risk and returns of RMB affects its share in the aggregate FX
reserves through its share in the investment tranche.25 As a benchmark, for each country
in our sample excluding China, we set the RMB’s expected return, variance and covari-
ances with EUR, JPY, GBP, USD to be the average of SDR currencies’ corresponding
parameters. The currency-specific fixed term of RMB in equation (3.2) is set to be the
average of SDR currencies’ estimated fix terms.26 Our analysis can be made in different
scenarios, using equation (3.2) with Ωt,mt,Tt,Dt augmented to include RMB terms. We
do the analysis for the last period in our sample, 2014 Q4.
The growing share of RMB in imports invoicing and short-term external
debt
Holding other things constant, the increase in RMB’s share in imports invoicing and
short-term external debt will increase RMB’s share in the liquidity tranche, thus in the
aggregate FX reserves. This can be observed from Figure 3.12. If the share of RMB
in imports invoicing and short-term external debt are 50 percent, RMB’s share in FX
reserves of developing countries including China would be around 15 percent;27 RMB’s
share in FX reserves of developing countries excluding China would be around 35 percent.
The trend of RMB to be reference currency
For a sample comprising emerging-market economies, [SK13] find that between 2010
and 2013, RMB has increasingly become a reference currency, which they define as one
that exhibits a high degree of co-movement with the domestic currencies of the reserve
holders; the rise of the RMB as a reference currency is especially prominent in East
Asia.28 [MC14], and [MIC15] point out that, for China’s trading partners, both changing
trade invoicing and currency movements could make RMB more attractive for reserve
25The analysis of the exchange rate return and risk of the free floating RMB is beyond the scope of
this paper.
26See footnote 24.
27We first adopt equation (3.2) to calculate the RMB’s share in FX reserves of developing countries
excluding China, as RMB’s share in China’s FX reserves is 0; then we can use the aggregate FX reserves
of China and developing countries excluding China to calculate RMB’s share in FX reserves of developing
countries including China.
28As a reference currency outside Asia, the RMB has increased its presence from 7 to 11 (out of 42)
countries in their sample.
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Figure 3.12: The Estimated Share of RMB in FX Reserves versus Those in Imports In-
voicing (0-0.5) and Short-term External Debt (0-0.5): China Included (left) and Excluded
(right)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; [Gop15]; Haver; IMF COFER and DOTs; UNCTAD; World
Bank International Debt Statistics; and authors’ calculations.
managers.29
Using our estimates, we estimate the share of RMB under the scenarios that RMB
has different levels of co-movement with the domestic currencies of our sample countries,
excluding China itself. If RMB has a stronger co-movement with our sample countries’
domestic currencies, then from those countries’ perspective, RMB is more like a risk-free
asset and has a lower variance. Thus for each of our sample countries excluding China,
we adjust the variance of RMB’s exchange rate return we set above; the covariances
between between RMB and EUR, JPY, GBP, USD are adjusted accordingly, assuming
the correlation parameters are the same as before. A smaller variance of RMB implies
the status of RMB as a reference currency is more prominent.
Figure 3.13 shows the estimated share of RMB in FX reserves versus the return of
RMB (vary between 0.1 × 10−5 and 10 × 10−5)30and the average of variance of RMB
29The dollar zone weight (the weighted average all other economies’ dollar zone weight, similar with
what we did in section 3.2.3, using GDP share as weight) and share in export invoicing are highly
correlated, their reduced-form analysis finds that both trade invoicing and currency movements drive
changing official reserve composition, but they can not distinguish the effect of these two factors on the
currency composition due to data limitation.
30Estimated using the sample data from 2007 Q4 to 2014 Q4, the averages of returns among our sample
countries including China are around 7.18× 10−5 for EUR, 5.44× 10−5 for JPY, 9.26× 10−5 for GBP,
12.54× 10−5 for USD respectively.
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among our sample countries excluding China (vary between 1.7× 10−5 and 24× 10−5)31.
We can see a more prominent status as reference currency could lead to higher RMB’s
share in FX reserves; the magnitude of the effect is more significant when RMB has a
relatively higher return.
Figure 3.13: The Estimated Share of RMB in FX Reserves versus the Returns of RMB
(0.1× 10−5-10× 10−5) and the Variances of RMB (1.7× 10−5-24× 10−5):
China Included (left) and Excluded (right)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; [Gop15]; Haver; IMF COFER and DOTS; UNCTAD; World
Bank International Debt Statistics; and authors’ calculations.
3.8 Conclusion
The way central banks manage their reserves have evolved over the past decades, reflecting
changes in both the economic and the broader institutional environment. Central banks
have begun to manage their FX reserves in two or more tranches, to satisfy their FX
liquidity needs in the liquidity tranche, and to pursue higher returns subject to some
risk constraints in the investment tranche. The appearance of the investment tranche
reflects the continuing accumulation of reserves and central banks’ growing emphasis on
preserving and enhancing the value of the reserves.
In this paper, based on the results of a reduced-form analysis and country-level cross-
31Estimated using the sample data from 2007 Q4 to 2014 Q4, the averages of variances among our
sample countries including China are around 5.23 × 10−5 for EUR, 40.71 × 10−5 for JPY, 5.98 × 10−5
for GBP, 4.97× 10−5 for USD respectively.
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sectional evidence, we present the importance of the currency compositions of imports
invoicing and external debt, and exchange rate risk and returns for the currency compo-
sition of FX reserves.
Based on central banks’ practice and literature review, we have developed a central
bank’s reserve portfolio choice model to analyze the determinants of the currency com-
position of FX reserves. Our model formalizes central banks’ reserve tranching practice
and is estimated to quantify the roles of the currency compositions of imports invoicing
and short-term external debt, and risk and returns of exchange rates in determining the
currency composition of FX reserves at the aggregate level of central banks. That is a
key contribution of our paper, given the absence of structural models in the literature.
Based on our estimates, we find that compared to 2006 and 2007, there had been a
significant increase of the absolute and relative sizes of the investment tranche in emerging
and developing countries’ FX reserve. After 2008, despite the growth of the aggregate
reserve portfolio, the absolute size of the estimated investment tranche has been stable,
likely due to the growing liquidity needs associated with the growing imports invoicing
and short-term external debt denominated in reserve currencies.
As expected, our estimates show that the investment tranche does have returns ob-
jective, while the liquidity tranche does not. The larger the relative size of the liquidity
tranche, the more important the effect of the imports invoicing and short-term external
debt, and the smaller the effect of reserve currencies’ returns on the currency composi-
tion of FX reserves. The choice of numeraire is relevant in particular for the investment
tranche, while the currency composition of liquidity tranche is determined by the currency
composition of FX liquidity needs. There is tendency for central banks to use domestic
currency as numeraire to measure the worth of reserve assets, which is the assumption
we have used in the estimation.
Finally, we apply our model to estimate the likely paths of share of RMB in FX reserves
under different scenarios. The scenarios include a larger share of RMB in countries’
imports invoicing and short-term external debt, and the trend of RMB becoming reference
currency for other countries. The exercise helps to shed light on the potential status of
the RMB as an international currency.
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CHAPTER 4
Appendix
4.1 Appendix of Chapter 1
4.1.1 Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof.
Dealer 1’s trading strategy is Q11,2 = a
1
1,2s1 + b
1
1,2p+ c
1
1,2η1, dealer 2’s trading strategy
is Q21,2 = b
2
1,2p+ c
2
1,2η2. For dealer 1, market clearing implies
Q11,2 + b
2
1,2p+ c
2
1,2η2 + βp = 0,
thus
p = − c
2
1,2η2
b21,2 + β
− Q
1
1,2
b21,2 + β
:= I1 + λ
1
1,2Q
1
1,2.
Dealer 1’s optimization problem is
max
Q11,2
(E(θ11,2|s1, η1)− p)Q11,2 = (E(θ11,2|s1, η1)− I1 − λ11,2Q11,2)Q11,2.
FOC
−2λ11,2Q11,2 + E(θ11,2|s1, η1)− I1
= −2λ11,2Q11,2 + E(θ11,2|s1, η1)− p+ λ11,2Q11,2 = −λ11,2Q11,2 + E(θ11,2|s1, η1)− p = 0,
thus
Q11,2 =
E(θ11,2|s1, η1)− p
λ11,2
, θ
s1
 ∼ N
0
0
,
σ2θ σ2θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ + σ
2
ε
 ,
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thus
E(θ|s1) = σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε
s1,
E(θ11,2|s1, η1) =
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε
s1 + η1,
we have
Q11,2 = −(b21,2 + β)(
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε
s1 + η1 − p). (4.1.1)
For dealer 2, market clearing condition implies
Q21,2 + a
1
1,2s1 + b
1
1,2p+ c
1
1,2η1 + βp = 0,
thus
p = −a
1
1,2s1 + c
1
1,2η1
b11,2 + β
− Q
2
1,2
b11,2 + β
:= I2 + λ
2
1,2Q
2
1,2.
Dealer 2’s optimization problem is
max
Q21,2
(E(θ2|I2, η2)− p)Q21,2 = (E(θ2|I2, η2)− I2 − λ21,2Q21,2)Q21,2.
FOC implies
−2λ21,2Q21,2 + E(θ2|I2, η2)− I2 = 0,
 θ
I2(− b
1
1,2+β
a11,2
)
 ∼ N
0
0
,
σ2θ σ2θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ
2
η
 ,
thus
E(θ|I2) = σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ2η
I2(−
b11,2 + β
a11,2
),
E(θ2|I2, η2) = σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ2η
I2(−
b11,2 + β
a11,2
) + η2,
thus
−2λ21,2Q21,2 +
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ2η
I2(−
b11,2 + β
a11,2
) + η2 − I2 = 0,
thus
−2λ21,2Q21,2 + (
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ2η
(−b
1
1,2 + β
a11,2
)− 1)(p− λ21,2Q21,2) + η2 = 0,
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thus
λ21,2Q
2
1,2(
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ2η
(−b
1
1,2 + β
a11,2
) + 1) = (
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ2η
(−b
1
1,2 + β
a11,2
)− 1)p+ η2,
we have
Q21,2 = −(b11,2+β)(
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2 σ
2
η
(− b11,2+β
a11,2
)− 1
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2 σ
2
η
(− b11,2+β
a11,2
) + 1
p+
1
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2 σ
2
η
(− b11,2+β
a11,2
) + 1
η2). (4.1.2)
From (4.1.1)(4.1.2), we have
a11,2 = −(b21,2 + β)
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε
:= −(b21,2 + β)
1
1 + γ
b11,2 = b
2
1,2 + β,
c11,2 = −(b21,2 + β),
b21,2 = −(b11,2 + β)
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2 σ
2
η
(− b11,2+β
a11,2
)− 1
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2 σ
2
η
(− b11,2+β
a11,2
) + 1
,
c21,2 = −(b11,2 + β)
1
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2 σ
2
η
(− b11,2+β
a11,2
) + 1
,
then we have
b21,2(
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ2η
(−b
1
1,2 + β
a11,2
) + 1) = −(b11,2 +β)(
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2σ2η
(−b
1
1,2 + β
a11,2
)−1),
thus
b21,2(
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
σ2η
( 1
1+γ
)2
(− b
2
1,2 + 2β
−(b21,2 + β) 11+γ
) + 1)
= −(b21,2 + 2β)(
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ
2
ε +
σ2η
( 1
1+γ
)2
(− b
2
1,2 + 2β
−(b21,2 + β) 11+γ
)− 1).
Define κ1 ≡ σ
2
η
V ar(θ)−V ar(θ|s1) = ϕ(1 + γ), we have
b21,2(
1
1 + κ1
b21,2 + 2β
b21,2 + β
+ 1) = −(b21,2 + 2β)(
1
1 + κ1
b21,2 + 2β
b21,2 + β
− 1), (4.1.3)
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thus
b21,2(
1
1 + κ1
(b21,2 + 2β) + b
2
1,2 + β) = −(b21,2 + 2β)(
1
1 + κ1
(b21,2 + 2β)− (b21,2 + β)),
thus
1
1 + κ1
(b21,2 + 2β)b
2
1,2 + (b
2
1,2 + β)b
2
1,2 = −(b21,2 + 2β)2
1
1 + κ1
+ (b21,2 + 2β)(b
2
1,2 + β),
thus
1
1 + κ1
(b21,2 + 2β)2(b
2
1,2 + β) = (b
2
1,2 + β)2β,
we have
b21,2 = β(1 + κ1)− 2β = β(κ1 − 1) = β(ϕ(1 + γ)− 1).
We require λ11,2 = − 1b21,2+β > 0, λ
2
1,2 = − 1b11,2+β > 0. We immediately have b
1
1,2 + β =
b21,2 + 2β = β(1 + κ1) < 0, b
2
1,2 + β < 0.
Then we have
a11,2 = −κ1β
1
1 + γ
= −βϕ,
b11,2 = κ1β = βϕ(1 + γ),
c11,2 = −κ1β = −βϕ(1 + γ),
c21,2 = b
2
1,2
1
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
(c11,2)
2
(a11,2)
2 σ
2
η
(− b11,2+β
a11,2
)− 1
= (β(1+κ1)−2β) 1σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
σ2η
( 11+γ )
2
(− β(1+κ1)−(β(1+κ1)−β) 11+γ )− 1
= (β(1 + κ1)− 2β) 11
1+κ1
1
1+γ
(− β(1+κ1)−(β(1+κ1)−β) 11+γ )− 1
= −κ1β = −βϕ(1 + γ).
Using a11,2s1 + b
1
1,2p+ c
1
1,2η1 + b
2
1,2p+ c
2
1,2η2 + βp = 0, we have
p =
ϕ
2κ1
s1 +
η1 + η2
2
.

Proof of Lemma 1
Proof.
Following the same procedure in the proof of Proposition 1, we have the counterparts
of (4.1.1)(4.1.2) above,
Qii,i+1 = −(bi+1i,i+1 + β)(
σ2θ
V ar(si)
si + ηi − p),
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Qi+1i,i+1 = −(bii,i+1+β)(
σ2θ
V ar(si)+
(ci
i,i+1
)2
(ai
i,i+1
)2
σ2η
(− bii,i+1+β
aii,i+1
)− 1
σ2θ
V ar(si)+
(ci
i,i+1
)2
(ai
i,i+1
)2
σ2η
(− bii,i+1+β
aii,i+1
) + 1
p+
1
σ2θ
σ2θ+σ
2
ε+
(ci
i,i+1
)2
(ai
i,i+1
)2
σi+1η
(− bii,i+1+β
aii,i+1
) + 1
ηi+1).
we have
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + β,
bi+1i,i+1 = −(bii,i+1 + β)(
σ2θ
V ar(si)+
(ci
i,i+1
)2
(ai
i,i+1
)2
σ2η
(− bii,i+1+β
aii,i+1
)− 1
σ2θ
V ar(si)+
(ci
i,i+1
)2
(ai
i,i+1
)2
σ2η
(− bii,i+1+β
aii,i+1
) + 1
),
thus
bi+1i,i+1(
σ2θ
V ar(si) +
(cii,i+1)
2
(aii,i+1)
2σ2η
(−b
i
i,i+1 + β
aii,i+1
) + 1)
= −(bi+1i,i+1 + 2β)(
σ2θ
V ar(si) +
(cii,i+1)
2
(aii,i+1)
2σ2η
(−b
i
i,i+1 + β
aii,i+1
)− 1),
thus
bi+1i,i+1(
σ2θ
V ar(si) +
(V ar(si))2
(σ2θ)
2 σ2η
(− b
i
i,i+1 + β
−(bi+1i,i+1 + β) σ
2
θ
V ar(si)
) + 1)
= −(bi+1i,i+1 + 2β)(
σ2θ
V ar(si) +
(V ar(si))2
(σ2θ)
2 σ2η
(− b
i
i,i+1 + β
−(bi+1i,i+1 + β) σ
2
θ
V ar(si)
)− 1).
Using
1
1 + κi
=
1
1 +
σ2η
V ar(θ)−V ar(θ|si)
=
1
1 +
σ2η
σ4
θ
V ar(si)
,
we have the counterpart of (4.1.3) above
bi+1i,i+1(
1
1 + κi
(
bi+1i,i+1 + 2β
(bi+1i,i+1 + β)
) + 1) = −(bi+1i,i+1 + 2β)(
1
1 + κi
(
bi+1i,i+1 + 2β
(bi+1i,i+1 + β)
)− 1).
The rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 1.

Proof of Lemma 2
Proof.
For dealer 2, market clearing condition for link (1,2) implies
Q21,2 + a
1
1,2s1 + b
1
1,2p1,2 + c
1
1,2η1 + βp1,2 = 0,
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thus
p1,2 = −
a11,2s1 + c
1
1,2η1
b11,2 + β
− Q
2
1,2
b11,2 + β
:= I2 + λ
2
1,2Q
2
1,2.
For dealer 2, p1,2 is informationally equivalent to s1 +
c11,2
a11,2
η1 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1 := s2. We
have
V ar(θ|s2) = σ2θ −
σ4θ
V ar(s1) + (
κ1
ϕ
)2σ2η
= σ2θ −
σ4θ
κ1
ϕ2
σ2η + (
κ1
ϕ
)2σ2η
,
thus
σ2η
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|s2) =
σ2η
σ4θ
κ1
ϕ2
σ2η+(
κ1
ϕ
)2σ2η
= κ1 + κ
2
1,
κ2 ≡
σ2η
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|s2) = κ1 + κ
2
1.
Using
κ2 = κ1 + κ
2
1,
c22,3
a22,3
=
κ2
ϕ
,
we prove by induction. Suppose for any 2 ≤ j < i,
κj = κj−1 + κ2j−1,
cjj,j+1
ajj,j+1
=
κj
ϕ
,
thus for dealer i, pi−1,i is informationally equivalent to si−1+
ci−1i−1,i
ai−1i−1,i
ηi−1 = si−1+
κi−1
ϕ
ηi−1 :=
si, thus
V ar(θ|si) = σ2θ −
σ4θ
V ar(si)
= σ2θ −
σ4θ
V ar(si−1) + (
κi−1
ϕ
)2σ2η
,
then we have
κi =
σ2η
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|si) =
σ2η
σ4θ
V ar(si−1)+(
κi−1
ϕ
)2σ2η
= (V ar(si−1) + (
κi−1
ϕ
)2σ2η)
ϕ
σ2θ
= (V ar(si−2)+(
κi−2
ϕ
)2σ2η+(
κi−1
ϕ
)2σ2η)
ϕ
σ2θ
= (V ar(s1)+(
κ1
ϕ
)2σ2η...+(
κi−2
ϕ
)2σ2η+(
κi−1
ϕ
)2σ2η)
ϕ
σ2θ
= (
κ1
ϕ2
σ2η + (
κ1
ϕ
)2σ2η...+ (
κi−2
ϕ
)2σ2η + (
κi−1
ϕ
)2σ2η)
ϕ
σ2θ
= κi−1 + κ2i−1.

Proof of Lemma 3
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Proof.
Dealer’s trading profit is
E[(Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] + E[βpi,i+1(pi,i+1 − θ − ηi)],
where
Qi+1i,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1pi,i+1 + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1,
pi,i+1 =
ϕ
2κi
si +
ηi + ηi+1
2
,
cii,i+1 = c
i+1
i,i+1 = −βκi.
We have
E[pi,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] = 0,
E[p2i,i+1] =
ϕ2
4κ2i
V ar(si) +
σ2η
2
=
ϕ2
4κ2i
κi
ϕ2
σ2η +
σ2η
2
=
σ2η
4κi
+
σ2η
2
,
thus
E[(Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] = ci+1i,i+1σ2η = −βσ2ηκi,
E[βpi,i+1(pi,i+1 − θ − ηi)] = β(
σ2η
4κi
+
σ2η
2
− ϕ
2κi
σ2θ −
σ2η
2
) = −β σ
2
η
4κi
.

Proof of Lemma 4
Proof.
pi,i+1 = ϕ
1
2κi
si +
ηi + ηi+1
2
,
thus
pi,i+1 − pi−1,i = ϕ 1
2κi
si +
ηi + ηi+1
2
− (ϕ 1
2κi−1
si−1 +
ηi−1 + ηn
2
)
= ϕ
1
2κi
(s1 + κ1
σ2θ
σ2η
η1 + κ2
σ2θ
σ2η
η2 + ...+ κi−1
σ2θ
σ2η
ηi−1)
−ϕ 1
2κi−1
(s1 + κ1
σ2θ
σ2η
η1 + κ2
σ2θ
σ2η
η2 + ...+ κn−2
σ2θ
σ2η
ηn−2) +
ηi+1 − ηi−1
2
= ϕ
1
2
(
1
κi
− 1
κi−1
)(s1 + κ1
σ2θ
σ2η
η1 + ...κn−2
σ2θ
σ2η
ηn−2) +
1
2
κi−1
κi
ηi−1 +
ηi+1 − ηi−1
2
= ϕ
1
2
(− 1
κi−1 + 1
)s1 +
1
2
(− 1
κi−1 + 1
)(κ1η1 + ...κn−2ηn−2) + (
1
2
1
κi−1 + 1
− 1
2
)ηi−1 +
1
2
ηi+1,
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thus
V ar(pi,i+1−pi−1,i) = (ϕ1
2
)2
σ2θ(1 + γ)
(κi−1 + 1)2
+(
1
2
1
κi−1 + 1
)2(κ21+..+κ
2
n−2)σ
2
η+(
1
2
κi−1
κi−1 + 1
)2σ2η+
1
4
σ2η
= (ϕ
1
2
)2
σ2θκ1
σ2θ
σ2η
(κi−1 + 1)2
+ (
1
2
1
κi−1 + 1
)2(κ21 + ..+ κ
2
n−2)σ
2
η + (
1
2
κi−1
κi−1 + 1
)2σ2η +
1
4
σ2η
=
σ2η
4
1
(κi−1 + 1)2
(κ1 + κ
2
1 + ..+ κ
2
n−2) + (
1
2
κi−1
κi−1 + 1
)2σ2η +
1
4
σ2η
=
σ2η
4
1
(κi−1 + 1)2
κi−1+(
1
2
κi−1
κi−1 + 1
)2σ2η+
1
4
σ2η =
σ2η
4
1
(κi−1 + 1)2
κi+
1
4
σ2η =
σ2η
4
κi−1
κi−1 + 1
+
1
4
σ2η,
thus given any κ1, V ar(pi,i+1−pi−1,i) is increasing in i ≥ 2. From E(|x|) = σ
√
2
pi
exp(− µ2
2σ2
)+
µ
(
1− 2Φ(−µ
σ
)
)
,
dE(|x|)
dσ
=
√
2
pi
exp(− µ
2
2σ2
) > 0,
we have E(|pi,i+1 − pi−1,i|) is increasing in i ≥ 2.

Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.
Dealer i’s trading strategy is Qii,i+1 = a
i
i,i+1sˆi + b
i
i,i+1p+ c
i
i,i+1ηi +
i
i,i+1 S, dealer i+ 1’s
trading strategy is Qi+1i,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1p + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1S. For dealer i, market clearing
implies
Qii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1p+ c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1S + βp = 0,
thus
p = −c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1S
bi+1i,i+1 + β
− Q
i
i,i+1
bi+1i,i+1 + β
:= Ii + λ
i
i,i+1Q
i
i,i+1.
Dealer i’s optimization problem is
max
Qii,i+1
(E(θi|sˆi, ηi, S)− p)Qii,i+1 = (E(θi|si, ηi, S)− Ii − λii,i+1Qii,i+1)Qii,i+1,
FOC
−2λii,i+1Qii,i+1 + E(θi|si, ηi, S)− Ii = −2λii,i+1Qii,i+1 + E(θi|si, ηi, S)− p+ λii,i+1Qii,i+1
= −λii,i+1Qii,i+1 + E(θi|sˆi, ηi, S)− p = 0,
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thus
Qii,i+1 =
E(θi|si, ηi, S)− p
λii,i+1
.
Using projection theorem,
θ
sˆi
S
 ∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ V ar(sˆi) Cov(sˆi, S)
σ2θ Cov(sˆi, S) V ar(S)

 ,
E(θi|sˆi, S, ηi) = σ
2
θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 sˆi +
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2S + ηi,
we have
Qii,i+1 = −(bi+1i,i+1 + β)(
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 sˆi
+
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2S + ηi − p).
For dealer i+ 1, market clearing condition implies
Qi+1i,i+1 + a
i
i,i+1sˆi + b
i
i,i+1p+ c
i
i,i+1ηi + d
i
i,i+1S + βp = 0,
thus
p = −a
i
i,i+1sˆi + c
i
i,i+1ηi
bii,i+1 + β
− d
i
i,i+1S
bii,i+1 + β
− Q
i+1
i,i+1
bii,i+1 + β
:= Ii+1 −
dii,i+1S
bii,i+1 + β
+ λi+1i,i+1Q
i+1
i,i+1.
Dealer i+ 1’s optimization problem is
max
Qi+1i,i+1
(E(θi+1|Ii+1, ηi+1)−p)Qi+1i,i+1 = (E(θi+1|Ii+1, ηi+1)−Ii+1+
dii,i+1S
bii,i+1 + β
−λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1)Qi+1i,i+1,
FOC implies
−2λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1 + E(θi+1|Ii+1, ηi+1)− Ii+1 +
dii,i+1S
bii,i+1 + β
= 0.
Using projection theorem,
θ
sˆi+1 = Ii+1(− b
i
i,i+1+β
aii,i+1
)
S
 ∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ V ar(sˆi+1) Cov(sˆi+1, S)
σ2θ Cov(sˆi+1, S) V ar(S)

 ,
E(θi+1|sˆi+1, S, ηi) = σ
2
θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S))
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 Ii+1(−
bii,i+1 + β
aii,i+1
)
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+
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi+1)− Cov(sˆi+1, S))
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2S + ηi+1
= k1Ii+1 + k2S + ηi+1,
thus
−2λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1 + k1Ii+1 + k2S + ηi+1 − Ii+1 +
dii,i+1S
bii,i+1 + β
= 0,
−2λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1 + (k1 − 1)(p− λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1 +
dii,i+1S
bii,i+1 + β
) + k2S +
dii,i+1S
bii,i+1 + β
+ ηi+1 = 0,
Qi+1i,i+1(−λi+1i,i+1)(1 + k1) + (k1 − 1)p+ k2S + k1
dii,i+1S
bii,i+1 + β
+ ηi+1 = 0,
we have
Qi+1i,i+1 = −(bii,i+1 + β)(
k1 − 1
k1 + 1
p+
k2S + k1
dii,i+1
bii,i+1+β
S + ηi+1
k1 + 1
),
thus using
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
bi+1i,i+1 = −(bii,i+1 + β)
k1 − 1
k1 + 1
,
we have
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + β =
β
k1
,
cii,i+1 = c
i+1
i,i+1 = −
β
k1
.
We also have
k1 =
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 (−
bii,i+1 + β
aii,i+1
)
=
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 (−
bi+1i,i+1 + 2β
−(bi+1i,i+1 + β) σ
2
θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
)
=
bi+1i,i+1 + 2β
bi+1i,i+1 + β
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 ,
thus
1
k1
=
bi+1i,i+1 + β
bi+1i,i+1 + 2β
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 ,
using
V ar(sˆi+1) = V ar(sˆi) + (
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
)2σ2η,
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
=
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
,
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we have
1
k1
=
bi+1i,i+1 + β
bi+1i,i+1 + 2β
(
1+(
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
)2σ2η
V ar(S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
)
,
we have
bi+1i,i+1+β =
bi+1i,i+1 + β
bi+1i,i+1 + 2β
(
1+(
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
)2σ2η
V ar(S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
)
β,
bi+1i,i+1 + 2β = β(1 +
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ4θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2
σ2ηV ar(S)
)
,
bi+1i,i+1 + β = β
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ4θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2
σ2ηV ar(S),
using
V ar(θ|S) = σ2θ −
σ4θ
V ar(S)
,
V ar(θ|sˆi, S) = σ2θ − σ4θ
V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) + V ar(sˆi)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 ,
we have
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) = σ4θ
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2
(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)V ar(S) ,
thus
bi+1i,i+1 + β =
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)σ
2
ηβ,
thus
k1 =
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)
σ2η
.
Finally, we can solve
dii,i+1 = −
β
k1
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ = −β
σ2η
σ2θ
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2V ar(S),
di+1i,i+1 = −β(1 +
1
k1
)(
k1
dii,i+1
bii,i+1+β
+ k2
k1 + 1
) = −β(1 + 1
k1
)(
k1
− β
k1
V ar(sˆi)−Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ
β( 1
k1
+1)
+ k2
k1 + 1
)
= − β
k1
(k1
− β
k1
V ar(sˆi)−Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2σ
2
θ
β( 1
k1
+ 1)
+ k2) = − β
k1
(
− V ar(sˆi)−Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2σ
2
θ
( 1
k1
+ 1)
+ k2)
=
β
1 + k1
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ −
k2
k1
β
=
β
1 + k1
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ −
β
k1
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi+1)− Cov(sˆi+1, S))
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
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=
β
1 + k1
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ
− β
k1
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi) + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
)2σ2η − Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S) + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
)2σ2ηV ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
=
β
1 + k1
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ
− β
k1
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi) + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
)2σ2η − Cov(sˆi, S))
(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)(1 + (V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2(σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)))2 σ
2
η)
=
β
1 + k1
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ
− β
k1
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi) + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
)2σ2η − Cov(sˆi, S))
(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)(1 + 1k1 )
=
β
1 + k1
1
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ
(
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)− V ar(sˆi)
−(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)
2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
)2σ2η + Cov(sˆi, S))
)
=
β
1 + k1
1
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ
(− (V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
)2σ2η)
)
= − β
1 + k1
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2 ϕ = −
β
1 + k1
σ4θ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))V ar(S)ϕ
= − β
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
σ4θ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))V ar(S)ϕ.

Proof of Lemma 5
Proof.
With public signal
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
=
σ2θ
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)(1−
Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(S)
),
V ar(θ|S) = σ2θ −
σ4θ
V ar(S)
.
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Using projection theorem, 
θ
sˆi+1 = sˆi +
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
ηi
S

∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2θ
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)(1−
Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η Cov(sˆi, S)
σ2θ Cov(sˆi, S) V ar(S)

 ,
we have
V ar(θ|sˆi+1, S)
= σ2θ −
(
σ2θ σ
2
θ
) V ar(S) −Cov(sˆi, S)
−Cov(sˆi, S) V ar(sˆi) + ( σ
2
θ
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)(1−
Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η
σ2θ
σ2θ

(V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2θ
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)(1−
Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
= σ2θ − σ4θ
V ar(S) + V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2θ
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)(1−
Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η − 2Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2θ
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)(1−
Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
.
Similarly, 
θ
sˆi
S
 ∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ V ar(sˆi) Cov(sˆi, S)
σ2θ Cov(sˆi, S) V ar(S)

 ,
we have
V ar(θ|sˆi, S) = σ2θ − σ4θ
V ar(S) + V ar(sˆi)− 2Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 .
Define
∆V ≡ V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) = − σ
4
θ
V ar(S)
+ σ4θ
V ar(S) + V ar(sˆi)− 2Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 ,
we have
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi+1, S)
=
1
σ4θ
1
V ar(S)+V ar(sˆi)+(
σ2
θ
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S) (1−
Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η−2Cov(sˆi,S)
(V ar(sˆi)+(
σ2
θ
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S) (1−
Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
− 1
V ar(S)
=
1
σ4θ
(V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2θ
∆V
(1− Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
V ar(S) + V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2
θ
∆V
(1− Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η − 2Cov(sˆi, S)−
(V ar(sˆi)+(
σ2
θ
∆V
(1−Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
V ar(S)
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=
1
σ4θ
(V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2θ
∆V
(1− Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
V ar(S) + V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2
θ
∆V
(1− Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η − 2Cov(sˆi, S)− (V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2
θ
∆V
(1− Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η) +
Cov(sˆi,S)2
V ar(S)
=
1
σ4θ
(V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2θ
∆V
(1− Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) + Cov(sˆi,S)2V ar(S)
,
we have
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi+1, S) −
σ2η
∆V
− ( σ
2
η
∆V
)2
= σ2η(
1
σ4θ
(
(V ar(sˆi) + (
σ2θ
∆V
(1− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(S)
))2σ2η)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
)
∆V 2
−σ2η(V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) +
Cov(sˆi, S)
2
V ar(S)
)−∆V (V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) + Cov(sˆi, S)
2
V ar(S)
))
1
(V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) + Cov(sˆi,S)2V ar(S) )∆V 2
= σ2η∆V
(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)(− 1V ar(S) +
V ar(S)+V ar(sˆi)−2Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2 )−
(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))2
V ar(S)
(V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) + Cov(sˆi,S)
2
V ar(S)
)∆V 2
= σ2η∆V
Cov(sˆi,S)
2−V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−V ar(S)2−Cov(sˆi,S)2+2V ar(S)Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
+ V ar(S) + V ar(sˆi)− 2Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) + Cov(sˆi,S)
2
V ar(S)
)∆V 2
= σ2η∆V
−V ar(sˆi)− V ar(S) + 2Cov(sˆi, S) + V ar(S) + V ar(sˆi)− 2Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) + Cov(sˆi,S)2V ar(S) )∆V 2
= 0.

Proof of Lemma 6
Proof.
Using the result
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + β = β
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) ,
cii,i+1 = c
i+1
i,i+1 = −β
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) ,
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
=
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
,
dii,i+1 = −β
σ2η
σ2θ
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2V ar(S),
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di+1i,i+1 = −
β
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
σ4θ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))V ar(S)ϕ,
we have
p = − a
i
i,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
sˆi −
cii,i+1ηi + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
− d
i
i,i+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
S
=
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)
2σ2θ(1− Cov(sˆi,S)V ar(S) )
sˆi − d1 + d2
2σ2ηβ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))S + η1 + η2
2
,
thus
E[Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)] = E[(aisˆi + bii,i+1pi,i+1 + cii,i+1ηi + dii,i+1S)(ηi+1 − ηi)] = cii,i+1σ2η
= −β σ
4
η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) ,
E[βpi,i+1(pi,i+1−θ−ηi)] = β
((V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))2V ar(sˆi)
4σ4θ(1− Cov(sˆi,S)V ar(S) )2
−V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)
2(1− Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(S)
)
+
(dii,i+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1)
2
4σ4ηβ
2
(V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi, S))2V ar(S)+
dii,i+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1
2ϕβ
(V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi, S))
− d
i
i,i+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1
2σ2ησ
2
θβ(1− Cov(sˆi,S)V ar(S) )
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))2Cov(sˆi, S)
)
.

Proof of Lemma 7
Proof.
Dealer np learns a private signal snp = θ + εnp , where γnp ≡
σ2np
σ2θ
.
Dealer np and np+1 observe a public signal S = θ+εS, where εS ∼ N (0, σ2p), εnp ⊥ εS,
γp ≡ σ
2
p
σ2θ
.
Without public signal,
V ar(θ|snp) = σ2θ −
σ2θ
1 + γnp
,
thus
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|s1) = σ
2
θ
1 + γnp
.
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With public signal,
θ
snp
S
 ∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ(1 + γnp) σ
2
θ
σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ(1 + γp)

 ,
thus
V ar(θ|snp , S) = σ2θ − σ2θ
γnp + γp
(1 + γnp)(1 + γp)− 1
,
V ar(θ|S) = σ2θ −
σ2θ
1 + γp
,
we have
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|snp , S) = −
σ2θ
1 + γp
+ σ2θ
γnp + γp
(1 + γnp)(1 + γp)− 1
,
thus the change of information asymmetry is
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|snp , S)− (V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|snp))
=
−2γnpγp − γnp − γp
(1 + γnp)(1 + γp)((1 + γnp)(1 + γp)− 1)
σ2θ < 0.

Proof of Lemma 8
Proof.
Using the results in Lemma 1.6, dealers’ profit from asset reallocation is
E(Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1 − ηi)) =
−βσ4η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|snp , S)
,
thus the increase of profit from asset reallocation is
−βσ4η
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|snp , S)
+ βσ4η
1
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|snp)
> 0,
we have limγp→0
1
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|snp ,S) =∞.
From the results in Proposition 2, we have
cii,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
=
ci+1i,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
= −1
2
,
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aii,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
= −1
2
γp
(1 + γ)(1 + γp)− 1 ,
dii,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
= −1
2
γ
(1 + γ)(1 + γp)− 1 ,
di+1i,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
= −1
2
((1 + γnp)(1 + γp)− 1)2ϕ
((1 + γnp)γ
2
p + ((1 + γnp)(1 + γp)− 1)2ϕ)(1 + γp)− γ2p
,
we have
lim
γp→0
aii,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
= 0,
lim
γp→0
dii,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
= lim
γp→0
di+1i,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + β
= −1
2
,
thus
lim
γp→0
p =
ηi + ηi+1
2
+
S
2
,
thus
lim
γp→0
βE(p2 − pθ − pηi) = β(
σ2η
2
+
σ2θ
4
− σ
2
θ
2
− σ
2
η
2
) = −βσ
2
θ
4
,
thus we have if γp is relatively small, dealers’ profit E(Qi+1i,i+1(ηi+1−ηi))+βE(p2−pθ−pηi)
is larger in the case with public signal.

Proof of Proposition 3
Proof.
(1) np = 3
In the model with transparency, what is public is
S ≡ 2(1 + τ)p1,2 = s1 + (1 + τ)(η1 + η2) = s1 + κ1
ϕ
(η1 + η2),
from trading with dealer 2, dealer 3 observes s3 = s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1 +
κ2
ϕ
η2.
Without public signal,
V ar(θ|s3) = σ2θ −
σ2θ
κ3
ϕ,
thus
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|s3) = σ
2
θ
κ3
ϕ.
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With public signal, it’s equivalent to dealer 3 observes s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1, θ
s1 +
κ1
ϕ
η1
 ∼ N
0
0
,
σ2θ σ2θ
σ2θ
σ2η
ϕ2
κ2
 ,
θ
S
 ∼ N
0
0
,
σ2θ σ2θ
σ2θ
σ2η
ϕ2
κ1 + 2
σ2η
ϕ2
κ21
 ,
thus
V ar(θ|s1 + κ1
ϕ
η1) = σ
2
θ −
σ2θ
κ2
ϕ,
V ar(θ|S) = σ2θ −
σ2θ
κ1 + 2κ21
ϕ,
we have
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|s1 + κ1
ϕ
η1) = − σ
2
θ
κ1 + 2κ21
ϕ+
σ2θ
κ2
ϕ,
thus the change of information asymmetry is
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|s1 + κ1
ϕ
η1)− (V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|s3)) = − σ
2
θ
κ1 + 2κ21
ϕ+
σ2θ
κ2
ϕ− σ
2
θ
κ3
ϕ
= σ2θϕ(
1
κ2
− 1
κ3
− 1
κ2 + κ21
) = σ2θϕ
κ2(κ
2
1 − 1)
(κ2 + κ22)(κ2 + κ
2
1)
.
we have
E(Q43,4(η4 − η3)) = −βσ2η(
κ22
κ21
+ κ2) = −βσ2ηϕσ2θ
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|s1 + κ1ϕ η1)
,
thus the increase of profit from asset reallocation is
−βσ4η
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|s1 + κ1ϕ η1)
+ βσ4η
1
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|s3) > 0 iff κ1 < 1.
(2) np > 3
Without public signal,
V ar(θ|sn) = σ2θ −
σ2θ
κn
ϕ
thus
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|sn) = σ
2
θ
κn
ϕ.
with public signal
θ
sn
S
 ∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ
σ2η
ϕ2
κn
σ2η
ϕ2
(κ2 + κ1κ2)
σ2θ
σ2η
ϕ2
(κ2 + κ1κ2)
σ2η
ϕ2
(κ2 + κ
2
1)

 ,
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thus
V ar(θ|sn, S) = σ2θ − ϕ
(κ21 − κ1κ2)σ2θ + (κn − κ2(1 + κ1))σ2θ
κn(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
,
we have
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sn, S) = − σ
2
θ
κ1 + 2κ21
ϕ+ ϕ
(κ21 − κ1κ2)σ2θ + (κn − κ2(1 + κ1))σ2θ
κn(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
,
thus the change of information asymmetry is
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sn, S)− (V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|sn)) =
− σ
2
θ
κ1 + 2κ21
ϕ+ ϕ
(κ21 − κ1κ2)σ2θ + (κn − κ2(1 + κ1))σ2θ
κn(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
− σ
2
θ
κn
ϕ.
Define
M ≡ κn(κ2 + κ
2
1)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
(κn + (
cn
an
)2ϕ2)(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
,
where
cnn,n+1
ann,n+1
= 1
ϕ
κn(κ2+κ21)−(κ2+κ1κ2)2
κ21−κ1κ2 .
We have
E(Qn+1n,n+1(ηn+1 − ηn)) = cn+1σ2η
= β(1− 1
M
)σ2η = β(1−
(κn + (
cn
an
)2ϕ2)(κ2 + κ
2
1)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
κn(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
)σ2η
= β(1−
(κn + (
κn(κ2+κ21)−(κ2+κ1κ2)2
κ21−κ1κ2 )
2)(κ2 + κ
2
1)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
κn(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
)σ2η
= −β
(
κn(κ2+κ21)−(κ2+κ1κ2)2
κ21−κ1κ2 )
2(κ2 + κ
2
1)
κn(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
σ2η = −β
κn(κ2 + κ
2
1)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
(κ2 + κ
2
1)σ
2
η,
as
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sn, S) = σ2θϕ
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
(κ1 + 2κ21)(κn(κ2 + κ
2
1)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2)
,
thus
E(Qn+1n,n+1(ηn+1 − ηn)) = −βσ4η
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sn, S) ,
as
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sn, S) −
1
V ar(θ)− V ar(θ|sn)
= σ2θϕ(
κn(κ2 + κ
2
1)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
(κ2 + κ
2
1)− κn)
= σ2θϕ
κn((κ2 + κ
2
1)
2 − (κ21 − κ1κ2)2)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2(κ2 + κ21)
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
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= σ2θϕ
κn(κ
2
2 + κ
4
1 + 2κ
2
1κ2 − (κ41 + κ21κ22 − 2κ31κ2))− (κ1 + κ1κ2)2(κ2 + κ21)
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
= σ2θϕ
κn((κ1 + κ
2
1)
2 + 2κ21(κ1 + κ
2
1)− κ21(κ1 + κ21)2 + 2κ31(κ1 + κ21))− (κ1 + κ1κ2)2(κ2 + κ21)
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
= σ2θϕ
κn(κ1 + κ
2
1)(κ1 + κ
2
1 + 2κ
2
1 − κ31 − κ41 + 2κ31)− (κ1 + κ1κ2)2(κ2 + κ21)
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
= σ2θϕ
κn(κ1 + κ
2
1)(κ1 + 3κ
2
1 + κ
3
1 − κ41)− (κ1 + κ1κ2)2(κ2 + κ21)
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
.
Obviously, it’s negative if κ1 is large enough.

Proof of Proposition 4
Proof.
(1) np = 3
Dealers’ profit from serving the clients
E(βp(p− θ − η3)) = βσ2η(−
1
4κ2
+
1
4
κ22(κ
2
1 + κ2)
(
κ22
κ21
+ κ2 + 1)2κ41
),
we have the magnitude of the increase of dealers’ profit from serving the clients
−βσ2η(
1
4κ2
− 1
4
κ22(κ
2
1 + κ2)
(
κ22
κ21
+ κ2 + 1)2κ41
− 1
4κ3
),
is smaller than the increase of profit from asset reallocation between dealers when κ1 is
relatively large.
(2) np > 3
Dealers’ profit from serving the clients
E(βp(p−θ−ηn)) = β
(1
4
A2σ2ηκn+
1
4
B2σ2η(κ2 +κ
2
1)+
1
2
ABσ2η(κ2 +κ1κ2)−
1
2
Aσ2η−
1
2
Bσ2η
)
,
where
A =
κ21 − κ1κ2
κn(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
,
B =
κn − κ2(1 + κ1)
κn(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
+
(κn(κ2 + κ
2
1)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2)2
(κn + (
κn(κ2+κ21)−(κ2+κ1κ2)2
κ21−κ1κ2 )
2)(κ2 + κ21)− (κ2 + κ1κ2)2
1
(κ21 − κ1κ2)2
,
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as κ1 is relatively large, we have κn  κ1, κ2, thus A→ κ
2
1−κ1κ2
κn(κ21+κ2)
, B → 2
κ2+κ21
.
We have the magnitude of the increase of dealers’ profit from serving the clients
βσ2η
(1
4
A2κn +
1
4
B2(κ2 + κ
2
1) +
1
2
AB(κ2 + κ1κ2)− 1
2
A− 1
2
B +
1
4κ3
)
,
is smaller than the increase of profit from asset reallocation between dealers when κ1 is
relatively large.

Proof of Proposition 5
Proof.
(1) For i ∈ {np + 1, ..., n¯}, in equilibrium lˆi−1,i = 1, if and only if C ≤ C∗i−1,i(κ1), where
C∗i−1,i(κ1) ≡ max{C∗(i), ..., C∗(n¯)}.
For j ∈ {i, ..., n¯},
C∗(j) = min{C˜1,2, ..., C˜j−1,j}.
For k ∈ {2, ..., j},
C˜k−1,k =
E(pik−1k−1,k) + E(pikk−1,k) +
1
2
(
E(pikk,k+1) + E(pi
k+1
k,k+1)
)
+ ... 1
2j−k
(
E(pij−1j−1,j) + E(pi
j
j−1,j)
)
1 + 1
2
+ ... 1
2j−k
.
As j ≥ i ≥ np+1, from Proposition 4, we have when κ1 is relatively large, E(pij−1j−1,j)+
E(pijj−1,j) is strictly smaller in the model with p1,2 as public signal. Thus C˜k−1,k is strictly
smaller in the model with p1,2 as public signal, for k ∈ {2, ..., j}. Thus C∗(j) is strictly
smaller in the model with p1,2 as public signal, for j ∈ {i, ..., n¯}. Thus C∗i−1,i(κ1) is strictly
smaller in the model with p1,2 as public signal, for i ∈ {np + 1, ..., n¯}.
(2) For i ∈ {2, ..., np}, for j ≥ i ≥ 2, from Proposition 4, we have when κ1 is relatively
large, E(pij−1j−1,j)+E(pi
j
j−1,j) is weakly smaller in the model with p1,2 as public signal. Thus
C˜k−1,k is weakly smaller in the model with p1,2 as public signal, for k ∈ {2, ..., j}. Thus
C∗(j) is weakly smaller in the model with p1,2 as public signal, for j ∈ {i, ..., n¯}. Thus
C∗i−1,i(κ1) is weakly smaller in the model with p1,2 as public signal, for i ∈ {2, ..., np}.

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Proof of Proposition 6
Proof.
Suppose there are n dealers in the network. For dealer n− 1, market clearing condition
for the link (n− 2, n− 1) implies
Qn−1n−2,n−1 + an−2sn−2 + bn−2pn−2,n−1 + cn−2ηn−2 + βpn−2,n−1 = 0,
thus
pn−2,n−1 = −an−2sn−2 + cn−2ηn−2
bn−2 + β
− Q
n−1
n−2,n−1
bn−2 + β
:= In−1n−2,n−1 + λn−1Q
n−1
n−2,n−1.
Market clearing condition for the link (n− 1, n) implies
Qn−1n−1,n + bnpn−1,n + cnηn + βpn−1,n = 0,
thus
pn−1,n = − cnηn
bn + β
− Q
n−1
n−1,n
bn + β
:= In−1n−1,n + λn−1Q
n−1
n−1,n.
The optimization problem of dealer n− 1 is
max
Qn−1n−2,n−1,Q
n−1
n−1,n
(E(θn−1|In−1n−2,n−1, ηn−1)− pn−2,n−1)Qn−1n−2,n−1
+(E(θn−1|In−1n−1,n, In−1n−2,n−1, ηn−1)− pn−1,n)Qn−1n−1,n
= (E(θn−1|In−1n−2,n−1, ηn−1)− In−1n−2,n−1 − λn−1Qn−1n−2,n−1)Qn−1n−2,n−1
+(E(θn−1|In−1n−2,n−1, ηn−1)− In−1n−1,n − λn−1Qn−1n−1,n)Qn−1n−1,n,
the above equality uses that In−1n−1,n is not informative about θ.
Thus it’s immediately clear that Qn−1n−2,n−1 does not depend on I
n−1
n−1,n, thus does not
depend on pn−1,n. Going backward, we can see the demand function of any i ∈ {2, ..., n}
is Qii−1,i just depends on pi−1,i and ηi. Thus the solution to the linear equilibrium of the
simultaneous trading game is equivalent to that of the sequential trading game.

Proof of Proposition 7
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Proof.
Starting from an equilibrium in the OTC game, we construct a bidding strategy for
dealer i as follows. For dealer i,
qii,i+1,0 = a
i
i,i+1si + b
i
i,i+1p
i
i,i+1,0 + c
i
i,i+1ηi,
pii,i+1,0 = 0,
qii,i+1,τ+1 = a
i
i,i+1si + b
i
i,i+1p
i
i,i+1,τ+1 + c
i
i,i+1ηi,
pii,i+1,τ+1 = p
i+1
i,i+1,τ .
For dealer i+ 1,
qi+1i,i+1,0 = b
i+1
i,i+1p
i+1
i,i+1,0 + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1,
pi+1i,i+1,0 = 0,
qi+1i,i+1,τ+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1p
i
i,i+1,τ+1 + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1,
pi+1i,i+1,τ+1 =
ϕ
2κi
qii,i+1,τ − bii,i+1pii,i+1,τ
aii,i+1
+
ηi+1
2
.
First, we show that if bidding functions are defined as above, the OTC price-discovery
process converges to the equilibrium prices and quantities in the OTC game.
In round 1, given the bids in round 0,
qii,i+1,1 = a
i
i,i+1si + b
i
i,i+1p
i
i,i+1,1 + c
i
i,i+1ηi,
pii,i+1,1 = 0,
qi+1i,i+1,1 = b
i+1
i,i+1p
i+1
i,i+1,1 + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi,
pi+1i,i+1,1 =
ϕ
2κi
(si +
κi
ϕ
ηi) +
ηi+1
2
.
In round 2, given the bids in round 1,
qii,i+1,2 = a
i
i,i+1si + b
i
i,i+1p
i
i,i+1,2 + c
i
i,i+1ηi,
pii,i+1,2 =
ϕ
2κi
(si +
κi
ϕ
ηi) +
ηi+1
2
,
qi+1i,i+1,2 = b
i+1
i,i+1p
i+1
i,i+1,2 + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1,
pi+1i,i+1,2 =
ϕ
2κi
(si +
κi
ϕ
ηi) +
ηi+1
2
,
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the trade takes place.
Then I show that dealer i and i+ 1 would not want to change their bidding strategy
unilaterally.
Firstly, I show that for dealer i+1, given dealer i’s strategy, it does not have incentive
to deviate. As given dealer i’s bid in last round τ , dealer i + 1 learns si +
κi
ϕ
ηi. It can
set price pi+1i,i+1,τ+1 such that the trade takes place in next round with p
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1, q
i
i,i+1,τ+2,
qi+1i,i+1,τ+2, such that
qii,i+1,τ+2 = a
i
i,i+1si + b
i
i,i+1p
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1 + c
i
i,i+1ηi,
qi+1i,i+1,τ+2 + q
i
i,i+1,τ+2 + βp
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1 = 0,
thus dealer i+ 1 solves
max
pi+1i,i+1,τ+1
E[qi+1i,i+1,τ+2(θ + ηi+1 − pi+1i,i+1,τ+1)|si +
κi
ϕ
ηi, ηi+1],
s.t.
qi+1i,i+1,τ+2 + a
i
i,i+1si + b
i
i,i+1p
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1 + c
i
i,i+1ηi + βp
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1 = 0,
by construction,
aii,i+1 = −βϕ,
bii,i+1 = βκi,
cii,i+1 = −βκi,
thus
E[qi+1i,i+1,τ+2(θ + ηi+1 − pi+1i,i+1,τ+1)|si +
κi
ϕ
ηi, ηi+1]
= E[−(aii,i+1si + bii,i+1pi+1i,i+1,τ+1 +ii,i+1 ηi + βpi+1i,i+1,τ+1)(θ + ηi+1 − pi+1i,i+1,τ+1)|si +
κi
ϕ
ηi, ηi+1]
= E[−(−βϕ(si + κi
ϕ
ηi) + βκip
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1 + βp
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1)(θ + ηi+1 − pi+1i,i+1,τ+1)|si +
κi
ϕ
ηi, ηi+1],
thus dealer i+ 1 solves
max
pi+1i,i+1,τ+1
E[(pi+1i,i+1,τ+1)2β(1+κi)+p
i+1
i,i+1,τ+1(−βϕ(si+
κi
ϕ
ηi)−β(1+κi)(θ+ηi+1))|si+κi
ϕ
ηi, ηi+1],
we have
pi+1i,i+1,τ+1 = −
−βϕ(si + κiϕ ηi)− β(1 + κi)(E(θ|si + κiϕ ηi) + ηi+1)
2β(1 + κi)
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=
ϕ(si +
κi
ϕ
ηi) + (1 + κi)
si+
κi
ϕ
ηi
κi+1
ϕ
2(1 + κi)
+
ηi+1
2
= ϕ
1 + 1+κi
κi+1
2(1 + κi)
(si +
κi
ϕ
ηi) +
ηi+1
2
= ϕ
κi(1 + κi) + 1 + κi
2κi(1 + κi)2
(si +
κi
ϕ
ηi) +
ηi+1
2
=
ϕ
2κi
(si +
κi
ϕ
ηi) +
ηi+1
2
=
ϕ
2κi
qii,i+1,τ − bii,i+1pii,i+1,τ
ai
+
ηi+1
2
.
Then I show that for dealer i, given dealer i+ 1’s strategy, it does not have incentive
to deviate. Given dealer i + 1’s strategy, the only way dealer i can affect the price that
the trade takes place, ϕ
2κi
qii,i+1,τ−bii,i+1pii,i+1,τ
aii,i+1
+ ηi+1
2
, is to change
qii,i+1,τ−bii,i+1pii,i+1,τ
aii,i+1
:= A.
Thus dealer i solves
max
qii,i+1,τ+1
E[qii,i+1,τ+1(θ + ηi −
ϕ
2κi
A− ηi+1
2
)|si, ηi],
s.t.
qii,i+1,τ+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1(
ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
) + ci+1i,i+1ηi+1 + β(
ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
) = 0,
thus dealer i solves
max
A
E[−(bi+1i,i+1(
ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
) + ci+1i,i+1ηi+1 + β(
ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
))(θ + ηi − ϕ
2κi
A− ηi+1
2
)|si, ηi],
by construction,
bi+1i,i+1 = β(κi − 1),
ci+1i,i+1 = −βκi,
thus
E[−(bi+1i,i+1(
ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
) + ci+1i,i+1ηi+1 + β(
ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
))(θ + ηi − ϕ
2κi
A− ηi+1
2
)|si, ηi]
= E[−(β(κi − 1)( ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
)− βκiηi+1 + β( ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
))(θ+ ηi − ϕ
2κi
A− ηi+1
2
)|si, ηi]
= −E[(βκi( ϕ
2κi
A+
ηi+1
2
)− βκiηi+1)(θ + ηi − ϕ
2κi
A− ηi+1
2
)|si, ηi]
= −E[(β(ϕ
2
A− κi
2
ηi+1)(θ + ηi − ϕ
2κi
A− ηi+1
2
)|si, ηi]
= −βκiE[− ϕ
2
4κ2i
A2 +
ϕ
2κi
A(θ + ηi)− ηi+1
2
(θ + ηi − ηi+1
2
)|si, ηi],
thus
A =
κi
ϕ
(E(θ|si, ηi) + ηi),
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thus
qii,i+1,τ − bii,i+1pii,i+1,τ
aii,i+1
=
κi
ϕ
(E(θ|si, ηi) + ηi),
we have
qii,i+1,τ = a
i
i,i+1
κi
ϕ
(E(θ|si, ηi) + ηi) + bii,i+1pii,i+1,τ = aii,i+1
κi
ϕ
(
ϕ
κi
si + ηi) + b
i
i,i+1p
i
i,i+1,τ
= aii,i+1(si+
κi
ϕ
ηi)+b
i
i,i+1p
i
i,i+1,τ = a
i
i,i+1si+b
i
i,i+1p
i
i,i+1,τ−βκiηi = aii,i+1si+bii,i+1pii,i+1,τ+cii,i+1ηi.

Proof of Proposition 8
Proof.
Dealer i’s trading strategy is Qii,i+1 = a
i
i,i+1sˆi + b
i
i,i+1p+ c
i
i,i+1ηi +d
i
i,i+1S, dealer i+ 1’s
trading strategy is Qi+1i,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1p+c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1+d
i+1
i,i+1S. Clients’ demand is βi,i+1p+δi,i+1S.
For dealer i, market clearing implies
Qii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1p+ c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1S + βi,i+1p+ δi,i+1S = 0,
thus
p = −c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1
− Q
i
i,i+1
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1
:= I ii,i+1 + λ
i
i,i+1Q
i
i,i+1.
Dealer i’s optimization problem is
max
Qii,i+1
(E(θi|sˆi, ηi, S)− p)Qii,i+1 = (E(θi|si, ηi, S)− Ii − λii,i+1Qii,i+1)Qii,i+1,
FOC
−2λii,i+1Qii,i+1 + E(θi|si, ηi, S)− Ii = −2λii,i+1Qii,i+1 + E(θi|si, ηi, S)− p+ λii,i+1Qii,i+1
= −λii,i+1Qii,i+1 + E(θi|sˆi, ηi, S)− p = 0,
thus
Qii,i+1 =
E(θi|si, ηi, S)− p
λii,i+1
.
Using projection theorem,
θ
sˆi
S
 ∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ V ar(sˆi) Cov(sˆi, S)
σ2θ Cov(sˆi, S) V ar(S)

 ,
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E(θi|sˆi, ηi) = σ
2
θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 sˆi +
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2S + ηi,
we have
Qii,i+1 = −(bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1)(
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 sˆi
+
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2S + ηi − p).
For dealer i+ 1, market clearing condition implies
Qi+1i,i+1 + a
i
i,i+1sˆi + b
i
i,i+1p+ c
i
i,i+1ηi + d
i
i,i+1S + βi,i+1p+ δi,i+1S = 0,
thus
p = −a
i
i,i+1sˆi + c
i
i,i+1ηi
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
− d
i
i,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
− Q
i+1
i,i+1
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
:= Ii+1 −
dii,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
+ λi+1i,i+1Q
i+1
i,i+1.
Dealer i+ 1’s optimization problem is
max
Qi+1i,i+1
(E(θi+1|Ii+1, ηi+1)− p)Qi+1i,i+1 = (E(θi+1|Ii+1, ηi+1)− Ii+1
+
dii,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
− λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1)Qi+1i,i+1,
FOC implies
−2λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1 + E(θi+1|Ii+1, ηi+1)− Ii+1 +
dii,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
= 0.
Using projection theorem,
θ
sˆi+1 = Ii+1(− b
i
i,i+1+βi,i+1
aii,i+1
)
S
 ∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ V ar(sˆi+1) Cov(sˆi+1, S)
σ2θ Cov(sˆi+1, S) V ar(S)

 ,
E(θi+1|sˆi+1, ηi) = σ
2
θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S))
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 Ii+1(−
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
aii,i+1
)
+
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi+1)− Cov(sˆi+1, S))
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2S + ηi+1
= k1Ii+1 + k2S + ηi+1,
thus
−2λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1 + k1Ii+1 + k2S + ηi+1 − Ii+1 +
dii,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
= 0,
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−2λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1+(k1−1)(p−λi+1i,i+1Qi+1i,i+1+
dii,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
)+k2S+
dii,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
+ηi+1 = 0,
Qi+1i,i+1(−λi+1i,i+1)(1 + k1) + (k1 − 1)p+ k2S + k1
dii,i+1S + δi,i+1S
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
+ ηi+1 = 0,
we have
Qi+1i,i+1 = −(bii,i+1 + βi,i+1)(
k1 − 1
k1 + 1
p+
k2S + k1
dii,i+1S+δi,i+1S
bii,i+1+βi,i+1
+ ηi+1
k1 + 1
),
thus using
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + βi,i+1,
bi+1i,i+1 = −(bii,i+1 + βi,i+1)
k1 − 1
k1 + 1
,
we have
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + βi,i+1 =
βi,i+1
k1
,
cii,i+1 = c
i+1
i,i+1 = −
βi,i+1
k1
,
we also have
k1 =
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 (−
bii,i+1 + βi,i+1
aii,i+1
)
=
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 (−
bi+1i,i+1 + 2βi,i+1
−(bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1) σ
2
θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
)
=
bi+1i,i+1 + 2βi,i+1
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 ,
thus
1
k1
=
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1
bi+1i,i+1 + 2βi,i+1
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2 ,
using
V ar(sˆi+1) = V ar(sˆi) + (
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
)2σ2η,
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
=
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
,
we have
1
k1
=
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1
bi+1i,i+1 + 2βi,i+1
(
1+(
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
)2σ2η
V ar(S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
)
,
we have
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1 =
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1
bi+1i,i+1 + 2βi,i+1
126
(
1 + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
)2σ2η
V ar(S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
)
βi,i+1
bi+1i,i+1 + 2βi,i+1 = βi,i+1(1 +
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ4θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2
σ2ηV ar(S)
)
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1 = βi,i+1
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ4θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2
σ2ηV ar(S),
using
V ar(θ|S) = σ2θ −
σ4θ
V ar(S)
,
V ar(θ|sˆi, S) = σ2θ − σ4θ
V ar(S)− 2Cov(sˆi, S) + V ar(sˆi)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 ,
we have
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) = σ4θ
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2
(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)V ar(S) ,
thus
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1 =
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)σ
2
ηβi,i+1,
thus
k1 =
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)
σ2η
.
Finally, we can solve
dii,i+1 = −
βi,i+1
k1
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ = −βi,i+1
σ2η
σ2θ
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2V ar(S),
di+1i,i+1 = −βi,i+1(1 +
1
k1
)(
k1
dii,i+1+λ
i
i,i+1
bii,i+1+βi,i+1
+ k2
k1 + 1
)
= −βi,i+1(1 + 1
k1
)(
k1
−βi,i+1
k1
V ar(sˆi)−Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ+λ
i
i,i+1
βi,i+1(
1
k1
+1)
+ k2
k1 + 1
)
= −βi,i+1
k1
(k1
−βi,i+1
k1
V ar(sˆi)−Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2σ
2
θ + λ
i
i,i+1
βi,i+1(
1
k1
+ 1)
+ k2)
= −βi,i+1
k1
(
− V ar(sˆi)−Cov(sˆi,S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2σ
2
θ +
k1
βi,i+1
λii,i+1
( 1
k1
+ 1)
+ k2)
=
βi,i+1
1 + k1
(
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ −
k1
βi,i+1
λii,i+1)−
k2
k1
βi,i+1
=
βi,i+1
1 + k1
(
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ −
k1
βi,i+1
λii,i+1)
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−βi,i+1
k1
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi+1)− Cov(sˆi+1, S))
V ar(sˆi+1)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi+1, S)2
=
βi,i+1
1 + k1
(
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ −
k1
βi,i+1
λii,i+1)
−βi,i+1
k1
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi) + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
)2σ2η − Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S) + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
)2σ2ηV ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
=
βi,i+1
1 + k1
(
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ −
k1
βi,i+1
λii,i+1)
−βi,i+1
k1
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi) + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
)2σ2η − Cov(sˆi, S))
(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)(1 + (V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2(σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)))2 σ
2
η)
=
βi,i+1
1 + k1
(
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ −
k1
βi,i+1
λii,i+1)
−βi,i+1
k1
σ2θ(V ar(sˆi) + (
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
)2σ2η − Cov(sˆi, S))
(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)(1 + 1k1 )
=
βi,i+1
1 + k1
1
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ
(
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)− V ar(sˆi)
−(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)
2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
)2σ2η + Cov(sˆi, S)
)− βi,i+1
1 + k1
k1
βi,i+1
λii,i+1
=
βi,i+1
1 + k1
1
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2σ
2
θ
(− (V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
)2σ2η)
)
− k1
1 + k1
λii,i+1
= − βi,i+1
1 + k1
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2 ϕ−
k1
1 + k1
λii,i+1
= − βi,i+1
1 + k1
σ4θ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))V ar(S)ϕ−
k1
1 + k1
λii,i+1
= − βi,i+1
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
σ4θ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))V ar(S)ϕ−
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
λii,i+1.
For client,
max
q
E
(
(θ − p)q − µ
2
q2|p, S),
thus
q =
E(θ|p, S)− p
µ
,
using the results above,
bii,i+1 = b
i+1
i,i+1 + βi,i+1 =
βi,i+1
k1
,
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cii,i+1 = c
i+1
i,i+1 = −
βi,i+1
k1
,
cii,i+1
aii,i+1
=
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
σ2θ(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))
,
k1 =
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)
σ2η
,
dii,i+1 = −βi,i+1
σ2η
σ2θ
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2V ar(S),
di+1i,i+1 = −
βi,i+1
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
σ4θ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))V ar(S)ϕ
−
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
λii,i+1,
we have
p = − a
i
i,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + βi,i+1
sˆi −
cii,i+1ηi + c
i+1
i,i+1ηi+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + βi,i+1
− d
i
i,i+1 + d
i+1
i,i+1 + λ
i
i,i+1
bii,i+1 + b
i+1
i,i+1 + βi,i+1
S
= −
cii,i+1
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
2
βi,i+1
k1
sˆi−
−βi,i+1
k1
2
βi,i+1
k1
(ηi+ηi+1)−
(−βi,i+1σ2η
σ2θ
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2V ar(S)
− βi,i+1
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
σ4θ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))V ar(S)ϕ
−
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
λii,i+1 + λ
i
i,i+1
) 1
2
βi,i+1
k1
S
=
σ2θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
2
sˆi +
1
2
(ηi + ηi+1)−
(− βi,i+1σ2η
σ2θ
V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))2V ar(S)
− βi,i+1
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
σ4θ
(V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S))V ar(S)ϕ
+
1
1 + V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
σ2η
λii,i+1
) 1
2
βi,i+1
k1
S
:= xsˆi + yS +
ηi + ηi+1
2
.

θ
p−yS
x
S
 ∼ N


0
0
0
,

σ2θ σ
2
θ σ
2
θ
σ2θ V ar(sˆi) +
1
2x2
σ2η Cov(sˆi, S)
σ2θ Cov(sˆi, S) V ar(S)

 ,
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thus
E(θ|p, S) = σ2θ
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))p−ySx + (V ar(sˆi) + 12x2σ2η − Cov(sˆi, S))S
V ar(S)(V ar(sˆi) +
1
2x2
σ2η)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
,
thus
βi,i+1 = (σ
2
θ
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)) 1x
V ar(S)(V ar(sˆi) +
1
2x2
σ2η)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
− 1) 1
µ
= (σ2θ
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)) 1σ2
θ
(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
2
V ar(S)(V ar(sˆi) +
1
2(
σ2
θ
(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
2
)2
σ2η)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
− 1) 1
µ
= (
2(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)
V ar(S)(V ar(sˆi) +
2
(
σ2
θ
(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
)2
σ2η)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
− 1) 1
µ
= (
2(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S)2)
V ar(S)V ar(sˆi)− Cov(sˆi, S)2 + V ar(S) 2
(
σ2
θ
(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))
V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)2
)2
σ2η
− 1) 1
µ
= (
2
1 + V ar(S)2(V ar(sˆi)V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S)
2)
σ4θ(V ar(S)−Cov(sˆi,S))2
σ2η
− 1) 1
µ
= (
2
1 + 2
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
− 1) 1
µ
= (
1− 2 σ2η
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
1 + 2
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
)
1
µ
,
λii,i+1 = σ
2
θ
(V ar(S)− Cov(sˆi, S))−yx + (V ar(sˆi) + 12x2σ2η − Cov(sˆi, S))
V ar(S)(V ar(sˆi) +
1
2x2
σ2η)− Cov(sˆi, S)2
1
µ
,
thus we have
ci+1i,i+1 = (
2
1 + 2
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
− 1) 1
µ
(− σ
2
η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)),
= (1− 2
1 + 2
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
)
1
µ
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S) .
As the second order condition requires that
bi+1i,i+1 + βi,i+1 =
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)σ
2
ηβi,i+1
=
1
V ar(θ|S)− V ar(θ|sˆi, S)σ
2
η(
1− 2 σ2η
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
1 + 2
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S)
)
1
µ
< 0,
which requires
σ2η
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S) >
1
2
. It’s immediately clear that βi,i+1 is decreasing
in 1
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S) and the surplus from the asset reallocation c
i+1
i,i+1σ
2
η in increasing in
1
V ar(θ|S)−V ar(θ|sˆi,S) .

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4.1.2 Microfoundation of Clients’ Linear Demand
In the trade between dealer i and i + 1, a continuum of clients participate in this trade.
Clients do not have private information about the asset payoff or the dealers’ private
values of the asset. Clients are risk-neutral and have liquidity needs of the asset. Client
j’s value of the asset is ηj with E(ηj) = 0 and independently distributed across the clients.
Clients incur a quadratic flow cost of trading the asset.
The demand function of client j is qji,i+1(pi,i+1, ηj).
1
The payoff of client j is
E
(
ηjq
j
i,i+1 − pi,i+1qji,i+1 −
µ
2
(qji,i+1)
2
)
.
Thus we have that the demand of client j is
qji,i+1(pi,i+1, ηj) =
1
µ
(ηj − pi,i+1).
Thus the aggregate demand of clients on each link (i, i+ 1) is βpi,i+1 ≡ − 2µpi,i−1.
It generates a linear demand function of clients, which ensures the existence of linear
equilibrium for bilateral trade in a double auction. So this provides a micro-foundation
for the reduced-form linear demand function of the customer base in Babus and Kondor
(2018), Babus, Kondor and Wang (2019).
By assuming that clients’ value of the asset does not depend on θ, I shut down clients’
learning of the asset payoff from the trading price. In the extension section, I relax the
baseline assumption that clients are liquidity traders and assume that clients trade also
for the asset payoff. In that case, the information diffusion in the tree network and the
equilibrium price function of each link is the same as the baseline model. The details are
shown in the proof of Proposition 8. But as clients learn from the price, clients’ trading
intensity is affected by the information content in the price. As shown in Proposition 8,
the main result in this paper still holds and is amplified in this case.
1The clients can submit their demand schedules via dealers i and i+ 1, who do dual-capacity trading
by submitting clients’ orders and trading on their own accounts. See Fishman and Longstaff (1992),
Roell (1990).
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4.1.3 Steps from the Academic TRACE File to the Cleaned Academic TRACE
Sample
Eliminate trade between a dealer and customer
As we focus on inter-dealer trade, we drop the trade between a dealer and customer.
There are 11,900,080 unique trade reports on 32,795 different CUSIPs left in the dataset.
Eliminate bonds based on characteristics
I replicate the cleaning procedure in Asquith, Covert and Pathak (2019). Before
eliminating and correcting trade reports, we match the TRACE dataset to the universe
of corporate bonds in the Mergent FISD database. The Mergent FISD database is our
source for bond characteristics such as issue size, ratings, maturity, etc. which we add
to the Academic TRACE dataset. The Mergent FISD database we use includes all the
bonds with an offering date between January of 1950 and January of 2010.
I drop all TRACE bonds that do not match to FISD by CUSIP. There are 11,800,641
unique trade reports on 31,682 different CUSIPs left in the dataset.
I also drop all bonds with equity-like characteristics (convertibles, exchangeables, etc.)
since their equity component may be included in the bond price. There are 11,005,869
unique trade reports on 29,872 different CUSIPs left in the dataset.
I next drop all Rule 144a bonds because TRACE did not disseminate trading infor-
mation on these bonds during 2002-2005.2 There are 10,704,976 unique trade reports on
26,965 different CUSIPS left.
FISD does not report a correct issue size in some cases. For example, there are some
bonds in FISD with a reported issue size of 0. I drop all bonds with a reported FISD
issue size of less than 1. (offering-amt ≤1) There are 10,687,352 unique trade reports on
26,729 different CUSIPs left.
Eliminate trade reports because of self-reported errors
Next, we eliminate trade reports which do not take place as reported since they are
later modified, cancelled, or reversed. I replicate cleaning procedure steps 1 and 2 in
2One way to circumvent TRACE, which applies to publicly issued bonds, is for a firm to issue privately
placed bonds (sometimes referred to as Rule 144a securities, for the section of the Securities Act of 1933
that provides exemption from registration requirements).
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Dick-Nielsen (2014).
I first clean same-day corrections and cancellations. Same-day refers to corrections
and cancelations reported within the same reporting date (not transaction date). These
can be uniquely identified by the link between the Record Count Number and Original
Message Sequence Number. The Record Count Number is unique on an intra-reporting
day level. There are 10,423,151 unique trade reports on 26,647 different CUSIPs left.
Remove reversals and the matching original transaction report. Reversals are can-
celations reported on a later date than the date on which the orignal transaction took
place. Trade reversals are identified by the As Of Indicator field by ”R”. Since the
original trade and its reversal are reported to TRACE on different days, the Original
Message Sequence Number of reversal trades do not necessarily match the Record Count
Number of the original trade. Therefore, to link a reversal to its original trade, following
Asquith, Covert and Pathak (2019), we match the reports using eight identifying charac-
teristics: CUSIP, Trade Execution Date, Trade Execution Time, Reported Price, Entered
Volume Quantity, Reporter ID, Contraparty ID, Buy/Sell Indicator, Buyer Capacity, and
Seller Capacity. (Nick-Nielsen (2014) does not use Reporter ID, Buyer Capacity, Seller
Capacity.) I called matches with these criteria a “ten-way” match.
In the dataset of reversals, these ten characteristics identify a unique observation for
most of the observations. For those that are not uniquely identified, we keep the last
one by the reported date and time. I keep those with a trade reported date after the
trade execution date. Then we merge the dataset of original trades using the dataset
of reversals. If there is only one exact match, both the reversal and its matched trade
are eliminated. If there is more than one exact match, we eliminate the reversal trade
and one of the matching trades. Because these multiple matching trades occur at the
same time, date, price and volume, the cleaned dataset is unaffected by the choice of
which matching trade reports we eliminate. There are 10,121,712 unique trade reports
on 26,581 different CUSIPs left.
Not all reversals have an exact ten-way match. I then drop the same execution time
requirement. Since execution time is self-reported, we assume these nine-way matches
were the original trades that were meant to be reversed, and we eliminate the reversal
and the matched trade following the steps above. Still, before we merge the datasets,
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in the dataset of reversals left, for those that are not uniquely identified by those nine
characteristics, we keep the last one by the reported date and time. There are 10,113,094
unique trade reports on 26,578 different CUSIPs left.
Next, we relax the requirement that the price must be exact in a nine-way reversal
and look for matches when prices are rounded to 0.01. There are 10,112,431 unique trade
reports on 26,578 different CUSIPs left.
There are 16859 reversals (each of them is uniquely identified by CUSIP, Trade Exe-
cution Date, Reported Price (rounded to 0.01), Entered Volume Quantity, Reporter ID,
Contraparty ID, Buy/Sell Indicator, Buyer Capacity, and Seller Capacity) that we are
unable to match to an original trade. I dropped these reversal reports from the dataset.
Eliminate one of the sides for inter-dealer trade
There are multiple conventions or paths by which the transacting parties can be
reported to TRACE. In addition to self-reporting, TRACE also allows another party
(such as a clearing firm) to fulfill the reporting obligation of the transacting party. There
are three fields that are used when trade reports do not report the transacting dealers
in the trade. They are Reporter Give-up ID, Contraparty Give-up ID, and Locked-in
Trade Identifier. In a Give-up trade, a clearing firm can submit a report on behalf of
either of the transacting dealers. When this is the case, either the Reporter Give-up ID
or Contraparty Give-up ID is populated by the ID of the transacting dealer. To correctly
identify the transacting parties in these trades, we replace the Reporter ID (Contraparty
ID) with the Reporter Give-up ID (Contraparty Give-up ID).
The other case where TRACE allows a variance on its reporting requirements is a
locked-in trade report. In a locked-in trade report, the reporting party submits the trade
report on its own behalf as well as on behalf of the contraparty. That is, there is only
one trade report, rather than a separate report from the buying dealer and selling dealer.
When the Locked-in Trade Identifier is checked, the reporter ID and the contraparty ID
are the same, but one give-up field is populated. For each trade report where the Locked-
in Flag is marked, we follow the convention in the paragraph above for the give-up fields
and modify the Reporter or Contraparty ID fields in the existing trade report.
For regular trade (Regular Trade Identifier is “x”), we adopt the convention of pre-
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serving the sell-side report. For locked-in trade, the trade report is kept. There are
5,155,102 unique trade reports on 25,239 different CUSIPs left.
Address trade splitting
I basically replicate the procedure in Asquith, Covert and Pathak (2019). Dealers
might report one trade in multiple pieces. To deal with trade splitting, we aggregate all
of the reports with the same CUSIP, Execution Date, Price, Reported ID, Contraparty
ID, Buy/Sell Indicator, Buyer Capacity, and Seller Capacity. There are 4,889,149 unique
trade reports and 25,239 different CUSIPs left.
Eliminate trade reports with price or volume issues
I basically replicate the procedure in Asquith, Covert and Pathak (2019). Some trade
prices are vastly out of line with other prices for the bond during the same period. The
reference prices are the median prices of the same bond traded in the same month. A
trade price is vastly out of line if the bond price differs by more than $20 per bond.
I eliminate the reports with price vastly out of line. There are 4,885,676 unique trade
reports and 25,239 different CUSIPs left.
The procedure above does not eliminate the report if there is not another trade report
in that month. Therefore we drop trade reports less than the 0.01 percentile and greater
than 99.99 percentile of all trade prices in the sample. Next, we eliminate trades when
volume is less than the 0.01 percentile and greater than 99.99 percentile of all trade
volumes in the sample. There are 4,883,688 unique trade reports and 25,181 different
CUSIPs left.
Eliminate if the trade is under special circumstances, or the traded asset is
an equity linked note, or the trade is not a cash sale
I replicate Dick-Nielsen (2014).There are 4,865,045 unique trade reports and 25,101
different CUSIPs left.
4.2 Appendix of Chapter 2
4.2.1 Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 9
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Proof.
Define σp :=
γσε
ωαx
, αp := σ
−2
p denotes the precision of the public signal p, α := αx+αp.
We guess in equilibrium,
p = θ − γσε
ωαx
ε+
z(p)γ
ωα
.
Small traders hold belief ze(p) of the large trader’s demand schedule.
p˜ := p− γz
e(p)
ωα
.
Small trader i’s asset demand is,
k(xi, p) =
E[θ|xi, p, ze(p)]− p
γV ar[θ|xi, p, ze(p)] =
αxxi + αpp˜− αp
γ
.
The aggregate demand of small traders in the asset market is,
K(θ, p) = E(k(xi, p)|θ, p)ω = αxθ + αpp˜− αp
γ
ω.
Market clear condition,
K(θ, p) + z(p) = σεε.
It implies
z(p) = M +Dp−Bp˜,
where M := (θ− γσε
ωαx
ε)(−ωαx
γ
), D := ωα
γ
, B := ωαp
γ
. Notice if substituting p˜ with p− γze(p)
ωα
,
p = θ − γσε
ωαx
ε+
γ
ωαx
(z(p)− αp
α
ze(p)),
thus if z(p) = ze(p), our initial guess is verified.
Conditional on M , the larger trader’s expected payoff in the asset market,
U1(M, p˜) = (E[θ|M ]− p)z(p) = η( M
B −D − p(p˜))(M +Dp(p˜)−Bp˜).
In equilibrium,
p˜(M) =
M
B −D = θ −
γσε
ωαx
ε
⇒ dU1(M, p˜)
dp˜
|p˜= M
B−D
= 0,
d2U1(M, p˜)
dp˜2
|p˜= M
B−D
≤ 0
⇒ p(p˜) = p˜.
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Next we check the sufficient condition. If p(p˜) = p˜, d
2U1(M,p˜)
dp˜2
≤ 0 ∀M, p˜.
It’s quite intuitive to have this result immediately after seeing the price function
p = θ− γσε
ωαx
ε+ z(p)γ
ωα
. For the large trader, conditional on any exogenous M , any purchase
of assets will raise the price to be higher than the expected value of dividend E(θ|M),
thus the large trader won’t purchase; and any sale of assets will depress the price to be
lower than the expected value of dividend, thus the large trader won’t sell. Or in other
words, any nonzero position for the first-stage large trader in asset market will affect the
asset price in his disadvantage. Thus not participating in the asset market at all is the
optimal strategy for the first-stage large trader.
Thus in equilibrium,
p = θ − γσε
ωαx
ε.

Proof of Proposition 10
Proof.
Under Assumption 1,
dθ¯(p)
dp
=
αp
αp −
√
αx
1−λ
1
φ(Φ−1( θ¯(p)−λ
1−λ ))
< 0.
dθˆ(p)
dp
=
αp
αp −
√
αx
(1−λ)
1
φ(Φ−1( θ(p)
1−λ ))
1 + 1√
αx(1−λ)φ(Φ−1( θ(p)1−λ ))
1 + 1√
αx(1−λ)φ(Φ−1( θˆ(p)1−λ ))
< 0.
Thus Φ( θ¯(p)−p
σp
) and Φ( θˆ(p)−p
σp
) are decreasing in p.
From equations
(1− λ)Φ(x
∗(p)− θ(p)
σx
) = θ(p),
λ+ (1− λ)Φ(x
∗(p)− θˆ(p)
σx
) = θˆ(p),
it’s clear that for any x∗(p), θˆ > θ.
Combine equations
λ+ (1− λ)Φ(x
∗(p)− θˆ(p)
σx
) = θˆ(p),
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Φ(
√
αx + αp(θ(p)− αx
α
x∗(p)− αp
α
p)) = t,
we have
αp
α
θˆ(p)−
√
αx
α
Φ−1(
θˆ(p)− λ
1− λ )− (θˆ(p)− θ(p)) =
Φ−1(t)√
α
+
αp
α
p.
Combine equations
λ+ (1− λ)Φ( x¯
∗(p)− θ¯(p)
σx
) = θ¯(p),
Φ(
√
αx + αp(θ¯(p)− αx
α
x¯∗(p)− αp
α
p)) = t,
we have
αp
α
θ¯(p)−
√
αx
α
Φ−1(
θ¯(p)− λ
1− λ ) =
Φ−1(t)√
α
+
αp
α
p.
Under Assumption 1, LHS of equation above is decreasing in θ¯, thus θ¯(p) > θˆ(p),∀p,
thus Φ( θ¯(p)−p
σp
) > Φ( θˆ(p)−p
σp
), ∀p. Combined with the monotonicity of Φ( θ¯(p)−p
σp
) and Φ( θˆ(p)−p
σp
),
we have p1 > p2.

Proof of Proposition 12
Lemma 9. Given p(p˜) pinned down by (2.10) and some (p˜∗, p0), a sufficient condition
for (9) to hold is ∂
2U(M,p˜)
∂p˜∂M
≤ 0 ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗,∀M ≥ (B −D)p˜∗.3
Proof.
From ∂
2U(M,p˜)
∂p˜∂M
≤ 0, and ∂U(M,p˜)
∂p˜
|p˜= M
B−D
= 0, we have for any M,M ′ ≥ (B −D)p˜∗,
∂U(M ′, p˜)
∂p˜
|p˜= M
B−D
≤ 0, if M ′ > M ; ∂U(M
′, p˜)
∂p˜
|p˜= M
B−D
≥ 0, if M ′ < M, (4.2.1)
Thus, for any M,M ′ ≥ (B −D)p˜∗, U(M ′, p˜)|
p˜= M
′
B−D
≥ U(M ′, p˜)|p˜= M
B−D
.
Otherwise, WLOG, assumeM < M ′, ∃p˜ ∈ [ M ′
B−D ,
M
B−D ], such that
∂U(M ′,p˜)
∂p˜
|
p˜∈[ M′
B−D ,
M
B−D ]
>
0, contradicting (4.2.1).

3This ensures the single-crossing property (Spence-Mirrlees Property) holds for U(M, p˜).
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Lemma 10. A sufficient condition for ∂
2U(M,p˜)
∂p˜∂M
≤ 0 ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗,M ≥ (B −D)p˜∗ to hold is,
p(p˜) pinned down above satisfies
p(p˜)− p˜ ≥
(2D −B)φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
1
σp
B2η − φ(1)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
1
σ2p
2D
, ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗,
p(p˜)suf is defined by letting the above condition be binding.
Proof.
∂2U(M,p˜)
∂p˜∂M
= B
2
2D(D−B)η +
2D−B
B−D
φ(
θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)
dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
1
σp
2D(p(p˜)−p˜) + φ(
θ¯(p˜)− M
B−D
σp
)
θ¯(p˜)− M
B−D
σp
dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
1
(B−D)σ2p .
Given dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
< 0, B < D, and φ(
θ¯(p˜)− M
B−D
σp
)
θ¯(p˜)− M
B−D
σp
∈ [−φ(1), φ(1)], ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗,M ≥
(B−D)p˜∗, a sufficient condition for the condition in Lemma 9 to hold can be characterized.
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Assumption 2. {αx, ω, γ, λ, η, ε} satisfies
φ(1)(
αx(1− λ)
αx(1− λ)− κ
√
2piαx
− 1) αx(1− λ)
αx(1− λ)− κ
√
2piαx
− 1√
2pi
κ
3
2α2xφ(1)(1− λ)
(αx(1−λ)√
2pi
− κ√αx)3
≤ ( 1
4(1 + κ)
− 1
2
)2(1 + κ)2η
ω
γ
,
1− λ ≤ (2κ
2 + 2κ− 1
2
)κη ω
γ
φ(1)2(1 + κ) + (2κ2 + 2κ− 1
2
)η ω
γ
√
2pi
αx
,
where κ := αx
αp
= γ
2σ2ε
ω2αx
.
For any αx, ω, γ, λ, η, when κ is relatively large, Assumption 2 is satisfied. That
implies when σε is relatively large, Assumption 2 is satisfied.
Under Assumption 2, Lemma 11 shows the existence of (p˜∗, p0), p˜∗ ≥ p0, such that
the condition in Lemma 10 is satisfied.
Lemma 11. Under Assumption 2, for any p˜∗, there exists (p˜∗, p0), p˜∗ ≥ p0, such that
p(p˜) pinned down by (2.10) and (p˜∗, p0) satisfies the condition in Lemma 10. The set of
such (p˜∗, p0) is given by,
φ( θ¯(p˜
∗)−p˜∗
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
|p˜=p˜∗
(1
2
− B
4D
)2ηDσp
≤ p0 − p˜∗ ≤ 0.
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Proof.
For some constant C > B
2D
, we can define an auxiliary locus p(p˜)aux by
C =
(p− p˜)Bη + φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
1
σp
(p(p˜)aux − p˜)2ηD ,
we have p(p˜)aux − p˜ = φ(
θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)
dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
(C− B
2D
)2ηDσp
, and dp
dp˜
|p(p˜)aux =
d(φ(
θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)
dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
)
dp˜
1
(C− B
2D
)2ηDσp
+ 1.
Suppose C satisfies dp
dp˜
|p(p˜)aux ≥ C ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗, then p(p˜)aux is the lower bound for any
p(p˜) pinned down by (2.10) and (p˜∗, p0), where
φ( θ¯(p˜
∗)−p˜∗
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
|p˜=p˜∗
(C − B
2D
)2ηDσp
≤ p0 − p˜∗ ≤ 0.
dp
dp˜
|p(p˜)aux ≥ C ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗ is equivalent to
d(φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
)
dp˜
≥ (C − 1)(C − B
2D
)2ηDσp, ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗, (4.2.2)
Let C =
1+ B
2D
2
, RHS of (4.2.2) is minimized. Denote Φ−1( θ¯(p˜)−λ
1−λ ) by x.
d(φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
)
dp˜
= −φ( θ¯(p˜)− p˜
σp
)
θ¯(p˜)− p˜
σp
1
σp
(
αp(1− λ)φ(x)
αp(1− λ)φ(x)−
√
αx
− 1),
αp(1− λ)φ(x)
αp(1− λ)φ(x)−
√
αx
+ φ(
θ¯(p˜)− p˜
σp
)α2p
√
αx
(1− λ)φ(x)x
(αp(1− λ)φ(x)−
√
αx)
3
. (4.2.3)
φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
) θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
, φ(x)x ∈ [−φ(1), φ(1)]. The lower bound of RHS of (4.2.3) is derived
and we require it to be bounded by (C − 1)(C − B
2D
)2ηDσp|
C=
1+ B
2D
2
, i.e.,
−( B
4D
− 1
2
)22ηDσp ≤ −φ(1) 1
σp
(
αp(1− λ) 1√2pi
αp(1− λ) 1√2pi −
√
αx
− 1)
αp(1− λ) 1√2pi
αp(1− λ) 1√2pi −
√
αx
+
1√
2pi
α2p
√
αx
(1− λ)φ(1)
(αp(1− λ) 1√2pi −
√
αx)
3
. (4.2.4)
We also require p(p˜)aux to be weakly above the sufficient locus p(p˜)suf defined by,
p(p˜)suf − p˜ =
(2D −B)φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
1
σp
B2η − φ(1)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
1
σ2p
2D
, ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗,
i.e.,
1
(
1+ B
2D
2
− B
2D
)2ηD
≤ 2D −B
B2η − φ(1)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
2D
σ2p
, ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗.
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As dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
≥ αp
αp−
√
2piαx
1−λ
, we require,
1
(
1+ B
2D
2
− B
2D
)2ηD
≤ 2D −B
B2η − φ(1) αp
αp−
√
2piαx
1−λ
2D
σ2p
. (4.2.5)
B = wαp
γ
, D = w(αx+αp)
γ
, and define κ = αx
αp
= γ
2σ2ε
ω2αx
, (4.2.4)(4.2.5) are reformulated as,
φ(1)(
αx(1− λ)
αx(1− λ)− κ
√
2piαx
− 1) αx(1− λ)
αx(1− λ)− κ
√
2piαx
− 1√
2pi
κ
3
2α2xφ(1)(1− λ)
(αx(1−λ)√
2pi
− κ√αx)3
≤ ( 1
4(1 + κ)
− 1
2
)2(1 + κ)2η
ω
γ
, (4.2.4)′
1− λ ≤ (2κ
2 + 2κ− 1
2
)κη ω
γ
φ(1)2(1 + κ) + (2κ2 + 2κ− 1
2
)η ω
γ
√
2pi
αx
. (4.2.5)′
For any αx, ω, γ, λ, η, when κ is relatively large, condition (4.2.4)
′, (4.2.5)′ are satisfied.
That implies when σε is relatively large, condition (4.2.4)
′, (4.2.5)′ are satisfied. Then
given any (p˜∗, p0) such that
φ( θ¯(p˜
∗)−p˜∗
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
|p˜=p˜∗
(1
2
− B
4D
)2ηDσp
≤ p0 − p˜∗ ≤ 0,
p(p˜) pinned down by (2.10) and (p˜∗, p0) satisfies the condition in Lemma 10.

Lemma 12. In equilibrium p˜∗, U(M, p˜)|M=(B−D)p˜∗ is continuous at p˜ = p˜∗. (p˜∗, p0)
satisfies,
η(
M
B −D − p0)(M +Dp0 −Bp˜
∗) + Φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)− M
B−D
σp
)− t =
η(
M
B −D − p˜
∗)(M +Dp˜∗ −Bp˜∗)|M=(B−D)p˜∗ ,
thus
p˜∗ − p0 =
√√√√Φ( θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗σp )− t
ηD
.
Lemma 13. In equilibrium p˜∗, U(M, p˜)|M 6=(B−D)p˜∗ is not continuous at p˜ = p˜∗.
η(
M
B −D − p˜
∗)(M +Dp˜∗ −Bp˜∗)
> η( M
B−D − p0)(M +Dp0 −Bp˜∗) + Φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)− M
B−D
σp
)− t if M
B−D > p˜
∗;
< η( M
B−D − p0)(M +Dp0 −Bp˜∗) + Φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)− M
B−D
σp
)− t if M
B−D < p˜
∗.
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Figure 4.1: Price Locus in Lemma 11
Parameters: σx = 0.5, σε = 1, ω = 1, γ = 2, t = 0.5, η = 1, λ = 0.7.
Line 1 denotes p = p˜, line 2 denotes p = p(p˜) pinned down by (2.10) with initial point
(p˜∗ = 0.85, p0 = 0.7663), line 3 denotes p(p˜)aux, line 4 denotes p(p˜)suf .
Proof.
G(M) := η(
M
B −D − p˜
∗)(M +Dp˜∗ −Bp˜∗)− (η( M
B −D − p0)(M +Dp0 −Bp˜
∗)
+Φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)− M
B−D
σp
)− t).
G(M)|M=(B−D)p˜∗ = 0, dG(M)dM = (p0 − p˜∗)2D−BD−B + φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)− M
B−D
σp
) 1
(B−D)σp < 0.

Now we can use the above lemmas to prove Proposition 12.
Proof.
The large trader’s utility function can be written as,
U(M, p˜) =

η( M
B−D − p(p˜))(M +Dp(p˜)−Bp˜) + Φ(
θ¯(p˜)− M
B−D
σp
)− t if p˜ ≤ p˜∗;
η( M
B−D − p(p˜))(M +Dp(p˜)−Bp˜) if p˜ > p˜∗.
where p(p˜) is given in Proposition 2.
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From (2.11) and Lemma 12, we can see the condition in Lemma 10 is satisfied, thus
∂2U(M,p˜)
∂p˜∂M
≤ 0 ∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗,∀M ≥ (B −D)p˜∗.
Thus ∀(M,M ′) such that M
B−D ≤ p˜∗, we have
∂U(M ′, p˜)
∂p˜
|p˜= M
B−D
≤ 0, if M ′ > M ; ∂U(M
′, p˜)
∂p˜
|p˜= M
B−D
≥ 0, if M ′ < M. (4.2.7)
(1) It’s easy to see ∀M ′ < (B − D)p˜∗, arg maxp˜>p˜∗ U(M ′, p˜) = M ′B−D . Now we prove
M ′
B−D is also the global maximizer.
Suppose not, i.e., ∃ M
B−D ≤ p˜∗ such that U(M ′, p˜)|p˜= M′
B−D
< U(M ′, p˜)|p˜= M
B−D
, together
with Lemma 13, we have ∂U(M
′,p˜)
∂p˜
|∃p˜∈[ M
B−D ,
M′
B−D ]
< 0.
As ∂U(M
′,p˜)
∂p˜
|
p˜∈(p˜∗, M′
B−D ]
= 2(D − B)( M ′
B−D − p˜) ≥ 0, we have ∂U(M
′,p˜)
∂p˜
|∃p˜∈[ M
B−D ,p˜
∗] < 0,
contradicting (4.2.7).
(2) We have shown for any M ≥ (B − D)p˜∗, arg maxp˜≤p˜∗ U(M, p˜) = MB−D . Now we
prove M
B−D is also the global maximizer.
Suppose not, i.e., ∃ M ′
B−D > p˜
∗ such that U(M, p˜)|p˜= M
B−D
< U(M, p˜)|
p˜= M
′
B−D
, together
with Lemma 13, we have ∂U(M,p˜)
∂p˜
|∃p˜∈[ M
B−D ,
M′
B−D ]
> 0.
As ∂U(M,p˜)
∂p˜
|
p˜∈(p˜∗, M′
B−D ]
= 2(D − B)( M
B−D − p˜) ≤ 0, we have ∂U(M,p˜)∂p˜ |∃p˜∈[ MB−D ,p˜∗] > 0,
contradicting (4.2.7).

Proof of Proposition 13
Proof.
There are multiple p˜∗ that satisfy the condition in Proposition 12,
−
√√√√Φ( θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗σp )− t
ηD
≥ φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
|p˜=p˜∗
(1
2
− B
4D
)2ηDσp
. (2.11)
Since −
√
Φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗
σp
)−t
ηD
is continuous and decreasing at any p˜∗ ∈ [p˜2, p˜1], we have
−
√√√√Φ( θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗σp )− t
ηD
|p˜∗=p˜1 = 0,
143
φ( θ¯(p˜
∗)−p˜∗
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
|p˜=p˜∗
(1
2
− B
4D
)2ηDσp
< 0, ∀p˜∗ ∈ [p˜2, p˜1].
Figure 4.2: Multiple p˜∗ Satisfy the Condition in Proposition 12
Parameters: σx = 0.5, σε = 1, ω = 1, γ = 2, t = 0.5, η = 1, λ = 0.7, p1 = 0.85,
p2 = 0.7011.
The blue line denotes the LHS of (2.11), the orange line denotes the RHS of (2.11).

Proof of Proposition 14
Proof.
From local condition, ∂
2U(M,p˜)
∂p˜2
|p˜= M
B−D
≤ 0 ∀M ≥ (B−D)p˜∗, we have ∂2U(M,p˜)
∂p˜2
|p˜= M
B−D
=
φ(
θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)
dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
(p(p˜)−p˜)σp (
B
2D
− 1) + B2η
2D
≤ 0, thus p(p˜)− p˜ ≥ φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
2D−B
B2ησp
∀p˜ ≤ p˜∗.
Define η(p˜∗) by
−
√√√√Φ( θ¯(p˜∗)−p˜∗σp )− t
η(p˜∗)D
= φ(
θ¯(p˜∗)− p˜∗
σp
)
dθ¯(p˜)
dp˜
|p˜=p˜∗ 2D −B
B2η(p˜∗)σp
.
If η > η(p˜∗), p˜∗ is not an equilibrium.

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Proof of Proposition 16
Proof.
Define p3,p4 by
Φ(
1− p3
σp
)− t = 0,
Φ(
λ− p4
σp
)− t = 0.
We have p4 < p2 < p1 < p3. Since our elimination procedure differs for p˜ within
different ranges, our exposition is thus case by case.
1. p4 ≤ p˜ < p1.
1st step:
For the large trader, {(z, 0)|z 6= 0} are dominated by (0,0).
Define z∗ by
z∗2γ
ωα
η = Φ(
1− p˜
σp
)− t,
thus {(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗, z∗]} are dominated by (0,0).
Figure 4.3 depicts the large trader’s expected payoff in the second-stage currency-
attack game, with red line denoting his expected payoff by taking strategy {(z, 1)|z 6= 0},
while blue line denoting the expected payoff by taking strategy (0,1), in the first step.
Figure 4.3: The Large Trader’s Expected Payoff in the Second-stage Currency-attack
Game in the First Step
In the later context, for the sake of brevity, x1 is short for x1(p˜), the strategy of small
trader after observing z = 0 and p˜; x2 is short for x2(z, p˜), the strategy of small trader
after observing z 6= 0 and p˜.
For any small trader, {(x1, x2|x1, x2 /∈ [−αpαx p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t), α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t)]} are
eliminated, as ( α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜ −
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t)) is the optimal threshold for the most optimistic
small trader, who believes the large trader will attack and all other small traders will
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attack, as well; and (−αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t)) is the optimal threshold for the most pessimistic
small trader, who believes the large trader won’t attack and all other small traders won’t
attack, as well.
2nd step:
Define x
(n)
2h and x
(n)
2l as the highest and lowest threshold of small traders contingent
on observing the large trader participated in the first-stage asset market, after n rounds
of elimination in this step.
Define x
(n)
1h and x
(n)
1l as the highest and lowest threshold of small traders contingent
on observing the large trader did not participate in the first-stage asset market, after n
rounds of elimination in this step.
At the beginning of this step, x
(0)
2h ,x
(0)
1h ,x
(0)
2l and x
(0)
1l are defined by
x
(0)
2h = x
(0)
1h :=
α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t),
x
(0)
2l = x
(0)
1l := −
αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t).
Correspondingly, let’s define θ
(0)
2h , θ
(0)
2l , θ
(0)
1h , θ
′(0)
1l by
λ+ (1− λ)Φ(x
(0) − θ(0)
σx
) = θ(0),
and define θ
(0)
1l by
(1− λ)Φ(x
(0)
1l − θ(0)1l
σx
) = θ
(0)
1l .
It’s immediately clear that θ
(0)
1l < θ
′(0)
1l < θ
(0)
2l < θ
(0)
1h = θ
(0)
2h .
Figure 4.4 depicts the large trader’s expected payoff in the second-stage currency-
attack game, with red line denoting his expected payoff by taking strategy {(z, 1)|z 6= 0},
while blue line denoting the expected payoff by taking strategy (0,1), at the beginning of
the second step.
Define positive value z∗(0) by
z∗(0)
2
γ
ωα
η = Φ(
θ
(0)
2h − p˜
σp
)− t.
For the large trader,{(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗(0), z∗(0)]} are dominated by (0,0).
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Figure 4.4: The Large Trader’s Expected Payoff in the Second-stage Currency-attack
Game in the Second Step
For any small trader, after observing the large trader has participated in the first-stage
asset market, he believes other small traders’ threshold is between x
(0)
2l and x
(0)
2h , and the
large trader will attack the currency regime . Then we could pin down x
(1)
2l and x
(1)
2h , and
we have x
(0)
2l < x
(1)
2l < x
(1)
2h < x
(0)
2h .
For any small trader, after observing the large trader did not participate in the first-
stage asset market, he believes other small traders’ threshold is between x
(0)
1l and x
(0)
1h .
Then we could pin down x
(1)
1l (contingent on the large trader will not attack) and x
(1)
1h
(contingent on the large trader will attack), and we have x
(0)
1l < x
(1)
1l < x
(1)
1h < x
(0)
1h .
It’s immediately clear that x
(1)
1l < x
(1)
2l < x
(1)
1h = x
(1)
2h .
Correspondingly, let’s define θ
(1)
2h , θ
(1)
2l , θ
(1)
1h , θ
′(1)
1l , and θ
(1)
1l , in the same way as above.
We have
θ
(0)
2l < θ
(1)
2l < θ
(1)
2h < θ
(0)
2h ,
θ
(0)
1l < θ
(1)
1l < θ
(1)
1h < θ
(0)
1h ,
θ
(1)
1l < θ
′(1)
1l < θ
(1)
2l < θ
(1)
1h = θ
(1)
2h .
Next, n = 1.
Define positive value z∗(1) by
z∗(1)
2
γ
ωα
η = Φ(
θ
(1)
2h − p˜
σp
)− t.
For the large trader, {(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗(1), z∗(1)]} are dominated by (0,0).
For any small trader, his belief is updated, and we could pin down x
(2)
2l , x
(2)
2h , x
(2)
1l , x
(2)
1h .
......
147
Until
Φ(
θn
∗−1
2l − p˜
σp
)− t ≤ 0,
Φ(
θn
∗
2l − p˜
σp
)− t > 0.
This n∗ must exist, since Φ( θ¯(p˜)−p˜
σp
)− t > 0, for p˜ < p1 and limn→∞ θ(n)2l = θ¯(p˜).
For the large trader, pick z with small enough magnitude, such that Φ(
θn
∗
2l −p˜
σp
)−t− z2γ
ωα
η >
0. (z, 1) dominates (0,0). (0,0) is eliminated.
3rd step:
At the beginning of this step, x
(n∗+1)
1l < x
(n∗+1)
2l < x
(n∗+1)
1h = x
(n∗+1)
2h .
Correspondingly, by using λ+ (1− λ)Φ(x(n∗+1)−θ(n∗+1)
σx
) = θ(n
∗+1), we have
θ
(n∗+1)
1l = θ
′(n∗+1)
1l < θ
(n∗+1)
2l < θ
(n∗+1)
1h = θ
(n∗+1)
2h .
Figure 4.5 depicts the large trader’s expected payoff in the second-stage currency-
attack game, with red line denoting his expected payoff by taking strategy {(z, 1)|z 6= 0},
while blue line denoting the expected payoff by taking strategy (0,1), at the beginning of
the third step.
Figure 4.5: The Large Trader’s Expected Payoff in the Second-stage Currency-attack
Game in the Third Step
Define a positive value z∗(n
∗+1) by
z∗(n
∗+1)2γ
ωα
η = Φ(
θ
(n∗+1)
2h − p˜
σp
)− t− (Φ(θ
(n∗+1)
2l − p˜
σp
)− t).
For the large trader, {(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗(n∗+1), z∗(n∗+1)]} are dominated by (δ, 1), where δ
is with very small magnitude such that,
Φ(
θ
(n∗+1)
2l − p˜
σp
)− t− δ
2γ
ωα
η > Φ(
θ
(n∗+1)
2h − p˜
σp
)− t− z
2γ
ωα
η.
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As δ converges to 0, the large trader’s strategies that survive infinite rounds of elimi-
nation are (0,1).
For small traders,
lim
n→∞
x
(n)
1l = limn→∞
x
(n)
1h = x¯
∗, lim
n→∞
x
(n)
2l = limn→∞
x
(n)
2h = x¯
∗
Figure 4.6 depicts the large trader’s expected payoff in the second-stage currency-
attack game, after infinite rounds of elimination.
Figure 4.6: The Large Trader’s Expected Payoff in the Second-stage Currency-attack
Game after Infinite Rounds of Elimination
2. p˜ = p1.
1st step:
For the large trader, {(z, 0)|z 6= 0} are dominated by (0,0).
Define z∗ by
z∗2γ
ωα
η = Φ(
1− p˜
σp
)− t > 0,
thus {(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗, z∗]} are dominated by (0,0).
For any small trader, {(x1, x2|x1, x2 /∈ [−αpαx p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t), α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t)]} are
eliminated.
2nd step: At the beginning of this step, x
(0)
2h , x
(0)
1h , x
(0)
2l and x
(0)
1l are defined by
x
(0)
2h = x
(0)
1h :=
α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t),
x
(0)
2l = x
(0)
1l := −
αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t).
After this round of elimination, x
(0)
2l < x
(1)
2l < x
(1)
2h < x
(0)
2h , x
(0)
1l < x
(1)
1l < x
(1)
1h < x
(0)
1h ,
x
(1)
1l < x
(1)
2l < x
(1)
1h = x
(1)
2h .
Define z∗(0) by
z∗(0)
2
γ
ωα
η = Φ(
θ
(0)
2h − p˜
σp
)− t.
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For the large trader, {(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗(0), z∗(0)]} are dominated by (0,0).
The large trader’s strategies that survive infinite rounds of elimination are (0,0) and
(0,1).
For small traders,
lim
n→∞
x
(n)
2l = limn→∞
x
(n)
2h = x¯
∗.
3. p˜ < p4.
1st step:
For the large trader, {(z, 0)|z 6= 0} and (0,0) are dominated by (0,1), since
Φ(
λ− p˜
σp
)− t > 0.
Also, define z∗ by
z∗2γ
ωα
η = Φ(
1− p˜
σp
)− t− (Φ(λ− p˜
σp
)− t),
thus {(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗, z∗]} are dominated by (0,1).
For any small trader, {(x1, x2|x1, x2 /∈ [−αpαx p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t), α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t)]} are
eliminated.
2nd step:
For small traders,
lim
n→∞
x
(n)
1l = limn→∞
x
(n)
1h = x¯
∗, lim
n→∞
x
(n)
2l = limn→∞
x
(n)
2h = x¯
∗.
4. p1 < p˜ < p3.
1st step: For the large trader, {(z, 0)|z 6= 0} are dominated by (0,0).
Define z∗ by
z∗2γ
ωα
η = Φ(
1− p˜
σp
)− t > 0,
thus {(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗, z∗]} are dominated by (0,0).
For any small trader, {(x1, x2|x1, x2 /∈ [−αpαx p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t), α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t)]} are
eliminated.
2nd step:
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At the beginning of this step, x
(0)
2h , x
(0)
1h , x
(0)
2l and x
(0)
1l are defined by
x
(0)
2h = x
(0)
1h :=
α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t),
x
(0)
2l = x
(0)
1l := −
αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t).
After this round of elimination, x
(0)
2l < x
(1)
2l < x
(1)
2h < x
(0)
2h , x
(0)
1l < x
(1)
1l < x
(1)
1h < x
(0)
1h ,
x
(1)
1l < x
(1)
2l < x
(1)
1h = x
(1)
2h .
Define z∗(0) by
z∗(0)
2
γ
ωα
η = Φ(
θ
(0)
2h − p˜
σp
)− t.
For the large trader, {(z, 1)|z /∈ [−z∗(0), z∗(0)]} are dominated by (0,0).
......
Until
Φ(
θn
∗−1
2h − p˜
σp
)− t ≥ 0,
Φ(
θn
∗
2h − p˜
σp
)− t < 0.
This n∗ must exist.For the large trader, {(z, 1)|z 6= 0} and (0,1) are dominated by
(0,0), and the only strategy surviving n∗ rounds of elimination is (0,0).
For small traders,
lim
n→∞
x
(n)
1l = x
∗, lim
n→∞
x
(n)
1h = x
∗.
5. p˜ = p3.
1st step:
For the large trader, {(z, 0)|z 6= 0} and {(z, 1)|z 6= 0} are dominated by (0,0).
For any small trader, {(x1, x2|x1, x2 /∈ [−αpαx p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t), α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t)]} are
eliminated.
2nd step:
At the beginning of this step, x
(0)
2h , x
(0)
1h , x
(0)
2l and x
(0)
1l are defined by
x
(0)
2h = x
(0)
1h :=
α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t),
x
(0)
2l = x
(0)
1l := −
αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t).
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After this round of elimination, x
(0)
1l < x
(1)
1l < x
(1)
1h < x
(0)
1h .
......
Until
Φ(
θn
∗−1
1h − p˜
σp
)− t ≥ 0,
Φ(
θn
∗
1h − p˜
σp
)− t < 0.
This n∗ must exist.
For the large trader, (0,1) is dominated by (0,0), and the only strategy surviving n∗
rounds of elimination is (0,0).
For small traders,
lim
n→∞
x
(n)
1l = x
∗, lim
n→∞
x
(n)
1h = x
∗.
6. p˜ > p3.
1st step:
For the large trader, {(z, 0)|z 6= 0}, {(z, 1)|z 6= 0}, (0,1) are dominated by (0,0), since
Φ(1−p˜
σp
)− t < 0.
For any small trader, {(x1, x2|x1, x2 /∈ [−αpαx p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t), α
αx
− αp
αx
p˜−
√
α
αx
Φ−1(t)]} are
eliminated.
2nd step:
For small traders,
lim
n→∞
x
(n)
1l = x
∗, lim
n→∞
x
(n)
1h = x
∗.

4.3 Appendix of Chapter 3
4.3.1 Central Banks’ Asset Allocation Problem
In this appendix, we generalize our model in the main text such that the asset returns are
incorporated into consideration. Then from central banks’ perspective, different assets
denominated in the same foreign currency are with different returns and risks. Central
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banks’ problem is an asset allocation problem. The model in the main text is a degenerate
case that assumes away the assets’ returns.
The central bank decides the share of the asset j. The return rate of asset j is rj. Ω is
the covariance matrix of assets return rates, m is the expected return rates of assets. RL
is the growth rate of the value of the obligations using domestic currency as numeraire.
The value of the liquidity tranche after one period is
∑
j
LxLj(1 + rj) = L(1 +
∑
j
xLjrj).
The value of the investment tranche after one period is
∑
j
(A− L)xIj(1 + rj) = (A− L)(1 +
∑
j
xIjrj).
The goal for the liquidity tranche is to maximize the surplus under some risk budget
L
∑
j
xLjrj − LRL.
We have
V ar(
∑
j
xLjrj −RL) = 1
2
xᵀLΩxL −
∑
j
xjCov(rj, RL) + V ar(RL).
Thus the central bank’s optimization problem is
max
xL
1
2
xᵀLΩxL − γᵀxL − λLmᵀxL,
s.t. eᵀxL = 1, where γj = Cov(rj, RL).
The FOC implies
ΩxL − γ − λLm− µe = 0,
so we have
Ω−1(γ + λLm + µe) = xL,
eᵀΩ−1(γ + λLm + µe) = 1,
then
µ =
1− eᵀΩ−1(γ + λLm)
eᵀΩ−1e
,
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xL = Ω
−1(γ + λLm +
1− eᵀΩ−1(γ + λLm)
eᵀΩ−1e
e)
=
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+ λL(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e) + (Ω−1γ − e
ᵀΩ−1γ
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e),
where Ω
−1e
eᵀΩ−1e + (Ω
−1γ − eᵀΩ−1γ
eᵀΩ−1eΩ
−1e) is the minimum variance portfolio (λL = 0).
RL =
∑
i yiRi, γ =
∑
i yiγ
i, where γij = Cov(rj, Ri), namely,
γ =

Cov(r1, R1), Cov(r1, R2), ...
Cov(r2, R1), Cov(r2, R2), ...
...


y1
y2
...
 = Sy.
The model in the main context is a special case where S is the covariance matrix of
the currencies’ return rates,
γ =

Cov(R1, R1), Cov(R1, R2), ...
Cov(R2, R1), Cov(R2, R2), ...
...


y1
y2
...
 = Ωy.
The goal for the investment tranche is to maximize the returns under some risk budget.
It’s equivalent to maximize 1 +
∑
j xIjrj. The central bank’s optimization problem for
the investment tranche is
min
xI
1
2
xᵀIΩxI − λImᵀxI ,
s.t. eᵀxI = 1.
The solution is
xI =
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+ λI(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e).
If L ≥ A, the whole portfolio is the liquidity tranche x = xL. Otherwise
x =
LxL + (A− L)xI
A
= xI +
L
A
(xL − xI)
=
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+ λI(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)
+
L
A
(Ω−1γ − e
ᵀΩ−1γ
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e + (λL − λI)(Ω−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)).
The obligations of foreign currencies depend on the imports payment and short-term
external debt service,
Ly = aT + bD.
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The aggregate obligation and the size of the liquidity tranche are
L = eᵀLy = eᵀ(aT + bD),
y =
aT + bD
eᵀ(aT + bD)
,
l ∈

J1 if e
ᵀ(aTl + bDl) < Al;
J2 if e
ᵀ(aTl + bDl) ≥ Al.
The asset composition of central bank l ∈ J1 are,
x =
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+ λI(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e) +
1
A
(a(Ω−1ST− Ω
−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
eᵀΩ−1ST)
+b(Ω−1SD− Ω
−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
eᵀΩ−1SD)) +
1
A
(λL − λI)(Ω−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)eᵀ(aT + bD).
The asset composition of central bank l ∈ J2 are,
x =
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+ λL(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e) + (Ω−1Sy − e
ᵀΩ−1Sy
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)
=
Ω−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
+ λL(Ω
−1m− e
ᵀΩ−1m
eᵀΩ−1e
Ω−1e)
+(Ω−1S
aT + bD
eᵀ(aT + bD)
− Ω
−1e
eᵀΩ−1e
eᵀΩ−1S
aT + bD
eᵀ(aT + bD)
).
Aggregating the optimal choice of central banks l ∈ J1 and l ∈ J2, assuming each
central bank has the same λL, λI , a, b,
xaggregate(A,Ω,S,m,T,D, a, b, λI , λL) :=
∑
l∈J Alxl∑
l∈J Al
=
∑
l∈J Al
Ω−1l e
eᵀΩ−1l e∑
l∈J Al
+a
∑
l∈J1(Ω
−1
l SlTl − Ω
−1
l e
eᵀΩ−1l e
eᵀΩ−1l SlTl)∑
l∈J Al
+ b
∑
l∈J1(Ω
−1
l SlDl − Ω
−1
l e
eᵀΩ−1l e
eᵀΩ−1l SlDl)∑
l∈J Al
+
∑
l∈J2 Al(Ω
−1
l Sl
aTl+bDl
eᵀ(aTl+bDl)
− eᵀΩ−1l Sl
eᵀΩ−1l e
aTl+bDl
eᵀ(aTl+bDl)
Ω−1l e)∑
l∈J Al
+λI(
∑
l∈J1 Al(Ω
−1
l ml − e
ᵀΩ−1l ml
eᵀΩ−1l e
Ω−1l e)∑
l∈J Al
−
∑
l∈J1(Ω
−1
l ml − e
ᵀΩ−1l ml
eᵀΩ−1l e
Ω−1l e)e
ᵀ(aTl + bDl)∑
l∈J Al
)
+λL(
∑
l∈J1(Ω
−1
l ml − e
ᵀΩ−1l ml
eᵀΩ−1l e
Ω−1l e)e
ᵀ(aTl + bDl)∑
l∈J Al
+
∑
l∈J2 Al(Ω
−1
l ml − e
ᵀΩ−1l ml
eᵀΩ−1l e
Ω−1l e)∑
l∈J Al
).
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As we don’t observe the asset composition, I transform the asset composition into the
observable currency composition. Define the assets denomination matrix M, Mij = 1 iff
asset j is denominated in currency i. Then Mxaggregate is the currency composition of
central banks’ aggregate foreign exchange reserves.
Define Λt := (At,Ωt,St,mt,Tt,Dt). Assuming xit, the share of currency i in devel-
oping countries’ foreign exchange reserves in quarter t satisfies
xit = ci + βx(Mx(Λt, a, b, λI , λL)aggregate)i + εit.
Then we can use similar moment conditions as in the main text to get the GMM
estimator. The estimation procedure is basically the same as what we did in the main
text.
We can extend this model and do the estimation for the case that the assets choice
set of the liquidity tranche is restricted to only include the short-dated securities such
as T-bills, time deposits, etc.; while the investment tranche also includes the long-term
securities, equities, etc.
4.3.2 Estimation of the Asymptotic Variance
Under a set of regularity conditions,4
√
n(θˆ − θ) d−→ N
(
0, (Gᵀ0W0G0)
−1Gᵀ0W0S0W0G0(G
ᵀ
0W0G0)
−1
)
,
where
G0 = E[
∂hi(xt,Λt, θ)
∂θᵀ
],
S0 = E[hi(xt,Λt, θ)hi(xt,Λt, θ)
ᵀ],
W0 = plimWn.
4Note the sample moments are not differentiable at (a, b) due to the kinks where eᵀ(aTlt+bDlt) = Al
for some l, t. To be more specific about the kinks, on one side, the change of (a, b) affects the currency
composition of the liquidity tranche, and it also has the size effect as the relative size of the liquidity
tranche to the investment tranche for central bank l in period t changes; one the other side, as the whole
portfolio of central bank l in period t is the liquidity tranche, the size effect goes away. So we are faced
with a GMM with nonsmooth moments. The regularity conditions under which the consistency and
asymptotic normality can be established can be seen at Newey and McFadden (1994).
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G0,S0 can be estimated by Gˆ, Sˆ, where
Gˆ =
1
n
∑
it
∂hi(xt,Λt, θˆ)
∂θᵀ
,
Sˆ =
1
n
∑
it
hi(xt,Λt, θˆ)hi(xt,Λt, θˆ)
ᵀ.
W0 is estimated by Wn we calculate in the main text.
5
∂hi(xt,Λt, θˆ)
∂a
=
(
ui(Λt, a, b)−u¯i(Λt, a, b), 1
)
β(−(ui2−u¯i2)−(ui4−u¯i4)−(λL−λI)(ui7−u¯i7)),
∂hi(xt,Λt, θˆ)
∂b
=
(
ui(Λt, a, b)−u¯i(Λt, a, b), 1
)
β(−(ui3−u¯i3)−(ui5−u¯i5)−(λL−λI)(ui8−u¯i8)),
∂hi(xt,Λt, θˆ)
∂β
=
(
ui(Λt, a, b)− u¯i(Λt, a, b), 1
)
(1, a, b, a, b, λI , (λL − λI)a, (λL − λI)b, λL)(ui(Λt, a, b)− u¯i(Λt, a, b)),
∂hi(xt,Λt, θˆ)
∂λI
=
(
ui(Λt, a, b)− u¯i(Λt, a, b), 1
)
(−β)(ui6− u¯i6−a(ui7− u¯i7)− b(ui8− u¯i8)),
∂hi(xt,Λt, θˆ)
∂λL
=
(
ui(Λt, a, b)− u¯i(Λt, a, b), 1
)
(−β)(a(ui7− u¯i7) + b(ui8− u¯i8) + ui9− u¯i9).
5If we estimate W0 using θˆ, then our estimate of W0 equals to Sˆ
−1, our estimate of the asymptotic
variance is (GˆᵀSˆ−1Gˆ)−1. The quantitative results are similar.
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